Rose Elizabeth Bird

The case involved George Lloyd Pool, who was arrested by Oakland police at a Safeway store after presenting a valid 1950-series $100 bill lacking the 'In God We Trust' motto, which store employees had been instructed to treat as a possible counterfeit despite no supporting basis. Pool sued Safeway for negligence in summoning police based on an erroneous suspicion and the City of Oakland for claims arising from his overnight detention on charges of interfering with an investigation, even after the bill's validity was quickly confirmed by phone. The court considered whether the evidence supported a negligence finding against Safeway and whether the trial court's jury instructions on reasonable cause for arrest required reversal of the verdict against Oakland. The analysis centered on the absence of probable cause or reasonable basis for treating the bill as suspicious, the limited scope of merchant detention statutes under Penal Code section 490.5, and the elements needed to establish reasonable cause for police action.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved a plaintiff who sued for damages arising from unlawful arrest and false imprisonment but refused to present any evidence during two court-ordered arbitration hearings under California's mandatory judicial arbitration program for smaller claims. After the arbitrator entered an award for the defendants despite the lack of evidence, the plaintiff requested a trial de novo, but the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, citing the plaintiff's willful nonparticipation as bordering on contempt. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority because neither the judicial arbitration statutes, related rules, nor Code of Civil Procedure section 581 expressly authorized dismissal for failure to present evidence at arbitration. The court further reasoned that the inherent discretionary power to dismiss applies only to lack of diligent prosecution after statutory minimum delays or to sham complaints, neither of which was present, and that the plaintiff retained the statutory right to a trial de novo following an arbitration award.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a libel lawsuit by two San Francisco police inspectors and a former prosecutor against the Hearst Corporation's San Francisco Examiner and two reporters, arising from 1976 articles that published allegations from a prisoner's affidavit claiming the officials had used threats, coercion, and other misconduct to obtain false testimony leading to a wrongful murder conviction. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $4.56 million, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. Applying the actual malice standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the California Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the record and concluded that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that the reporters knew the statements were false or published them with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. The court therefore held that the libel judgment violated First Amendment protections.

free speechtorts & liabilitycriminal law

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Youth Authority wards challenged the installation of a microphone in the Protestant chapel complex at the Karl Holton School, contending that the device would infringe on their religious freedom and privacy during worship, confessions, and counseling sessions. The court described the surveillance system's technical features, including its placement in the foyer with open doors to surrounding areas, noise-threshold activation connected to a central control room, and the authority's ability to disable it upon request, while noting the YA's stated security goals of detecting disturbances and gathering information. The opinion evaluated these measures against statutory protections like Penal Code section 636 on confidential communications and considered alternative security options such as personal staff beepers, ultimately addressing whether the monitoring violated the wards' rights.

religious libertycriminal lawcivil rights

CBS sought to inspect and copy applications and licenses for concealed weapons issued by the Los Angeles County Sheriff under the California Public Records Act to investigate possible abuses of discretion in their issuance. The trial court ordered disclosure of most current licenses with home addresses redacted but denied access to the applications. On appeal, the Supreme Court conducted an independent review and held that the records were not exempt from disclosure under the Act, noting that such information had been open to public inspection from 1957 to 1968, that no specific statutory exemption applied, and that the public interest in overseeing the permitting process outweighed privacy concerns, particularly given the pro forma nature of many applications.

gunscriminal law

The case concerned Ronald Jerome Smallwood's convictions for first degree murder with firearm use and robbery with firearm and great bodily injury enhancements, along with true findings on special circumstance allegations that the murder was intentional and for financial gain and was committed during a robbery; the trial court imposed a death sentence after the defendant waived a jury at the penalty phase. Smallwood appealed the convictions and sentence automatically and filed a consolidated habeas corpus petition, raising claims including error in the denial of his motion to sever the House and Dunbar murder counts and challenges to witness credibility based on post-trial recantations. The court reviewed the trial evidence, including testimony from witnesses Arthur Spencer and Kathy Hall linking Smallwood to the House shooting during an apparent robbery, noted Spencer's recantation of testimony followed by a recantation of the recantation due to safety concerns, and examined whether joinder of the counts was prejudicial under the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a defamation lawsuit brought by television documentary producer Walt Baker against the Los Angeles Herald Examiner and columnist Peter Bunzel over a review of Baker's program on sex education. The review included the statement, introduced by the phrase "My impression is," that Baker had directed his writer to add "titillating innuendo and as much bare flesh as we can get away with." The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the action, concluding that the statement was protected opinion rather than actionable fact. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statement constituted an alleged fact charging Baker with intentionally presenting pornography and was defamatory as a matter of law. The California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal's analysis was consistent with First Amendment principles distinguishing protected opinions from false statements of fact in libel cases.

free speechtorts & liability

The case involved parents seeking to file a late tort claim against a community college district after their son drowned during a sponsored biology field trip, where their attorney initially filed with the State Board of Control due to a mistaken belief about the employer's identity. The trial court denied their petition for relief from the 100-day Government Code claim presentation deadline under section 946.6, finding no excusable neglect. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the attorney's prompt investigation and filing error constituted excusable neglect under the remedial statute, the application was made within a reasonable time, and the defendant suffered no prejudice. The core reasoning emphasized the policy favoring resolution on the merits, construing relief provisions liberally, and resolving doubts in favor of granting relief when uncontradicted evidence supports it.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether a Court of Appeal properly overturned rape and false imprisonment convictions on grounds that the complainant's lack of measurable physical resistance rendered the evidence insufficient. The opinion reviewed detailed facts in which the complainant entered the defendant's home late at night to purchase marijuana, became trapped after the defendant grew angry and threatening, and ultimately submitted to intercourse amid repeated displays of force and statements inducing fear of bodily injury. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's findings of non-consent accomplished by force or fear under the governing statute, without any requirement that the complainant have resisted measurably. Its reasoning rested on the plain language of the rape statute, legislative elimination of a resistance element, and the recognition that victims may reasonably respond to threats by freezing or complying rather than fighting back.

criminal law

The case concerned whether California could constitutionally require applicants for driver's licenses to submit fingerprints under Vehicle Code section 12800(c), where the DMV collected and disseminated those prints to third parties for purposes beyond motor vehicle regulation. Plaintiff Perkey refused to provide a fingerprint during her license renewal despite meeting all other requirements, resulting in denial of her application, and she sought a writ of mandate arguing that the requirement violated her state constitutional right to privacy by conditioning a public benefit on waiver of that right. The court applied rational basis review, finding the right to drive is not fundamental and that the fingerprint mandate was reasonably related to the legitimate goal of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the state's identification system. The opinion emphasized that while internal use by the DMV for fraud prevention might be permissible, broad dissemination raised significant privacy concerns under the California Constitution.

civil rights

The case involved a child born in 1972 who sued medical providers in 1981 for injuries allegedly caused by negligence during birth, claiming that the cause was not discovered until 1980. The central issue was whether the applicable statute of limitations was Civil Code section 29, which incorporated a common-law delayed-discovery rule, or Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, the specific provision for medical malpractice actions. The trial court sustained a demurrer, holding that section 340.5 controlled and barred the action because it imposed a three-year limit (or until the plaintiff's eighth birthday) and eliminated open-ended discovery tolling. The core reasoning was that section 340.5, as amended in 1975, expressly governs malpractice claims with its own tolling rules for concealment and minority, thereby superseding the more general provisions of section 29 and its judicially adopted discovery doctrine.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

This case involved the criminal prosecution of Joseph and Dennis Figueroa for one count of selling unqualified securities under California's Corporate Securities Law after they issued promissory notes to investor Arlo Kurrle in exchange for funds intended for their insulation and solar energy businesses. The California Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the notes were securities as a matter of law and by mishandling the burden of proof on exemptions from qualification requirements. The court held that the jury instructions were improper and emphasized that securities determinations must examine the economic substance of the transaction rather than its form. Core reasoning focused on the Howey test factors, particularly whether profits were expected to come solely from the efforts of others, and noted that Kurrle's potential active role in the business could affect the analysis.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether medical residents (housestaff) in University of California residency programs qualify as "employees" under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA), entitling them to collective bargaining rights and payroll dues deductions. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) ruled that housestaff are employees under Government Code section 3562(f) because service components predominate over educational goals, and the University petitioned for review after ceasing dues deductions. The court examined the statutory text and legislative intent, comparing HEERA's professional employee definition to the federal National Labor Relations Act to determine whether the Act precludes housestaff from employee status.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case involved a class action antitrust lawsuit brought by the California Attorney General against Levi Strauss & Co. for alleged violations of the Cartwright Act through price maintenance on jeans sold in the early 1970s, resulting in a negotiated settlement providing cash refunds to consumers. The trial court approved the settlement over objections regarding unverified claims, minimal individual recoveries, and inadequate opportunities for class member participation. On appeal, the California Supreme Court declined to invalidate the six-year-old settlement as impractical due to the passage of time and shifts in the intervener's position, but addressed the distribution of a sizable unallocated residue of funds plus interest. The court emphasized the need for guidance on fluid recovery methods in consumer class actions consistent with state law and policy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the characterization of disability insurance benefits in a marital dissolution proceeding after 18 years of marriage. The policies had been purchased with community funds during the marriage, but the husband began receiving monthly benefits after separating due to his disability, with payments scheduled to continue and decrease at various ages until his death. The trial court treated the future benefits as the husband's separate property while ordering him to pay half as spousal support. The court held that such benefits are the separate property of the disabled spouse because they replace earnings that would have been separate property after separation, drawing an analogy to the rule for post-separation personal injury damages under Civil Code section 4800. The decision disapproved contrary lower court precedent and remanded for reconsideration of spousal support.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether an arbitration clause in a Kaiser health service agreement, covering claims "arising from rendition or failure to render services," applied to a patient's lawsuit against the hospital for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an orderly who allegedly sexually assaulted her during post-surgical recovery. The California Supreme Court held that the claims were not subject to arbitration and directed the superior court to hear the case instead. The court reasoned that arbitration agreements must be interpreted according to ordinary contract principles reflecting the parties' intent, with ambiguities construed against the drafter, and that the negligent employment claim was distinct from the provision of medical services even though a general policy favors arbitration. The decision balanced these interpretive rules against the broad language of the clause and the exemption of Kaiser's plan from certain statutory notice requirements.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a challenge to the City of San Diego's municipal code provision banning write-in voting in general and recall elections. Petitioners, a would-be write-in mayoral candidate and a voter, sought a writ of mandate to compel the city clerk to accept write-in candidacies and count such votes in the 1984 mayoral election, arguing the prohibition infringed on constitutional voting rights. Although the city later amended its rules to permit write-ins in primaries, the ban remained for general elections, and the Court of Appeal had upheld the restriction. The California Supreme Court analyzed the provision under strict scrutiny, finding that the ban imposed a real and appreciable impact on the electoral process by limiting voter choice and candidate access, and it was not narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests.

electionscivil rights

In People v. Fuentes, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder during an attempted robbery of a Brinks guard, attempted robbery, and automobile theft, with findings that he personally used a firearm and that the murder occurred in the course of the robbery attempt; the jury imposed a death sentence under the 1978 death penalty law. On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed claims that voir dire questioning was improperly limited and that the jury instructions on the special circumstance failed to require a finding of intent to kill. The court concluded that the special circumstance finding had to be set aside under controlling precedent because the instructions omitted the intent-to-kill requirement and no exception to reversal applied, which in turn required reversal of the death judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a mobilehome between T&O Mobile Homes, a dealer that purchased it as a bona fide buyer, and United California Bank, which held a security interest from the original owners. The bank had properly submitted documents to the DMV to perfect its lien under Vehicle Code section 6301, but the DMV erroneously issued a certificate of ownership that did not list the bank as legal owner. Relying on the clean certificate, T&O bought the mobilehome without knowledge of the lien; the trial court ruled that the bank's perfected security interest took priority. The Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding that under the Uniform Commercial Code and Vehicle Code, a security interest perfected by deposit with the DMV is effective against subsequent purchasers even if the certificate fails to disclose it, as the statutory scheme prioritizes the perfected interest over equitable claims based on the erroneous certificate.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to a San Francisco ordinance that required operators of escort services and their employees to obtain permits from the chief of police, pay annual license and investigation fees, and meet various application and operational requirements, including age restrictions and record-keeping. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was preempted by state law governing employment agencies and related business regulations. The court held that the ordinance was not preempted, reasoning that escort services do not qualify as employment agencies under the state's statutory definitions because they do not procure engagements in the manner covered by the Business and Professions Code, and that the local measure fell within the city's police power to address potential criminal activity such as prostitution. The decision affirmed the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement.

business & regulatorycriminal lawlabor & employment