The case concerned whether the Quebec Bank of Toronto acquired title to an accommodation promissory note made by Weyand & Jung and given to Bacon & Co. for the purpose of reducing Bacon & Co.'s existing debt to the bank. The court assumed the note had been manually delivered to the bank's agent but held that delivery was conditional on the bank crediting the note or its proceeds against the debt; because that condition was never performed and the bank retained the original draft and note instead, no title passed. As the dispute was between the original parties and the bank was not a bona fide holder, it could not enforce the note against Hellman, the assignee of Bacon & Co. for creditors, and the lower court's dismissal of the bank's bill was affirmed.
The case concerned whether the United States could withhold payment to the Central Pacific Railroad Company for transportation services performed over sections of its rail lines that had not received federal construction aid, relying on section 2 of the Thurman Act of 1878. The railroad sued in the Court of Claims for compensation on its unaided mileage, the government demurred, and judgment was entered for the company; the United States appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1862 and 1864 statutes created a contract under which the government could retain compensation only for services on aided roads, and that the later Thurman Act must be read consistently with that limitation to avoid altering the original bargain. The Court reasoned that the statutory language referring to “compensation for services rendered for the government” had already been construed by prior decisions to cover only aided portions, and a broader reading would impair vested contractual rights.
The case involved a dispute over land conveyances and mortgages in Michigan, where plaintiff David Oliver transferred property via quitclaim deeds and bills of sale to defendant Cunningham in 1868 amid financial troubles and creditor pressures, allegedly to hold title in trust, pay debts, and reconvey surplus; this led to the Buffalo agreement selling portions to Haines, Ranney, and Robinson, with Hunt and Eschleman holding a mortgage interest. Oliver sued claiming the transfers created a trust violated by the defendants and that Hunt and Eschleman were partners in the resulting firm. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decree against Hunt and Eschleman, directing dismissal of the bill as to them, because the evidence showed no partnership or unauthorized actions by them, the assignment of mortgage interest caused no harm, and the Buffalo agreement had been performed to Oliver's benefit with lands reconveyed or available.
The case concerned whether Du Pont's small steam-powered boat, used to transport himself, his superintendent, and occasionally workers across the Delaware River, was subject to federal inspection requirements under Title 52 of the Revised Statutes regulating steam vessels. Du Pont paid a $500 penalty under protest after the vessel was seized for operating without inspection papers and a licensed engineer and pilot, then sued the customs collector to recover the amount. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment for Du Pont, holding that the boat was a steam vessel navigating waters that are common highways of commerce and qualified as "other small craft of like character" under §4426, making it liable for inspection to ensure safety. The Court reasoned that the statutory language and purpose of protecting life and property from boiler explosions applied to this vessel despite its modest size and private use.
This case involved a challenge by the widow and heirs of Allison Nailor to four deeds he executed conveying real property in Washington, D.C., and Maryland to his mistress, Catharine Conley, and their two young children. The plaintiffs alleged the deeds were invalid due to the grantor's insanity, illegal consideration based on their concubinage, and undue influence or fraud by Conley. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree voiding the deeds and directed dismissal of the bill. The Court found the evidence showed Nailor was of sound mind when executing the deeds, that there was no proof of threats, persuasion, or other undue influence by Conley, and that the conveyances reflected Nailor's own long-held intention to provide for the children.
The case involved William J. Landram, collector of internal revenue for Kentucky's eighth district, who sued the United States in the Court of Claims to recover commissions of one-half of one percent on taxes collected from distilled spirits through the sale of tax-paid stamps during fiscal years 1879-1884, after the Treasury had denied the claims on top of his graduated salary. The lower court awarded him $4,724.78 (subject to the $4,500 annual net compensation cap), and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the 1879 act, by re-enacting without change the prior language of Revised Statutes § 3314, preserved the commission entitlement alongside the salary provisions in § 2 of the same act; applying the rule that statutes must be construed to give effect to all parts, the opinion concluded that Congress intended collectors to receive the commissions within the overall compensation limit. It rejected the argument that the salary provisions impliedly repealed the commission right, noting both the explicit re-enactment and a later 1880 confirmatory statute covering most of the period.
