David Josiah Brewer

The case involved a contract between William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. and the United States for construction of the ironclad vessel Alabama, authorized by acts of Congress. After the vessel's completion and payment of the contract price, the company sued in the Court of Claims for unliquidated damages arising from extra work caused by the United States, which that court quantified at $49,792.60. The Court of Claims had initially ruled for the government based on a prior decision involving a similar contract and release, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the release executed in 1901 included a proviso expressly excluding claims for unliquidated damages beyond the Secretary of the Navy's authority to adjudicate, unlike the broader release in the earlier case; the Tucker Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear and decide such claims. The Court therefore remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the company in that amount.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a citizen of the Choctaw Nation who had selected and received a certificate of allotment for forty acres of land and a patent executed by tribal authorities, but was denied delivery of the federal patent by the Secretary of the Interior due to prior recommendations regarding townsite additions. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia issued a writ of mandamus compelling delivery, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held that under the relevant acts of Congress, including the 1902 act governing allotments, the issuance of the allotment certificate without contest within the statutory nine-month period fixed the allottee's title absolutely, leaving the Secretary with only the ministerial duty to deliver the patent. Mandamus was deemed appropriate to enforce that duty, as the Secretary lacked discretion to withhold the patent once rights had vested.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a dispute between two similarly named corporations, Central Trust Company and Central Trust Company of Illinois, over which should receive mail addressed simply to "Central Trust Company, Chicago, Ill." The Postmaster General's First Assistant had directed delivery to the defendant under postal regulations for resolving name conflicts, and the complainant sought a court order to redirect the mail. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the Post Office order, holding that courts should not disturb administrative determinations on mail delivery absent a clear legal right or palpable error, as such matters involve discretion and practical factors like business volume and context rather than strict legal names alone. The Court emphasized deference to the Post Office Department's findings in administering its duties, consistent with precedents on judicial review of agency actions.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case Wagg v. Herbert involved a dispute over a deed to 55 acres of land in Oklahoma Territory, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant obtained the deed through fraud, oppression, and undue influence in settlement of a debt secured by a mortgage. The trial court and the Supreme Court of the Territory found the allegations supported by evidence and set aside the 1901 deed as void, treating it effectively as leaving the original mortgage in place and ordering an accounting. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that equity courts may look beyond the face of documents to the real facts when fraud is charged, that the evidence sustained the findings despite conflicts on property value, and that the suit was timely without laches barring it.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a federal grant of right of way to the Union Pacific Railroad through public lands in 1866 overrode the rights of a settler who had occupied the land under the homestead law. The Supreme Court affirmed the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in favor of the settler. The Court reasoned that 'public lands' refers to lands subject to sale or disposal under general laws, and a homesteader in actual occupation acquires an equity that Congress did not intend to deprive through the railroad grant. The grant takes effect from the date of the act prescribing the route, and precedents protect settlers' possessory claims.

propertyfederal power

The case concerned the tariff classification of imported sake for duty purposes under U.S. customs laws. The court affirmed the classification of sake by similitude to still wine, resulting in a lower duty rate than classification by similitude to distilled liquor. The core reasoning was that a consistent administrative practice since 1894, acquiesced in by the Treasury Department, had been effectively adopted by Congress through reenactment of the relevant tariff provisions in 1897 without change and by explicitly grouping sake with still wines in the 1909 tariff act.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case concerned whether a federal indictment for introducing liquor into the Yakima Indian Reservation charged a valid offense under U.S. law, specifically the act of January 30, 1897. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's ruling and upheld the indictment. The Court reasoned that the Yakima Reservation's boundaries were unaffected by allotments, which carried restrictions on alienation. It further held that the Washington enabling act preserved absolute federal jurisdiction and control over Indian lands, allowing Congress to prohibit liquor introduction on reservations regardless of the parties' race. This federal authority applied even after statehood, as the offense was not limited to crimes between Indians or between non-Indians.

criminal lawfederal power

The case concerned whether a federal court had jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian defendant for the murder of another Indian on the Tulalip Reservation in Washington, after both the defendant and victim had received land patents and U.S. citizenship. The Circuit Court had sustained the defendant's special plea in bar, dismissing the indictment, and the Supreme Court reviewed that ruling under the 1907 statute authorizing appeals from such decisions. The Court reversed, holding that the 1885 act making Indians committing murder on reservations subject to federal law and courts continued to apply. Its reasoning was that Congress alone controls the boundaries and status of reservations under the Constitution, that patented lands remained part of the reservation until Congress acted otherwise, and that the grant of citizenship did not clearly terminate federal jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes within reservation limits.

criminal lawfederal power

The case concerned the validity of a $2 per car terminal charge imposed by railroads for delivering livestock shipments to the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, with the Interstate Commerce Commission seeking to reduce it to no more than $1 per car. The court affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the charge. The core reasoning was that the terminal charge must be evaluated separately from through transportation rates, and the record showed it was reasonable based on the actual costs of service including trackage and unloading; if the aggregate rate was excessive, that should be addressed by challenging the prior transportation charges rather than the terminal fee, which carriers are entitled to impose if separately stated and justified.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a criminal prosecution under a federal customs statute prohibiting acts to deprive the United States of lawful duties on imported goods through false entries. The defendant, a government employee who assisted a consignee in making an entry but was not himself an owner, importer, consignee, or agent, was charged with violating the law. The trial court sustained a demurrer, holding that the statute's reference to "owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person" did not reach the defendant under the ejusdem generis canon of construction. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that Congress had deliberately added the phrase "or other person" in 1874 to broaden the statute's scope beyond the enumerated classes, and that applying ejusdem generis would render those words meaningless and defeat the legislative purpose. The Court concluded that the defendant's conduct fell within both the text and intent of the provision.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over whether railroads could charge shippers more than the actual added cost for the privilege of stopping hay shipments in transit at East St. Louis for inspection, unloading, and reconsignment, a service the Interstate Commerce Commission had found cost about $2 to $2.50 per car. The Commission ruled that carriers could charge only their actual costs for this service when offered to some shippers but not others in competing markets, leading to a lower court judgment in favor of the shipper for excess charges paid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a carrier providing such a non-mandatory privilege outside the core transportation service is entitled to reasonable compensation beyond mere cost, akin to charging profit on optional amenities. The Court remanded the case to the Commission for further investigation and report on a fair charge, noting inconsistencies in the Commission's prior rulings on similar facts.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerns an interstate boundary dispute between Washington and Oregon along the Columbia River near its mouth, focusing on the location of the dividing channel and ownership of islands such as Sand Island, Desdemona Sands, and Snag Island. On rehearing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior ruling that the boundary follows the north channel of the river around Sand Island and determined that Desdemona Sands and Snag Island fall within Oregon's territory under the description in Oregon's 1859 admission act. The reasoning relied on historical treaties fixing the middle of the river channel as the line, the principle that gradual changes from accretion or human improvements like jetties do not alter established boundaries, and interpretation of the statutory language referring to the middle or widest channel where divided by islands. The Court denied Washington's petition for rehearing and noted the concurrent jurisdiction provision in the admission acts but suggested the states consider a compact to resolve remaining issues.

federal powerproperty

The case concerned whether a Kentucky statute regulating the transportation and delivery of liquor could be applied to shipments from out of state without violating the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the statute, as applied to interstate shipments, was invalid because it directly regulated interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that liquor is an article of commerce, that the right to ship it across state lines falls under Congress's exclusive authority, and that transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee. It further noted that the Wilson Act did not authorize state regulation of goods while still in transit, and that state police powers must yield to federal supremacy in cases of conflict. The judgment of the Kentucky court was reversed.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus directing federal district judges in New York to dismiss or reopen involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against the New York Tunnel Company, a firm constructing a railroad tunnel between Manhattan and Brooklyn. The petitioner, who held a state-court judgment for wrongful death, contended that the bankruptcy petition was defective because it did not establish that the company's principal business fell within the categories (such as manufacturing or mercantile pursuits) required by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Supreme Court denied the writ. It reasoned that the district court had already resolved a question of fact or mixed fact and law in entering the adjudication, that the record did not demonstrate the evidence was insufficient, and that mandamus cannot serve as a substitute for appellate review by writ of error.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over title to a quarter-section of public land in Idaho between an individual claimant (White) seeking to enter it as a homestead and a group of settlers (represented by Whitcomb) attempting to secure it as a townsite after the Northern Pacific Railroad's right-of-way was clarified. The Land Department ruled in favor of the homestead claimant based on priority of settlement rights and equitable claims, and both the state trial court and Supreme Court of Idaho upheld that decision after finding a full hearing with no fraud. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Land Department's factual findings are conclusive on courts unless a clear mistake of law can be separated out, and that the record supported the agency's determination that the homestead claim had priority over the later townsite application.

propertyfederal power

This case concerned a dispute over the validity of a charitable bequest in a will for forming an institution under Ohio law, with challenges raised in New York courts regarding whether the bequest complied with Ohio's constitutional restrictions on special corporate acts. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the incorporation and distribution of the property. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, finding that the state courts had not questioned the validity of Ohio's constitution or denied it full faith and credit under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, but at most had engaged in construction of state law without raising a federal question.

propertyprocedurefederal power

The case concerned advances made by a railway company to a coal company to cover employee wages so that coal deliveries under an existing supply contract could continue without interruption. The court affirmed the judgment recognizing an equitable lien or pledge on the unmined coal in favor of the railway company. The core reasoning was that the advances were not independent loans but payments made in anticipation of coal delivery under the original contract; equity looks to substance rather than form, and a bankruptcy trustee takes the bankrupt's property subject to all existing legal and equitable obligations.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned two defendants convicted under a federal statute for harboring an alien prostitute within three years of her entry into the United States. The Supreme Court addressed whether Congress had constitutional authority to punish this conduct or whether jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the states. The Court ruled the statute unconstitutional, holding that the offense fell within the states' reserved police powers to regulate public morals and order. It reasoned that while Congress possesses broad authority over the admission, exclusion, and deportation of aliens, the Constitution does not delegate to the federal government general power to criminalize the harboring of prostitutes or similar local conduct, even when involving recent immigrants.

immigrationcriminal lawfederal power

In Keerl v. Montana, the defendant claimed that retrying him after the trial court discharged a deadlocked jury violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in double jeopardy. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Montana Supreme Court's ruling permitting the retrial. Drawing on United States v. Perez, the Court explained that judges may discharge a jury when manifest necessity exists, such as a reasonable probability that the jury cannot agree after extended deliberations of at least twenty-four hours, and that such a discharge does not bar further proceedings. The decision applied settled Fifth Amendment precedent to state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment without resolving whether the Fourteenth Amendment itself independently forbids double jeopardy.

criminal lawfederal power

The case concerned whether Oregon could prosecute and punish an individual for an act on the Columbia River that Washington had specifically authorized by license, given that Congress had granted the two states concurrent jurisdiction over the river as their shared boundary. The Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment upholding the conviction. It reasoned that while concurrent jurisdiction permits either state to prosecute offenses prohibited by both, it does not allow one state to enforce its prohibition against an act that the other state has affirmatively authorized when that act occurs within the territorial limits of the authorizing state. The Court limited its holding to the facts presented, distinguishing the situation from prosecutions for acts malum in se or those prohibited by both states separately.

criminal lawfederal power