William J. Sullivan

The case involved a class action by state employee Ronald Gold against former Governor John Rowland, the state of Connecticut, and several Anthem insurance entities, alleging that the state improperly received approximately 1.6 million shares of Anthem stock issued during a 2001 demutualization that should have been distributed to the plaintiff and other state employees covered under a group health policy. The trial court dismissed most claims against the state on sovereign immunity grounds but allowed constitutional claims for an unconstitutional taking and due process violations under the Connecticut constitution, as well as interpleader claims, to proceed. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the denial of dismissal for the constitutional claims, holding that they were barred, determined that the insurance defendants lacked standing for their cross-appeal, and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's constructive and resulting trust claims. The core reasoning centered on the application of sovereign immunity to bar constitutional claims seeking recovery of the stock from the state and the lack of a colorable basis for trust remedies against the state.

propertycivil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to the South Windsor Planning and Zoning Commission's approval of a site plan for a retail and office development on property owned by Evergreen Walk, LLC, which relied in part on access easements over town land and on a previously approved general plan of development. The plaintiff, an adjacent property owner, appealed to the trial court, claiming the approval was invalid because the easements had not yet been granted (and were later ruled invalid) and because the general plan approval itself was unlawful. The trial court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the plaintiff was aggrieved but that the approval was valid. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that the plaintiff was aggrieved and that the lack of granted easements at the time of approval did not invalidate it, but reversed the judgment because the commission's prior approval of the general plan of development was unlawful and could not support the site plan.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved plaintiffs who intervened in proceedings before the Inland Wetlands Commission of Orange and appealed its decision granting Stew Leonard's a permit to develop a commercial site including a dairy store and related facilities on property containing regulated wetlands. The trial court denied the appeal, finding the commission's decision supported by substantial evidence despite conditions requiring additional post-decision submissions. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision lacked substantial evidence because the commission had not determined compliance with state erosion control regulations and other requirements before granting the permit. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs had standing as intervenors under section 22a-19 and that the trial court's judgment was appealable despite remand orders for further proceedings. The core reasoning focused on the statutory requirement that permit conditions cannot substitute for the commission's initial finding of compliance with wetlands protections.

environmentpropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a taxpayer's challenge to the Town of South Windsor's grant of easements over parcels of land it received from the state to a private developer for a commercial project, alleging that the conveyance violated procedural requirements in the town charter such as public hearings and referendums. The trial court issued a declaratory ruling that the initial easement was void but then dismissed the complaint as moot after the town and developer entered a new agreement concerning use of the property. On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal, concluding that the action was not moot and that the subsequent agreement constituted a conveyance of real property interests that triggered the charter's procedural mandates.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a workplace injury claim by Marcin Mazurek against Handy Rent-All Center and Sperry Rail Service after he fell from mobile scaffolding rented by his employer's client, Sperry, from Handy; the complaint alleged negligence and recklessness for failure to warn about using ladders on the scaffolding, among other specifications. The trial court granted summary judgment to Handy on the ground that it owed no duty to the plaintiff and partial summary judgment to Sperry on control-of-workplace issues. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for Handy, reasoning that any potential duty was satisfied by warnings and that product liability act exclusivity provisions barred the negligence claims, while also dismissing the appeal as to Sperry because a partial summary judgment that does not dispose of an entire count is not a final judgment for appellate purposes.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a Connecticut worker injured while descending into the hold of a ship docked in New Haven harbor who sought workers' compensation benefits under both the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the state Workers' Compensation Act. The compensation commissioner dismissed the state claim for lack of jurisdiction, and the review board affirmed, relying on precedent that injuries on navigable waters fall under exclusive federal authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state and federal governments have concurrent jurisdiction over the claim. The court reasoned that the employer and employee were locally based, the employment contract was performed partly within the state, and later federal case law had modified the strict rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction for certain maritime injuries occurring on a state's territorial waters.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of an Andy Warhol painting titled 'Red Elvis,' which the plaintiff had purchased in 1987 through an art dealer who later purported to sell it to the defendant in 2000 amid the plaintiff's divorce proceedings. The plaintiff sued the defendant for conversion, claiming the dealer lacked authority to sell the work. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendant qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course of business under General Statutes § 42a-2-403(2) because he purchased in good faith from a dealer in art without knowledge that the sale violated the plaintiff's rights and in accordance with customary practices in the trade.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether an indigent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel to pursue an appeal from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under General Statutes § 51-296(a). The defendant had been convicted after a nolo contendere plea and later filed a pro se motion alleging his sentence was imposed in violation of his rights; the trial court denied the motion and refused to appoint appellate counsel. The court held that the statute requires appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant both to evaluate whether a legitimate basis exists for filing such a motion and, if so, to represent the defendant in filing the motion and in any direct appeal from its denial. The reasoning centered on statutory interpretation, concluding that a motion to correct an illegal sentence and its appeal qualify as part of a "criminal action" because they directly challenge the legality of the sentencing proceeding before the sentencing court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Harold W. Mead, who was convicted in 1972 of second-degree murders committed in 1970 and sentenced to three concurrent life terms under then-existing law, which treated life imprisonment as lasting for the duration of natural life. After later statutes shifted Connecticut to indeterminate sentencing and then definite sentencing, Mead sought to have General Statutes § 53a-35b—which defines a life sentence as a definite term of sixty years—applied retroactively to recalculate his sentence with credits, potentially advancing his parole eligibility. The habeas court denied relief on summary judgment, concluding that the statute did not apply retroactively because it affected substantive rights and lacked any clear legislative expression of retroactive intent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that statutes altering substantive sentencing rights are presumed to operate only prospectively under General Statutes § 55-3 and that no contrary intent appeared in the text or history of § 53a-35b.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Connecticut resident who sued a New York-based certified public accountant and his firm for professional malpractice and breach of contract, alleging improper preparation of the plaintiff's New York state income tax returns that resulted in additional tax assessments, penalties, and interest. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Connecticut's long-arm statutes applicable to individuals and foreign corporations. The trial court granted the motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendants lacked sufficient contacts with Connecticut because all services were performed in New York, they derived only minimal revenue from Connecticut clients, did not solicit business in the state, and had not transacted business there without authorization.

proceduretorts & liabilitytaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a challenge to a zoning board's grant of a variance allowing M & E Construction to reconfigure three lots into two, despite a utility easement that prevented one proposed lot from meeting the town's 150-foot square minimum area requirement in an R-40 residential zone. The trial court upheld the variance, but the Appellate Court reversed, finding the hardship was merely financial. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding that the variance was properly granted because the easement created an unusual hardship beyond the owner's control by rendering the lot nonconforming, consistent with precedent on condemnations that affect zoning compliance, and the variance would not undermine the town's zoning plan given the original subdivision's density allowances.

property

The case involved owners of restaurants and cafés challenging a Connecticut law banning smoking in those establishments but exempting casinos and most private clubs, claiming it violated equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed, first holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide required notice to interested parties in the declaratory judgment action. On the merits, the court concluded that the legislative classification was rationally related to legitimate public health goals and practical enforcement considerations, such as tribal sovereignty issues at casinos, and thus did not violate equal protection. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved the dissolution of the marriage between Victoria Wood Friezo and David Friezo, centering on the enforceability of their prenuptial agreement and the resulting financial orders for property distribution. The trial court had found the agreement unenforceable and issued orders presuming an equal division of marital assets. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable under applicable standards. The court's reasoning focused on the circumstances of the agreement's execution, including the parties' relationship, the plaintiff's awareness, and compliance with statutory requirements for validity, which required financial orders to follow the agreement's terms rather than equitable distribution principles.

family lawproperty

This case concerned a post-divorce motion to modify child support payments, in which the trial court increased the defendant's obligation after imputing investment income to him at a 2.96 percent rate based on five-year Treasury bills rather than his actual lower returns from investment accounts. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that imputation required proof that the defendant had unreasonably or deliberately depressed his income or used an unreasonable investment strategy. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court's order, concluding that under the applicable standard a court may impute an ordinary rate of return on investment assets without first requiring evidence of evasion or unreasonableness, provided the obligor offers no justification for earning below that rate.

family law

The petitioner, a Nigerian citizen and lawful permanent resident, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his prior state convictions for credit card fraud and larceny on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise on immigration consequences that led to removal proceedings. The habeas court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the petitioner was not in state custody under General Statutes § 52-466 because his sentences had fully expired and he was held by federal immigration authorities. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that collateral immigration consequences do not satisfy the custody requirement, that the petition could not be recharacterized as a writ of error coram nobis, and that no plain error occurred regarding judicial disqualification.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

This case is a zoning appeal in which plaintiff Thomas P. Clifford III challenged the Ansonia planning and zoning commission's approval of Complete Construction's site plan application to install bunkers for storing dynamite on a contractor's yard in a heavy industrial zone, without holding a public hearing. The trial court dismissed the appeal after denying the plaintiff's motions to introduce evidence of the commission's prior 1998 site plan approvals for the same property. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the denial of the motion to add the 1998 documents to the record was improper. The court addressed the commission's discretion regarding public hearings, the permitted-use status of explosive storage under the zoning ordinances, and the role of the additional evidence in the administrative appeal.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a town's zoning regulation allowing appeals from a planning and zoning commission's denial of a special exception application to the zoning board of appeals was authorized by state statute. The plaintiff bank had its application for land development denied by the commission, appealed that denial to both the Superior Court and the board under the local regulation, and sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was void because the denial was not an "enforcement action." The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and declared the regulation void. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the commission's denial constituted an enforcement action under General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1) since it applied established regulatory standards, and that municipalities have authority to provide for such intermediate appeals before Superior Court review.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Smith, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and risk of injury to a child arising from an alleged group assault on a 13-year-old runaway; he sought to introduce evidence of semen from third parties found on the victim to support his misidentification defense. The trial court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing and excluded the evidence under Connecticut’s rape shield statute, General Statutes § 54-86f. The Appellate Court reversed the sexual assault convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the defendant had sufficiently shown the relevance of the semen evidence. On the state’s certified appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that under the specific facts of the case the trial court should have admitted the evidence because the defendant met his burden to demonstrate its relevance to his defense without needing to show the state had introduced semen evidence first.

criminal lawprocedure

In Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., the plaintiff brought a product liability action against a ladder manufacturer and retailer after a ladder collapsed and caused him serious injuries while shopping at a Home Depot store; after the defendants destroyed the ladder before the plaintiff could inspect it, he amended his complaint to add a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence. The trial court struck the spoliation claim on the ground that Connecticut does not recognize such a tort and denied leave to add a related CUTPA claim. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed in part, holding that intentional spoliation of evidence is a cognizable independent tort when a party destroys evidence with the purpose of defeating a pending or potential civil action, because traditional remedies such as adverse inferences and discovery sanctions do not adequately protect the injured party's interest in pursuing the underlying claim. The court affirmed the denial of the CUTPA amendment as untimely and unsupported.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Damon Fagan's appeal from his jury convictions for criminal violation of a protective order, reckless driving, and attempt to elude a police officer, as well as the trial court's revocation of his probation from a prior conviction. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the protective order violation on the ground that he lacked intent because there was no proof he knew the protected person was home, the application of a sentence enhancement, and the probation revocation. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding that the jury could reasonably infer the required intent from the circumstances including the defendant's threatening call and his proximity to the victim's home, that the enhancement and revocation were properly imposed, and that the evidence supported all findings.

criminal law