The case concerned an application for a writ of mandate to force the Sonoma County board of supervisors to schedule a hearing on a petition to form a new county from territory within Sonoma County. The petition did not satisfy the 1909 statute's signature requirements and would reduce Sonoma County's area below the 1,200 square miles minimum set by both the 1907 and 1909 statutes. The court denied the writ and dismissed the proceeding, holding that the legislature possesses authority under the state constitution to enact general laws governing new county formation and to impose conditions such as the area limit. If that limit were invalid, the statutes as a whole would be void, leaving no valid procedure for creating new counties; either way, the petition could not proceed.
In Chester v. Carmichael, a Sacramento taxpayer sued to enjoin the city from accepting and performing under a deed conveying land for park purposes, claiming the deed's conditions created unconstitutional indebtedness. The deed required the city to make specified annual expenditures of at least $5,000 for improvements and driveways, maintain the property as a named park, and cover certain costs, with reversion to the grantors if conditions were breached; no voter approval was obtained and funds were to come from future revenues. The trial court sustained demurrers and entered judgment for the defendants. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that acceptance of the deed created a present liability exceeding the year's income and revenue in violation of Article XI, section 18 of the state constitution because the consideration was fully furnished at the time of the transaction. The court distinguished cases involving future services or materials, emphasizing that the fixed obligations here constituted immediate indebtedness without the required electoral assent or tax provisions.
This case involved shareholders petitioning for a writ of mandate to compel a dissolving corporation (formed by navy yard employees to run a ferry) and its directors to repurchase all 'excess stock' (shares held beyond ten per stockholder) from corporate assets at a fixed price before distributing the remaining funds pro rata among all stockholders. The superior court sustained a demurrer and denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the articles of incorporation and bylaws treated all shares as ordinary stock subject to an optional repurchase right designed solely to maintain equal voting voice among stockholders while the corporation operated as a going concern; with the business wound up, property sold, and dissolution imminent, no such obligation or authority existed to force repurchases that would alter asset distribution. The provisions did not create a loan or priority claim for excess stock in liquidation, and officers were not required to act under the circumstances.
This case involved a quo warranto action challenging whether the city of Sawtelle had validly consolidated with Los Angeles following a 1917 election. The trial court upheld the consolidation, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that no consolidation occurred. The core issue was the ballot used in Sawtelle, which stated only whether the cities should consolidate without mentioning the proposed assumption by Sawtelle property owners of a portion of Los Angeles's existing bonded indebtedness, a condition required by the governing 1913 statute as amended. The court reasoned that the statute mandated the full proposition, including the tax burden, to be submitted on the ballot in a manner that accurately reflected the question presented, and the substantial omission meant the electors never approved the consolidation terms.
The case involved a Mexican citizen living in California who was detained for failing to register under the state's 1921 Alien Poll Tax Law. The court held that the law could not be enforced because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The decision rested on the principle that the amendment applies to all persons within a state's jurisdiction, including aliens, and forbids laws that impose additional tax burdens on a class of inhabitants solely because of their alien status without a reasonable basis for the distinction. The court noted that the tax was enacted purely for revenue purposes and created an unequal burden not applied to citizens.
The case involved a habeas corpus petition by a Japanese subject held in custody for failing to register and pay California's alien poll tax of ten dollars, which applied only to non-citizen males and was enacted to comply with a state constitutional amendment. The court decided that the petitioner must be discharged because the complaint failed to state an offense, as the state law was ineffective against Japanese nationals. The core reasoning was that the 1911 treaty between the United States and Japan expressly barred either country from imposing on the other's subjects any charges or taxes other or higher than those paid by native citizens, that this poll tax violated that provision by taxing aliens alone, and that the treaty-making power of the federal government validly covered such protections against tax discrimination and controlled over conflicting state law.
