Davenport v. Community Corrections of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-07-27 · cited 26×
This case concerned a negligence lawsuit brought by Eric Davenport against Community Corrections of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc., a private facility, after Davenport suffered severe injuries in a car accident caused by Fred Rutledge, a resident on a weekend pass who had a history of rule violations including failed drug and alcohol tests. The trial court found the facility 90% at fault and awarded damages, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that no duty existed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the statutes governing community corrections imposed no statutory duty on the facility to protect the public from offenders' conduct. It further held that no common law duty arose because the facility's alleged failure to notify the sentencing judge or revoke the pass constituted nonfeasance rather than misfeasance, and no special relationship created an obligation to control Rutledge's actions off-site.
criminal lawtorts & liability
Montanez v. People
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-06-29 · cited 12×
In Montanez v. People, the defendant was tried on charges including burglary, aggravated robbery, and crime of violence; the jury initially returned guilty verdicts on the first two but not guilty on the crime of violence charge, after which the trial court polled the jurors, accepted the verdicts, and discharged the jury. Minutes later, upon learning of a possible error on the crime of violence verdict form, the court recalled the jurors—who had begun to leave the courthouse—and, over objection, allowed them to deliberate again, resulting in a guilty verdict on that charge as well. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that once a jury has been formally discharged and dispersed beyond the court's control, it may not be recalled to amend its verdict due to the risk of outside influence and the need for verdict finality protected by double jeopardy principles. The Court reasoned that the jurors had separated sufficiently to create such a risk, distinguishing this from mere clerical corrections, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.
criminal lawprocedure
Board of Educ. of Jefferson Co. v. Wilder
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-06-29 · cited 29×
This case involved the dismissal of high school teacher Alfred Wilder by the Jefferson County School District Board of Education for showing an R-rated film containing nudity, sex, violence, and profanity to his senior logic and debate class without following the district's policy on controversial learning resources. The policy required teachers to provide written notice to the principal at least 20 working days in advance when planning to use such materials. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling that the dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, instead holding that the dismissal was permissible. The court reasoned that the film qualified as a controversial resource based on its content and rating, that Wilder had adequate notice of the policy through prior reprimands and a staff meeting on similar films, and that his failure to comply with the notification requirement justified termination.
labor & employmentfree speech
Van Steenhouse v. Jacor Broadcasting of Colorado, Inc.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-04-27 · cited 11×
The case concerned a radio talk show host's breach of contract claim against her broadcasting employer after the station replaced her program with Rush Limbaugh but continued paying her base salary without providing the agreed-upon on-air time. The trial court found a material breach and awarded the host the performance bonus she likely would have earned, while denying attorney fees to either party; the court of appeals affirmed the breach but granted fees to the employer on a wage claim that the host had dropped. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the breach ruling, holding that an employment agreement can imply an obligation to furnish work when the employee's material benefits, such as bonuses tied to performance or reputation, depend on it, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 433 cmt. c. It reversed the attorney fees award, concluding the employer was not a prevailing party under the wage statute because the claim was never formally dismissed.
labor & employment
Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority v. Centennial Express Airlines, Inc.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-04-13 · cited 23×
The case concerned whether the Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority could enforce a ban on scheduled passenger air carrier service at Centennial Airport, a facility designated as a general aviation reliever airport that had received federal grants. The Authority obtained a permanent injunction against Centennial Express Airlines, but the court of appeals reversed that ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision, thereby upholding the injunction. The court reasoned that planning documents at local, regional, and national levels designated the airport for non-commercial general aviation use, that federal grant assurances permitted limits on aeronautical uses to serve civil aviation needs, and that the airport lacked the facilities required for scheduled passenger operations.
business & regulatoryfederal power
City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-03-23 · cited 22×
The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Urban and Cynthia Sisneros against the City of Grand Junction after a hose fell from a city fire truck responding to an emergency call, allegedly causing personal injuries and vehicle damage when their car struck it. The trial court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) provided the city with tort immunity under the emergency vehicle exception. The court of appeals reversed, but the Colorado Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, holding that the defendants were immune because the fire truck qualified as an authorized emergency vehicle operating in compliance with the conditions in section 42-4-106(2) and (3). The court reasoned that the GIA's waiver of immunity for motor vehicle operations includes an exception granting immunity for such emergency responses to allow public entities to perform essential duties without the risk of unlimited liability.
torts & liabilityprocedure
People v. Dumas
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-03-02 · cited 25×
In People v. Dumas, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order suppressing evidence found in a checkbook during a consent search of the defendant's motel room. Officers received consent to search for drugs, contraband, and weapons based on an anonymous tip, discovered a shoebox with stamps and then a checkbook containing receipts and checks linked to forgery and theft, and later obtained incriminating statements from the defendant after her arrest on unrelated warrants. The trial court ruled the checkbook search exceeded the scope of consent because the officer was not specifically seeking the consented items when opening it. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the scope of consent is measured by objective reasonableness—what a typical person would understand—and that containers like a checkbook could hold the items sought, with any incriminating evidence also subject to seizure under the plain view doctrine.
criminal lawprocedure
Erickson v. People
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-01-20 · cited 35×
The case concerned whether a bill of particulars was adequate to provide notice in a prosecution for two counts of sexual assault on a child, where the information had been amended to allege abuse over a seven-year period rather than three months. The trial court granted the defendant's request for a bill of particulars, the prosecution responded with a narrative describing the types of acts, their frequency (approximately 30-40 times), and the victim's age ranges, and the jury convicted after receiving a modified unanimity instruction. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed as well, reasoning that the bill of particulars gave the defendant early notice of the full extent of the allegations and a description of the acts on which the prosecution would rely, thereby enabling preparation of a defense consistent with due process requirements.
criminal lawprocedure
Morrissey v. State
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1998-01-20 · cited 15×
This case involved challenges to Colorado's Amendment 12, a voter-initiated constitutional amendment that instructed state legislators and congressional representatives to support a specific term limits amendment to the U.S. Constitution and imposed ballot labels on candidates who did not comply. The Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 12 is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the amendment improperly interfered with the amendment process outlined in Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves to state legislatures the power to apply for a constitutional convention or ratify amendments without external coercion from the people via ballot designations. Drawing on precedents like U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton and Hawke v. Smith, the court concluded that states cannot direct or penalize legislators in fulfilling their federal constitutional duties under Article V.
electionsfederal power
Norton v. Gilman
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-11-24 · cited 20×
In Norton v. Gilman, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed whether the State must indemnify a county social services director and supervisors under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for costs and judgments arising from a former employee's age and sex discrimination lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, finding the county employees were not the State's "public employees," but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that county department employees are not "public employees" of the State for purposes of the Act. The Court applied the common-law test for employment, which centers on the right to control the details of performance, and determined that the county board primarily controls hiring, firing, salaries, and work details, while the State's role is limited to funding and oversight.
torts & liabilityprocedure
SAN MIGUEL CTY. BD. OF EQUAL. v. Telluride
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-10-27
The case concerned whether a county assessor could increase the 1994 property tax valuation of open space land owned by the Telluride Company after the company protested an initial lower valuation, with the increase intended to align with a prior Board of Assessment Appeals ruling on the 1993 valuation. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that assessors possess authority to raise valuations during the protest process. The court reasoned that this power is consistent with the Colorado Constitution's requirement for uniform taxation based on actual value and with statutes governing the assessment cycle and de novo review by the Board of Assessment Appeals, which permit adjustments supported by evidence or prior determinations.
taxespropertyprocedure
City of Westminster v. Brannan Sand & Gravel Co.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-06-30 · cited 7×
The case concerned whether a contractor, Brannan Sand & Gravel Co., could enforce a mechanic's lien against land that a developer had dedicated and that the City of Westminster had accepted for public streets and utilities after the developer went bankrupt without paying for the paving work. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the city. The court held that a common-law rule bars mechanic's liens on public property and that the statutory "relate back" provision in section 38-22-106(1) cannot be used to establish priority before the dedication and acceptance occurred, rendering the lien invalid.
property
Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Big O Tires, Inc.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-06-30 · cited 52×
The case involved a claim by Karen Thurman, an African-American employee at Big O Tires, that she was fired for time clock violations while a white colleague with similar violations was not. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission found discrimination, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that once a prima facie case of discrimination is shown and the employer's stated reasons are deemed pretextual, no further evidence is needed to infer intentional discrimination, reversing the appeals court and reinstating the Commission's order.
civil rightslabor & employment
Stepanek v. Delta County
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-06-23 · cited 19×
The case concerned whether a county attorney was absolutely immune from a request for attorney fees and sanctions after filing a petition for temporary guardianship of an at-risk adult based on facilitated communication allegations of sexual abuse that later proved unreliable. The district court granted absolute immunity, but the court of appeals and Supreme Court reviewed the application of section 13-17-102 and C.R.C.P. 11. The Supreme Court held that absolute immunity protects the county attorney from fees under section 13-17-102 because filing the petition was akin to a prosecutorial function, but does not shield against C.R.C.P. 11 sanctions. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for consideration of the sanctions issue.
procedurefamily lawcriminal law
Robert C. Ozer, PC v. Borquez
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-06-23 · cited 53×
The case involved an associate attorney who was terminated shortly after disclosing his sexual orientation and his partner's AIDS diagnosis to his employer, with the employer having shared that information with others in the firm. The employee sued for wrongful discharge under a state statute prohibiting termination based on lawful off-duty activities and a local anti-discrimination ordinance, as well as for invasion of privacy by unreasonable publicity given to private facts. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' affirmance of the wrongful discharge verdict, holding that the statute did not support the claim as presented. It affirmed recognition of the privacy tort claim but reversed the judgment because the trial court's jury instruction failed to properly define the public disclosure element. The court remanded for a new trial on the privacy claim.
labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability
Transamerica Premier Insurance Co. v. Brighton School District 27J
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-06-09 · cited 69×
This case involved a school district that sued its performance bond surety after a contractor was terminated from a school construction project for defective and incomplete work; the district sought payment on the bond and damages for the surety's alleged bad faith refusal to honor the claim. The trial court allowed a bad-faith tort claim to proceed alongside the contract claim, and the jury awarded damages on both. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Colorado recognizes a common-law bad-faith tort action against a commercial surety that fails to reasonably investigate and pay a performance-bond claim. The court reasoned that the suretyship agreement functions like an insurance contract by shifting the risk of default to the surety for the obligee's benefit, making the obligee analogous to a first-party insured and justifying the same implied duty of good faith recognized in insurance cases.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
People v. Altman
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-05-19 · cited 31×
In this case, Colorado state troopers stopped Damian Altman's vehicle for obstructed license plates and a cracked windshield, then observed him making furtive movements inside the car during a records check. After ordering him out, they searched under the seats and found controlled substances, leading to his arrest and charges for possession. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding the troopers lacked subjective safety concerns that would justify a protective search under Terry v. Ohio standards. On interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was objectively reasonable because Altman's bending motions provided specific and articulable facts suggesting he might be armed and dangerous, with the search limited to areas within his reach. The ruling emphasized that objective reasonableness, not the officers' subjective intent, controls the Fourth Amendment analysis.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Juvenile Court, City & County of Denver
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-05-19 · cited 8×
This case involved an original proceeding in which the prosecution sought relief from a juvenile court order denying admission of multiple hearsay statements by a thirteen-year-old alleged sexual assault victim under section 13-25-129. The juvenile court had ruled the statements inadmissible because the victim did not testify at the pretrial hearing and no corroborative evidence was presented, finding the victim incompetent. The supreme court held that the statute's availability requirement was conditionally satisfied by the prosecution's representation that the victim would testify at trial, so the juvenile court erred by denying the motion on that basis without assessing the statements' reliability under the statute's first prong. The court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute and directed the juvenile court to evaluate reliability.
criminal lawprocedure
Christie v. Coors Transportation Co.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-03-31 · cited 51×
The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Richard Christie, who suffered a spinal injury while employed as a truck driver for Coors Transportation Company. After returning to work and later being terminated, Christie sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, which the administrative law judge denied based on a finding that he retained the ability to earn wages in certain jobs. The court of appeals affirmed, interpreting the PTD definition in section 8-40-201(16.5)(a) as limited to claimants unable to earn any wages and rejecting arguments that it should be read in conjunction with different standards in sections 8-43-303(3) and 8-46-101(1)(a). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial of benefits, holding that the statutes are to be applied separately according to their plain language and legislative history, and that this interpretation does not violate equal protection under the U.S. or Colorado Constitutions.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Archibold v. Public Utilities Commission
Supreme Court of Colorado · 1997-03-17 · cited 3×
The case involved former PUC officials who sought to challenge the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's approval of a settlement agreement with U.S. West resolving alleged violations of telecommunications service rules, under which U.S. West established a fund for public projects and agreed to reporting requirements. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court requesting declaratory and injunctive relief, later moving to amend it to seek mandamus and certiorari review under section 40-6-115, after the PUC denied their untimely request to intervene in the proceedings. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that section 40-6-115 provides the exclusive procedure for district court review of PUC decisions, requiring a timely application for a writ of certiorari within thirty days of the final agency decision on April 5, 1995, which the plaintiffs missed by filing months later; it further noted that the plaintiffs lacked standing as non-parties to the PUC proceedings. The core reasoning rested on the statutory limits on judicial review of administrative orders and the requirement that all issues be resolved for a decision to become final.
business & regulatoryprocedure