James J. Brady

The case concerns a priority dispute over security interests in the Perkins Rowe mixed-use development in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, between ThornCo's construction liens arising from subcontractor work and KeyBank's mortgage obtained through assignment and consolidation of prior Wachovia and JTS mortgages. KeyBank sought summary judgment to establish that its consolidated mortgage ranks from the September 2005 recording of the Wachovia mortgage, while ThornCo argued its liens relate back to site work begun in 2003-2004 by earlier contractors. The court analyzed Louisiana statutes governing the ranking of privileges and mortgages, the validity of mortgage consolidations without novation, the effect of recorded "no work" affidavits under La. R.S. 9:4820(C), and whether preparatory work allows relation back under La. R.S. 9:4808(C). It addressed issues including potential fraud exceptions to affidavit reliance and the scope of separate works on different blocks of the property. The ruling resolves these competing motions for summary judgment on the relative priority of the interests.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by Bossier City Medical Suite, an outpatient abortion facility, to Louisiana's Act 490, which amended the Outpatient Abortion Facility Licensing Law to alter standards for license denial, suspension, revocation, and appeals, removing the prior 'substantial failure' requirement and changing review standards and remedies. The plaintiff alleged that the changes and their enforcement against another facility created a reasonable fear of arbitrary future action without notice or opportunity to cure, leading to constitutional violations. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), concluding that the claims did not establish jurisdiction or a viable cause of action.

abortionhealthcarecivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a teacher employed by the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the Board's policy of requiring drug and alcohol testing for any on-the-job injury violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged she was ordered to undergo testing after a student attack without any individualized suspicion of impairment, leading to emotional distress. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing lack of coerced consent, insufficient allegations against the superintendent, and qualified immunity. The court denied the motion, finding the complaint plausibly alleged coercion from the mandatory policy, personal involvement by the defendant, and that existing Fifth Circuit precedent clearly established the unconstitutionality of such suspicionless testing for teachers injured at work.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a Louisiana attorney suing a Texas attorney for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and related claims arising from an alleged 50/50 fee-sharing agreement and unpaid expenses in a joint Texas pharmaceutical lawsuit that settled without the plaintiff's knowledge. The defendant removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, but the plaintiff moved to remand, submitting an affidavit waiving any recovery exceeding $75,000. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that the jurisdictional amount was not apparent on the face of the petition and that the defendant's evidence concerning potential attorney's fees was too speculative to satisfy the preponderance standard.

procedure

In Williams v. Commissioner, taxpayers sued the IRS Commissioner after levies on their assets for alleged 1998 tax deficiencies, which they attributed to erroneous documents, seeking both a refund of over $250,000 and access to withheld records under FOIA. The court granted dismissal of the tax refund and wrongful levy claims because the plaintiffs had not filed a proper and timely administrative refund claim with the IRS as mandated by 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a), and the two-year limitations period from the levy date had passed. The court denied dismissal of the FOIA claim and granted leave to amend the petition to name the correct agency, citing the interests of justice in allowing correction of a pro se filing issue.

taxesprocedure

This case concerns plaintiffs' efforts to obtain Road Home Program benefits for a home they purchased after Hurricane Katrina, where their application was initially deemed eligible but later ruled ineligible due to ownership timing requirements, leading to an administrative appeal and eventual lawsuit against multiple defendants including in-state Quadel employees. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging improper handling of their application and moved to remand after the case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. The court denied the motion for remand, adopting the magistrate judge's findings after a summary inquiry that pierced the pleadings. The core reasoning was that plaintiffs lacked any reasonable basis for recovery against the non-diverse defendants, as evidence showed only potential negligence claims that were time-barred by prescription with no indication of knowledge or participation in any alleged bonus scheme.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between the Nineteenth Judicial District Court Building Commission and Level 3 Communications over delays and costs during construction of a new courthouse in Baton Rouge. The Building Commission sued Level 3 for negligence and damages after the company took three and a half months to relocate its fiber-optic cables from the project site in a public right-of-way, while Level 3 filed a counterclaim for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit and moved for summary judgment. Level 3 argued it had no duty to move the cables at its own expense because the permit from the City/Parish required relocation only upon written notice for street, sewer, or drainage projects, none of which applied here. The court examined the permit terms, the parties' statements of undisputed facts, Louisiana's dig law, potential trespass and detrimental reliance claims, and the duty/risk analysis for negligence to decide the motion.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves the State of Louisiana's claims against the vessel M/T KITION and related parties for damages to the Interstate 10 bridge after a collision in the Mississippi River. The DOTD asserted both in personam and in rem claims, seeking to arrest the vessel which had departed the district after initial repairs. The court denied the defendant's motion to strike or dismiss the in rem claim, permitting the state to perfect in rem jurisdiction through arrest or seizure until trial begins. It granted in part the state's cross-motion by requiring supplemental discovery on the vessel's location but denied the request for security posting due to the limitation of liability defense. The court also excluded certain NTSB, USCG reports, and a newspaper article as evidence.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the EEOC's lawsuit against Columbia Sussex Corp. alleging that it violated Title VII by terminating employee Richard Knight based on his sex and in retaliation for complaining about sex-based disparate treatment during a meeting with the general manager. Columbia Sussex sought summary judgment, contending that Knight was not similarly situated to a female manager who was retained, that Knight had performance issues leading to his termination, that his protected complaint occurred after the termination decision, and that the EEOC failed to engage in good faith conciliation. The court examined whether Knight could establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by comparing the circumstances of his termination to those of the female employee, reviewed evidence regarding performance and timing, addressed motions to strike declarations, and assessed the adequacy of the EEOC's conciliation efforts under the statute.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned plaintiff John T. Netherland's challenge to the City of Zachary's enforcement of Ordinance 59-93.2(a)(2) against his religious preaching on a public easement adjacent to a bar. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to Netherland because the city's actions constituted a content-based restriction on protected speech in a traditional public forum. Testimony showed that enforcement was driven by complaints about the religious content of his message, subjecting the restriction to strict scrutiny, which it did not satisfy. The court further found that the application violated Netherland's First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

B-Real appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of summary judgment in an adversary proceeding where the Rogers alleged that B-Real violated the FDCPA by filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts during their Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. The district court addressed whether the Bankruptcy Code and its claims procedures preclude FDCPA liability for such filings and whether filing a proof of claim on a prescribed debt can itself constitute an FDCPA violation. The court reviewed conflicting circuit precedent, noting the Seventh Circuit's allowance of overlapping FDCPA claims in Randolph v. IMBS but the Ninth Circuit's holding in Walls v. Wells Fargo that the Bankruptcy Code's remedial scheme governs and precludes separate FDCPA actions arising from bankruptcy filings. It concluded that the Code broadly permits filing proofs of claim even on unenforceable debts, with the debtor's remedy being an objection under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), rendering simultaneous FDCPA claims incompatible during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned parents of a minor child with autism who reached a confidential settlement agreement with the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board regarding special education services under the IDEA after filing a due process complaint but outside of a preliminary resolution meeting or mediation. The school board moved to dismiss the federal suit to enforce the agreement, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On reconsideration, the court granted the motion, reversing its prior denial of dismissal. It reasoned that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii) grants federal courts authority to enforce only those IDEA settlements reached during the statutory preliminary meeting or mediation, which did not occur here, and plaintiffs had not shown futility or other exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.

civil rightsprocedure

Charles David Whitehead filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his Louisiana state conviction for fourth-offense operating a vehicle while intoxicated, raising five claims that included challenges to the constitutionality of certain statutes authorizing arrests, the vagueness of the DWI statute, and the admissibility of lay opinion testimony and field sobriety test results. The district court conducted a de novo review of the record and the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, which analyzed the claims on the merits after finding them timely and exhausted. The court adopted the magistrate judge's findings that the state courts' resolutions were neither contrary to federal law nor unreasonable in light of the evidence, and accordingly dismissed the petition with prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves parents of an autistic child who alleged that the East Baton Rouge Parish School System failed to implement required individualized education plan services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), leading to complaints, mediation attempts, a due process hearing request, and a subsequent settlement agreement. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the parents had not exhausted IDEA's administrative remedies by obtaining a due process hearing decision. The court examined whether exhaustion was required or excused, specifically analyzing if the settlement arose from a statutory resolution session under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii), which would allow direct enforcement in federal district court, or if other bases like the agreement's terms conferred jurisdiction. It concluded that the settlement qualified under the resolution session provision, providing federal court enforceability without further administrative exhaustion.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Reginald Richard challenging his 2001 Louisiana state conviction and ten-year sentence (suspended with probation) for sexual battery of the infirm, entered via a nolo contendere plea. Richard raised claims that the plea lacked an adequate factual basis and was involuntary due to a later change in state law or ineffective assistance of counsel, along with errors in the trial court's pre-trial rulings on subpoenas and jury instructions. The court denied the petitioner's motion for injunctive relief and dismissed the habeas application, finding that certain claims were procedurally defaulted under independent and adequate state procedural rules, while the ineffective assistance claim failed because the petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice from counsel's performance. The magistrate judge's report and recommendation was adopted in full after no objections were filed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns an ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance plan sponsored by CF Industries and administered by Hartford Life, under which plaintiff Kelvin Schexnayder received benefits for two years after a back injury before Hartford terminated payments. After the initial 24-month period, the plan defined disability as the inability to perform any occupation for which the claimant was qualified by education, training, or experience; Hartford concluded based on medical reviews and a vocational assessment that Schexnayder could perform sedentary work and therefore was no longer disabled. Schexnayder sued seeking reinstatement of benefits, arguing that Hartford abused its discretion by disregarding evidence from his treating physicians showing he could not work full time. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment under the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable when a plan grants the administrator discretionary authority, evaluating whether the termination decision was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case arose from Barry Concrete's claim that aggregate purchased from Martin Marietta was contaminated with sugar during transport, causing concrete to fail to harden and resulting in $378,000 in damages; Martin Marietta then sought indemnity from trucker Wilson and its insurer Western World. Western World moved for summary judgment, arguing that its Cargo and Auto policies provided no coverage for the alleged contamination. The court granted the motion in part, finding that the Cargo Policy's packaging and contamination exclusions barred coverage because the aggregate qualified as cargo and the exclusions applied to the facts alleged. It denied summary judgment on the Auto Policy, holding that the pollution exclusion did not clearly apply to sugar contamination and that the completed-operations exclusion was inapplicable since the alleged mixing occurred during transport. The decision rested on standard principles of insurance-policy interpretation under Louisiana law and the absence of genuine factual disputes on the exclusion issues.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a personal injury suit filed by Angela Dowling against Georgia-Pacific after she fell from scaffolding at its plant while working as a KBR employee under a 1999 Cost-Plus Construction Agreement. Georgia-Pacific sought contractual defense and indemnity from KBR (and its insurer) for the claims and for its own third-party action against KBR, following a mediated settlement with Dowling. The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment and denied KBR's cross-motion, holding that the contract's defense and indemnity provisions (Articles 15 and 24) unambiguously required KBR to defend and indemnify Georgia-Pacific on both the main demand and the third-party demand without regard to fault allocation, which the settlement had made impossible. The ruling rested on the plain language of the agreement, which contained no precondition that Georgia-Pacific be free of fault.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerns plaintiff John Netherland, a Christian who preaches aloud in public areas, who was threatened with arrest by Zachary police under the city's disturbing the peace ordinance (Zachary Code Ordinance § 58-93.2) while speaking on a public easement near a bar; he sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement against his religious speech and a declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The court applied the four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief and examined whether the ordinance violated the First Amendment in a traditional public forum. It found a substantial likelihood that Netherland would succeed on the merits because the ordinance is content-based or, even if content-neutral, vague, overbroad, and not narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests, as it allows arbitrary enforcement based on subjective terms like "annoying" or "offensive."

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

In Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., a former employee filed a putative class action after personal data of approximately 17,000 current and former Pfizer employees was exposed when unauthorized file-sharing software on a company laptop allowed access to names, Social Security numbers, and other information. The plaintiff alleged violations of Louisiana’s Database Security Breach Notification Law, breach of a duty to protect private information, and a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy. The court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the complaint failed to state any plausible claim. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff had not alleged actual identity theft or cognizable damages, that the constitutional privacy provision applies only to government action, and that the claims did not meet the Twombly plausibility standard.

business & regulatorycivil rightstorts & liability