The case involved the conviction of the appellant for knowingly making a false report on the condition of the Declo State Bank to the state commissioner pursuant to a required call for statements. The appellant challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including improper denial of a motion to quash the information, an invalid special plea of former acquittal based on a grand jury's failure to indict, and errors in jury instructions regarding the need for specific intent to deceive, reasonable doubt, and bank accounting details. The court rejected all assignments of error, holding that procedural requirements for the motion and plea were not met, that precedent established no specific deceptive intent was required for the offense, that the jury instructions were sufficient and correct, and that factual questions like overdrafts were properly for the jury, thereby upholding the judgment and sentence.
In this case, a stockholder sued the corporation to recover funds she paid to redeem its mining property from an execution sale, plus related expenses and attorneys' fees. The trial court ruled she could recover only $50 in attorneys' fees and directed return of the redemption money. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a stockholder may not redeem corporate property without first demanding that the corporation act to preserve its assets or showing such a demand would be useless, findings supported by the evidence here. Because the stockholder lacked authority to redeem, she had no basis to recover expenses or fees. The court affirmed the judgment as modified by striking the fee award and awarded costs to the corporation.
In Mathers v. Mathers, a wife who received community property but no alimony in a final divorce decree sought to modify the judgment for permanent alimony after the husband’s bankruptcy left her with nothing; the district court denied modification, prompting appeals over allowances for suit money, temporary alimony, and attorney’s fees. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the wife’s application for those allowances during the appeals. The court reasoned that the sole statutory authority, C.S. sec. 4642, permits such awards only while a divorce action is pending, but here the decree had become final before modification proceedings began and the parties were no longer married.
The case involved a suit by a doctor against the Al. G. Barnes Circus company for payment of medical services rendered to an injured employee and for assigned hospital bills. The company specially appeared to challenge service of summons and attachment but later took actions including filing an answer, stipulating to depositions, and appealing the probate court judgment to the district court on both law and fact. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that those actions amounted to a general appearance under Idaho statutes, which waived any defects in service and submitted the company to the court's jurisdiction; it also upheld the trial court's allowance of an amendment correcting the defendant's name in the complaint.
The case concerned a dispute over whether a party was entitled to statutory notice under C. S. sec. 6577 after her attorney ceased to act, in a civil proceeding where the opposing side obtained an ex parte judgment following the case being set for trial. The majority held that the statute did not apply because the party had personal knowledge of the attorney's withdrawal and the trial setting, so no formal notice was required. The dissent argues that this construction directly conflicts with the plain language of the statute, which mandates notice whenever an attorney dies, is removed, suspended, or ceases to act, without any exception for personal knowledge. The core reasoning is that the statute is unambiguous and must be applied as written to give it effect, rather than judicially adding exceptions that would render it meaningless, consistent with principles of statutory construction that prioritize the legislature's expressed intent.
This case concerned a dispute over Republican Party nomination for prosecuting attorney in Gooding County, Idaho, after Democrat M. F. Ryan received the Democratic nomination and also the highest number of write-in votes on the Republican primary ballot, leading the canvassing board to declare him the nominee for both parties. Plaintiff D. H. Sutphen, nominated by the Republican County Central Committee to fill an alleged vacancy, sued to compel the county auditor to file his certificate of nomination, arguing that Idaho's primary law created a closed primary that barred a non-member from becoming a party's nominee. The court held that Ryan's nomination did not create a vacancy on the Republican ticket and denied the writ of mandate. It reasoned that while the legislature intended a closed primary to give bona fide party members control over party affairs, the statutes contained no explicit prohibition against party voters nominating a non-member, and provisions applicable to primaries from general election law allow voters to support any candidate. The court distinguished contrary rulings from Nebraska and Ohio based on differences in statutory language and facts.