Stanley G. Feldman

This case arose from a bad faith lawsuit filed by excess insurer Twin City against primary insurer General Star, alleging that General Star wrongfully refused to settle a wrongful death claim within its $1 million policy limit, resulting in Twin City paying most of a $5.4 million settlement. The trial court compelled Twin City to produce documents and answer interrogatories about its counsel’s monitoring and evaluation of the underlying claim, ruling that Twin City had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege by filing the bad-faith action. The Arizona Supreme Court held that no waiver occurred under the principles announced in State Farm v. Lee, because Twin City’s claim rested solely on General Star’s conduct and did not place Twin City’s own reliance on counsel’s advice at issue. The court therefore vacated the discovery order as to privileged materials and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

proceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a multi-vehicle automobile accident in Arizona involving only California residents, after which the injured plaintiff filed a tort suit in Arizona superior court more than one year but less than two years after the collision. The trial court and court of appeals held that California's one-year statute of limitations barred the action, applying choice-of-law principles that gave greater weight to California's interest in protecting its residents from stale claims. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Arizona's two-year statute governs under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 142 because Arizona possesses substantial interests in regulating conduct on its highways, deterring wrongful acts within the state, and providing a forum for claims arising from in-state injuries. The court emphasized that these interests satisfy the Restatement test for applying the forum's limitations period even when all parties are non-residents.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a wrongful death action brought by Connie Wilmot, the surviving spouse of Milton Wilmot, under Arizona’s Wrongful Death Act on behalf of herself and the decedent’s six adult children from a prior marriage. After learning of the children, Wilmot and her counsel notified them of the suit but later settled with the defendants without their consent or further participation, leading the children to challenge the settlement as a breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court confirmed the settlement and denied the children’s motion to set it aside, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the statute requires the statutory plaintiff to act as a fiduciary for all beneficiaries and that a settlement terminating their claims cannot be reached without their consent or proper notice. The core reasoning was that damages under the statute are calculated individually for each beneficiary, so the plaintiff must protect all interests and cannot unilaterally dismiss their claims.

torts & liabilityprocedurefamily law

This case involved the estate of Norma McGill, a woman with a long history of psychiatric illness who died in 1997, suing her psychiatrist, primary care physician, and behavioral health provider for negligence, neglect, and abuse under both Arizona's Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) and Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court had dismissed or granted summary judgment on the APSA claims, ruling that medical negligence could not support an APSA action. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and held that an APSA damage action may be maintained for negligent medical care provided to a vulnerable or incapacitated adult when the negligent acts were undertaken because of the person's incapacity, were closely connected to the caregiver relationship, and related to the problems giving rise to the incapacity. The court reversed the summary judgment on the APSA claims against the psychiatrist and provider (while noting the claim against the primary care physician was weaker) and remanded for further proceedings under these standards, distinguishing the interplay with the MMA.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved abortion providers challenging Arizona's AHCCCS policy, which funded abortions for indigent women only when necessary to save the mother's life or in cases of rape or incest, but not when medically necessary to protect the mother's health from serious illness. The Arizona Supreme Court held that this selective funding violated the state constitution. The core reasoning was that once the state chooses to fund medically necessary abortions for one group of pregnant women, it cannot deny funding for another group for whom the procedure is also medically necessary to preserve health.

abortionhealthcare

In this case, a debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy, which was dismissed, after which her home was sold at a trustee's sale under a deed of trust for $10,304 despite an appraised value of at least $57,500. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court certified the question of whether a trustee's sale of real property can be set aside solely because the bid price was grossly inadequate. The Arizona Supreme Court answered yes, holding that such sales may be vacated on that basis alone. The court's reasoning centered on equitable principles drawn from the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3, which allow courts to consider gross inadequacy of price to prevent unfair results in non-judicial foreclosures, while balancing concerns for debtors and third-party purchasers.

property

The case involved Carolyn Peak, charged with first-degree murder in her husband's death; she was acquitted of first-degree murder and manslaughter but convicted of second-degree murder. The trial judge granted a new trial, finding the second-degree murder verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence and not supported beyond a reasonable doubt. Peak sought dismissal via special action, arguing that double jeopardy barred retrial due to the manslaughter acquittal and the nature of the evidence ruling. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the acquittal on manslaughter did not bar retrial for second-degree murder because the manslaughter statute requires proof of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, a distinct element not required for second-degree murder, but directed the trial court to clarify whether its ruling was based on evidentiary weight (permitting retrial) or insufficiency (barring retrial).

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the direct appeal of Antoin Jones, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and two counts of sexual assault of a minor, and sentenced to death on the murder charge plus other prison terms. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed claims that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant's post-Miranda statements to police and that Arizona's death penalty statute and procedures violated various state and federal constitutional provisions, including due process and protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the convictions and all non-capital sentences, holding that the statements were properly admitted and rejecting all constitutional challenges based on prior precedent. The death sentence itself was not affirmed in the disposition.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Doris Carlson's convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and burglary arising from the 1996 stabbing death of her mother-in-law, Mary Lynne Carlson, whom she and her husband sought to kill for financial gain from the victim's trust fund and annuities. The trial court sentenced Carlson to death on the murder count along with concurrent prison terms on the other charges. On automatic direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed all three convictions but reduced the death sentence. The majority's core reasoning was that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts and that claimed errors in jury selection and other trial procedures did not require reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved certified questions from a federal district court in Michael Evanchyk's habeas corpus petition challenging his Arizona convictions for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and second-degree murder arising from a fatal assault on an apartment resident. Evanchyk argued that Arizona law does not recognize conspiracy to commit first-degree murder when the murder conviction rests on a felony-murder theory rather than premeditation. The Arizona Supreme Court answered that a defendant cannot be convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder if the conviction is based solely on felony murder or on intent only to commit the underlying felony, but a conviction is possible if the state proves the defendant formed an intent to kill and agreed with others to do so, regardless of whether the completed murder or any other offense occurred. The court's reasoning centered on the distinct elements of conspiracy, which requires specific agreement and intent to commit the target crime of premeditated murder, separate from the elements of felony murder.

criminal law

The case involved Stanley Gunnell, an excavator injured when he cut into an unmarked underground high-voltage power line owned by Arizona Public Service Company (APS) while working on a sewer project; Gunnell had notified the Blue Stake Center as required by the Underground Facilities Act, but APS delayed marking its lines and one pipe was unmarked. The trial court granted summary judgment to APS on the basis that Gunnell violated the Act, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that comparative negligence principles govern claims under the Act when both the excavator and the utility owner are negligent. The core reasoning was that article XVIII, § 5 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits courts from treating contributory negligence as a complete bar as a matter of law and instead requires the jury to decide the facts and apply comparative fault.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dental malpractice claim by plaintiff Jimmye Walk against defendant Dr. Dale Ring, alleging that a full-mouth reconstruction performed starting in 1991 caused severe TMJ pain and related injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on statute of limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that factual issues existed for a jury regarding whether the discovery rule prevented the limitations period from running and whether the defendant's fiduciary relationship and alleged constructive fraud tolled the statute. The core reasoning was that, viewing facts favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant may have failed to disclose information about possible negligence despite a duty to do so, and the plaintiff may not have had sufficient notice to investigate earlier than two years before filing suit in 1997.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case involved Arizona bar disciplinary proceedings against lawyers Steven Feola and Richard Alcorn, who represented a doctor in a medical malpractice action. The lawyers entered into an agreement with plaintiffs for a sham trial that would result in dismissal after the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, without disclosing the arrangement to the court, in order to limit the doctor's financial exposure. A hearing officer recommended dismissing the charges for lack of clear and convincing evidence of ethical violations, but the Disciplinary Commission found violations of ER 8.4(c) and (d) and recommended a 30-day suspension. The Arizona Supreme Court, exercising sua sponte review, determined that the lawyers had violated ER 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal) as well as ER 8.4(c) and (d), and imposed a six-month suspension on each as the proportionate sanction.

proceduretorts & liability

This habeas corpus case concerned Kevin McDonald, who received a mandatory life sentence for aggravated assault committed while on probation. After the legislature eased such sentences, the Disproportionality Review Act allowed the Board of Executive Clemency to recommend commutation, which would take effect automatically if the governor did not reject it within 90 days. The Board unanimously recommended commuting McDonald’s sentence, but Governor Symington’s office sent an unsigned letter on plain paper purporting to deny the recommendation. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the denial was invalid because state law requires official acts to be signed by the governor and attested by the secretary of state, and no valid rejection occurred within the statutory period. As a result, the commutation became effective, and McDonald was ordered released.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a proposed class action by Arizona taxpayers, including the Estate of Helen Ladewig, seeking refunds of state income taxes paid on dividends from corporations whose business was primarily outside Arizona, on the ground that the state's deduction for dividends was limited to in-state corporations in violation of the Commerce Clause. The central issues were whether each putative class member had to file an individual administrative refund claim with the Arizona Department of Revenue to participate in the class action and exhaust remedies, and whether a representative administrative claim would toll the statute of limitations for all class members. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed lower court rulings that allowed class actions in tax court but required individual administrative claims, holding that the statutory claim-filing requirements must be met on an individual basis while addressing the tolling effect of a representative filing. The court's reasoning focused on the plain language of the refund claim statute, which mandates specific identification of each claimant, and the policy of providing the Department with adequate notice before litigation.

taxesprocedure

The case involved Timothy Stuart Ring's appeal from his convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses stemming from the 1994 robbery of a Wells Fargo armored van, during which the driver was killed, and his subsequent death sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the jury's guilty verdicts and the trial judge's imposition of the death penalty. The court found sufficient evidence based on witness statements, financial transactions by the defendants, and other investigative leads to support the convictions. Regarding sentencing, the court reasoned that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, which allows the judge to find aggravating factors, does not violate the Sixth Amendment, following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona.

criminal law

The case involved Arizona attorney William J. Walker, a sole practitioner, who touched a client and discussed a possible sexual relationship during representation in personal injury and other matters, leading to his arrest on charges of public sexual indecency and solicitation of prostitution; the client had recorded calls and terminated the representation. The Disciplinary Commission recommended a 90-day suspension for violating ethical rules, but the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the matter and instead imposed a censure. The court adopted the hearing officer's findings that the contact was consensual and stemmed from negligence or poor judgment rather than extortion, concluding that the violation of ER 1.7 (conflict of interest) did not warrant suspension under the circumstances, including Walker's unblemished record.

criminal lawprocedure

The case addressed whether a law firm retained by an insurer to defend its insured in a medical malpractice action could be held liable to the insurer for negligence that harmed only the insurer, not the insured client. The trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm, ruling that no attorney-client relationship existed with the insurer absent an express agreement. The court of appeals reversed, finding an implied dual representation relationship that created a duty of care to the insurer. The Arizona Supreme Court examined whether express consent is required to form such a relationship and held that an implied attorney-client relationship between assigned counsel and the insurer is possible depending on the facts, allowing a malpractice claim to proceed if the elements are met.

torts & liability

This case involved a declaratory judgment action over whether supplemental liability insurance purchased with a rental car covered damages from an accident caused by the renter driving under the influence. The insurer denied coverage based on a DUI exclusion in the rental agreement and policy, leading to a lawsuit by the accident victims' representatives after they obtained a judgment against the renter. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DUI exclusion was unenforceable under the reasonable expectations doctrine because the marketing materials did not disclose it, the full policy was unavailable to the renter, and the exclusion was not brought to the insured's attention. The court found no need to address public policy arguments regarding excess coverage limits. The decision vacated the lower court rulings in favor of the insurer.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this eminent domain case, the City of Phoenix condemned 1.4 acres from the Wilsons' 23.24-acre parcel for a fire station, and the dispute centered on the proper method for valuing the taken land and any resulting severance damages. The trial court permitted the landowners' expert to testify that a 5-acre corner portion including the taken land had a different highest and best use and higher value than the rest of the parcel based on market data and rezoning likelihood, which the jury accepted in awarding compensation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the property could not be valued by dividing it into hypothetical separate units. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial judgment, holding that the expert testimony was properly admitted because the Arizona Constitution requires just compensation and prior cases permit separate valuation when parts of the parcel have distinct highest and best uses.

property