Plaintiffs sued after their homes flooded repeatedly, alleging that defendant Goodkind's errors in a Flood Insurance Study prepared for FEMA led to homes being built 3.5 feet below the correct base flood elevation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 4001. Goodkind moved to dismiss the federal claims on the ground that the statute creates no private right of action. The court granted the motion, holding that Congress did not intend to imply a private cause of action under the National Flood Insurance Program and that allowing such suits would undermine the program's purposes. With the federal claims dismissed, the court remanded the cases to state court for lack of remaining jurisdiction.
The case concerned Fidel Vargas's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. After initially denying the motion, the court granted reconsideration but adhered to its prior ruling. The court rejected claims that the indictment was defective for not naming a specific co-conspirator, that the Sentencing Guidelines were ultra vires, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not interviewing government informants, finding no legal requirement for naming co-conspirators, no invalidity in the Guidelines, and no prejudice or unreasonable performance by counsel. The decision emphasized that strategic choices by counsel are not to be second-guessed absent clear evidence of deficiency or impact on the trial outcome.
The case was a diversity suit by Star Enterprise against SPI Petroleum for tortious interference with contract, after service station owners switched their gasoline supplier from Star to SPI; Star had also sued the owners for breach of contract, but those claims were stayed due to the owners' bankruptcy filing. The court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment without prejudice. The core reasoning was that the petroleum supply agreements contained no exclusivity provision requiring the owners to purchase fuel only from Star, there was no evidence that SPI caused any breach or the bankruptcy, and implying an unwritten exclusive dealing obligation would face significant hurdles including the parties' sophistication, the need for written terms, and potential antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason.
In Shendur v. United States, petitioner Harris Shendur filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction after trial for possessing three kilograms of heroin with intent to distribute, along with challenges to his ten-year sentence and $250,000 fine imposed in 1992. The court denied the petition in full. It found no ineffective assistance of counsel because claims regarding testimony, competency, and an entrapment defense were either raised or available at sentencing without a direct appeal having been pursued, and § 2255 cannot substitute for appeal. The fine was upheld as falling within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range with no showing of inability to pay. Finally, the court held that the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act provision allowing departures from mandatory minimums did not apply retroactively here, as there was no independent basis for resentencing and the petitioner had not provided complete information to the government as required.
In this case, North River Insurance Company moved for summary judgment seeking a declaratory ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Dutchess County under an insurance policy for claims of improper law enforcement conduct, including false arrest and imprisonment, in the underlying Fodelmesi v. Schepperly action. The court denied the motion, holding that it could not reliably determine whether an "occurrence" triggering coverage took place during the policy period beginning in 1986, because the underlying events began in 1984 and key facts about the county's conduct were unavailable without first resolving the merits of the underlying lawsuit. The court further reasoned that the insurer must cover defense costs unless the complaint clearly falls outside policy coverage, and that questions of allocation among other insurers were not properly before the court since they were not joined as parties.
Jose Medina filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1986 New York state convictions for murder and arson arising from a fatal building fire, along with his consecutive sentences. He raised multiple claims including ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate his mental capacity, double jeopardy from the consecutive sentences, insufficient evidence, denial of due process regarding a witness recantation, improper jury instructions on the burden of proof, and use of inflammatory evidence; he also sought appointment of counsel. The court denied the petition and the motion for counsel, determining that defense counsel had conducted a vigorous defense including cross-examination and expert testimony, that consecutive sentences were authorized for separate crimes with distinct elements, that the evidence supported the verdict and sentencing findings, that delayed recantations are viewed with suspicion, and that the actual jury instructions were correct. The court further noted that the petition's delay prejudiced the state's ability to respond and that no federal constitutional violation was shown.