This case was an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction after appellant Breyer shot Oscar Taylor three times, claiming self-defense, insanity, and provocation based on his belief that Taylor had improper designs on his wife. The jury rejected these defenses, finding the killing deliberate and premeditated. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that although the trial judge improperly conducted an independent factual investigation when denying a change of venue, the affidavits did not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to require reversal, and other alleged errors regarding prosecutorial statements, admission of spousal res gestae statements, and certain evidence were either not properly preserved, not erroneous, or not prejudicial.
The case involved a claim by Myra Fisk for workers' compensation benefits following the death of her husband Arthur N. Fisk while hauling ties for the Bonner Tie Company. The Industrial Accident Board initially denied the claim, but the district court reversed and ordered compensation, leading to this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Fisk qualified as an employee of the company under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the company was the virtual proprietor of the business, and the hauling work was integral to its operations despite being performed through independent contractors. The court reasoned that the statute extends liability to such proprietors and that common-law independent contractor rules do not apply in this context.
This case involved a public administrator suing to cancel a warranty deed from an adjudicated incompetent (Henry Wing) to the defendant and a related mortgage back to Wing, along with damages for clouding title on real property that was already under contract for sale to third parties. The trial court canceled both instruments and awarded $250 in damages. On appeal, the court affirmed the cancellation, holding that the defendant fraudulently induced the deed from the incompetent with knowledge of the prior sale and escrow, and that an administrator is the proper party to quiet title or remove clouds on estate property; however, it reversed the damages award for lack of sufficient pleading or evidence regarding necessity and reasonableness. The court also rejected challenges to the complaint, the denial of a jury trial (as this was an equitable action), and other procedural claims.
The case concerned the proper valuation and taxation of a bank's capital stock in Latah County for 1921, after the county board of equalization adjusted the assessment and the district court further modified it based on market evidence. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the matter, holding that the statutory formula under C.S. § 3298 governs valuation by using paid-up capital plus surplus and undivided profits less expenses and taxes paid, rather than sales prices or other market data. The court further held that the 1919 statutes permit appeals from board of equalization decisions and require deduction of amounts invested in other assessed property before determining any taxable stock value. It directed the lower court to apply the statutory method to the bank's reported figures and the evidence of assessed investments.
The case involved a suit on a promissory note secured by a recorded chattel mortgage on personal property in Kootenai County, Idaho, along with a claim that certain defendants wrongfully removed and converted some of the mortgaged chattels. The plaintiff sought foreclosure of the remaining property in Kootenai County and recovery from the converters. The defendants, who resided in Lewis County, moved for a change of venue under the general statute requiring actions to be tried in the county of their residence. The court held that the specific statute governing foreclosure of chattel mortgages, which requires the action to be brought in the county where the property is situated, controls over the general venue rule, and that this rule extends to connected claims arising from the mortgage such as conversion. The order denying the change of venue was therefore affirmed.
This case involved a writ of review challenging district court orders in a pending divorce action between plaintiff Hay and defendant Josephine Hay, including an order directing plaintiff to pay $1,500 in attorney fees and suit money (with a provision allowing payment from funds previously deposited to defendant's credit in a bank), a restraining order on property, temporary child custody arrangements, and a subsequent contempt judgment against plaintiff for failing to comply with the payment order. The court granted the writ in part and annulled the suit money order and contempt judgment, while quashing the writ as to the restraining and custody orders. The core reasoning was that the suit money order exceeded the court's jurisdiction by attempting to redirect funds that undisputedly belonged to the defendant (with plaintiff retaining no control), making compliance impossible and rendering the contempt finding invalid as it rested on that order; the other orders were not subject to review in this proceeding.
