Robert F. Stephens

In Baker v. Commonwealth, the appellant was convicted of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and being a persistent felony offender after Lexington police officers, while patrolling a high-crime area, ordered him to remove his hands from his pockets, prompting him to discard a crack pipe and foil packet containing cocaine. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the officer's order amounted to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the seizure was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, as the late hour, high-crime location, appellant's presence with a known prostitute, baggy clothing, and refusal to comply with the initial request provided specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a need to ensure officer safety. Relying on Terry v. Ohio, the court determined that the evidence was not the fruit of an unlawful seizure and was therefore admissible.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case concerned a dispute over spousal maintenance awarded to Theresa Leveridge following her divorce from Phillip Leveridge after an 18.5-year marriage. The trial court granted Theresa maintenance for 12 years at decreasing rates, along with child support and attorney fees, based on her need for retraining and the income disparity between the parties. The Court of Appeals vacated the maintenance award as excessive, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion under KRS 403.200 and that appellate courts should not substitute their judgment for the trial court's when supported by substantial evidence.

family law

This case involved Ernest Rogers, who was convicted after a joint trial of murder, first-degree robbery, attempted murder, kidnapping, and attempted rape, and sentenced to death for the murder committed during the robbery. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for retrial, ruling that the admission of co-defendant Nakia Dillard's redacted videotaped statement violated Rogers' Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States because the redactions were insufficient to prevent clear implication of Rogers. The court further held that permitting the defendants to display their fingernails to the jury was error, as the evidence lacked relevance and could mislead the jury without any foundational showing. These evidentiary rulings formed the basis for reversal, with the opinion emphasizing constitutional protections against uncross-examined statements in joint trials.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 1994 natural gas explosion in Bowling Green, Kentucky, that destroyed four homes, damaged personal property, and injured two people, leading multiple plaintiffs to sue Atmos Energy (WKG) along with Bowling Green Municipal Utilities, Scotty's Contracting, and GRW Engineers for negligence and punitive damages. The trial court granted the plaintiffs a total of sixteen peremptory challenges and allowed the jury to award $450,000 in punitive damages against WKG only. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the extra peremptory challenges violated CR 47.03 because the plaintiffs lacked antagonistic interests and that the evidence was insufficient to support punitive damages. The Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed these rulings, focusing on whether the trial court's allocation of challenges was proper under the civil rule and whether the record supported submitting the punitive damages claim to the jury.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Kentucky still recognized a common-law cause of action for breach of promise to marry. Plaintiff Suzanne Barkes sued defendant Alvin Gilbert after their engagement ended, alleging she had relied on his promise by retiring early and moving in with him. The trial court dismissed the claim on summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reinstated it, and the Kentucky Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and abolished the action, holding that it was an outdated hybrid of contract and tort rooted in an era when marriage was treated primarily as an economic transaction and that the majority of states had already eliminated it by statute or judicial decision.

family lawtorts & liability

The case involved appellants challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky House Bill 250, a 1994 law enacting wide-ranging health care reforms including creation of a Health Policy Board, provider arbitration, certificate of need procedures, insurance reforms, and a provider tax. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Franklin Circuit Court's ruling that the bill was constitutional, rejecting nine separate challenges based on sections 59, 47, and 51 of the Kentucky Constitution, equal protection, separation of powers, privacy rights, the Open Meetings Act, and the federal supremacy clause. The court's reasoning centered on prior precedent upholding a similar provider tax, findings that the bill was not special legislation or an improper revenue measure, that no unconstitutional delegation of gubernatorial power occurred, and that procedural and substantive requirements were satisfied.

healthcaretaxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to the 1991 will of William McQuady, which reverted to the terms of his 1988 will by leaving personal property to Samuel Beavin and real property to Richard McQuady, after McQuady had briefly changed his will in 1989 to leave nearly everything to his housekeeper, Mary Ruth Bye. Bye sued the estate executor, alleging that the 1991 will was invalid due to undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, particularly in light of McQuady's prior limited guardianship and conservatorship, his Alzheimer's diagnosis, and the circumstances surrounding the will's execution. A jury upheld the 1991 will, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed as well, holding that a partial disability judgment does not remove testamentary capacity or create a presumption against it, that a limited conservator/guardian does not bear the burden to disprove undue influence, and that a sitting judge's subpoenaed character-witness testimony about the will's drafter was permissible and any error was harmless.

propertyprocedure

The case involved James H. Baker appealing his conviction and 20-year sentence for first-degree unlawful imprisonment enhanced by persistent felony offender status after being acquitted of kidnapping and sexual abuse charges arising from a 1996 incident with victim L.T. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that Baker's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was not preserved for review because he failed to renew his directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence and did not object to the jury instructions. The court further held that even on the merits the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of risk of serious physical injury through witness testimony, and that objections to the prosecutor's closing arguments were unpreserved due to lack of request for additional relief after the trial court's rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a Jefferson District Court judge in one division had authority to hold defendant Donna Brutley in contempt for nonpayment of a public defender fee imposed in a prior traffic case in a different division, and whether that judge was required to follow a Chief District Judge administrative order mandating continuances in cases of instant public defender appointments. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's affirmance of the thirty-day contempt sentence, holding that Supreme Court Rule 1.040(4)(c) requires supplemental proceedings such as contempt to be heard by the original judge or a successor judge absent good cause, and Judge Ray was not a successor. The Court further held that the Chief Judge's administrative order did not bind other district judges in their handling of cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This consolidated case involved three DUI prosecutions in which defendants challenged the admissibility of verbal field sobriety tests (such as reciting the alphabet or counting backwards) without Miranda warnings and argued that pretrial license suspensions under KRS 189A.200 constituted punishment that barred further prosecution or punishment under double-jeopardy principles. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the tests did not require Miranda warnings because the defendants were not in custody during routine traffic stops, applying the analysis from Berkemer v. McCarty and Pennsylvania v. Bruder, and reaffirmed that Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution provides the same protection against self-incrimination as the Fifth Amendment. It further held that the administrative license suspensions were not punitive and thus did not trigger double-jeopardy protections under either the state or federal constitutions. The Court affirmed the convictions in the Hourigan and Wylie matters and reversed the lower courts' suppression ruling in the Maguire matter.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the convictions of Peggy Ann Wolbrecht and Arthur Feakins for murder by complicity in the 1985 shooting death of Robert Wolbrecht in Henderson County, Kentucky, for which each received a 20-year sentence. The indictment initially charged the defendants with committing the murder by shooting the victim or by soliciting, aiding, or conspiring with others who did so, and a bill of particulars specified the location and that the planning occurred in Florida. Midway through trial, the court allowed the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to broaden the complicity theory by removing any requirement that one of the named defendants be the shooter, and it denied the defendants' request for a continuance to prepare a new defense. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the amendment prejudiced the defendants' substantial rights by changing the basis for liability without adequate notice or time to respond. The court held that this violated criminal procedure rules governing indictment amendments and that a sufficient continuance should have been granted to allow preparation for the altered charges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a non-owner operator of a motor vehicle could be criminally penalized under Kentucky law for driving an uninsured car. George Estes was cited and pled guilty under KRS 304.99-060 for operating a vehicle without insurance, though he was not the owner; the Nicholas Circuit Court reversed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reinstated it. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 1994 amendment to the penalty statute (KRS 304.99-060), which added "operator" language, could not create a substantive offense where the underlying requirement in KRS 304.39-080(5) applies only to owners. The court reasoned that criminal liability requires a clear statutory designation of the offense, that penalty provisions alone do not establish new crimes, and that the statutes as written failed to provide adequate notice to non-owners.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from the Madison Circuit Court's denial of a successive post-conviction motion under RCr 11.42 and a renewed request to stay execution in a capital case. The appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on an alleged conspiracy within the Department of Public Advocacy and renewed allegations of Brady violations involving withheld exculpatory evidence, while also asking the court to overrule Hicks v. Commonwealth. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief and denied the stay. It held that the claims were procedurally barred under RCr 11.42(3) because they could have been raised in the prior motion or were already litigated, that no actual denial of technical assistance or exculpatory evidence was shown, and that precedent on appellate ineffective-assistance claims would not be revisited.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by Circuit Judge Patricia M. Summe from a Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission decision finding her in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct based on two campaign items used in her 1994 election bid. Count I concerned a newsletter styled as the Kenton County Citizen's Courier that the Commission determined gave a false impression of being an independent publication rather than campaign material. Count II involved a letter from Mary Gregory that the Commission found constituted an improper pre-election commitment regarding probation in child abuse cases. The Commission imposed a 60-day suspension, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the violations of Canons 7B(1)(c), 1, and 2A, concluding the materials misrepresented facts and undermined public confidence in judicial impartiality. The court rejected the judge's arguments that the materials were clearly identified as campaign literature and that the statements were protected political speech.

electionsfree speech

This case arose after a car accident involving a vehicle that had passed through multiple commercial dealers and an uninsured buyer who never registered the title; injured parties sued prior dealers and their insurers, arguing that legal ownership and insurance responsibility had not transferred. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed summary judgment for the dealers and insurers, holding that title had passed under state law when the sellers completed and delivered the assigned certificate of title and related documents. The court relied on KRS 186A.215 and 186A.220, which provide that ownership transfers upon proper execution and delivery of the title assignment by the seller, with dealer-specific notice rules that had been satisfied here. It distinguished prior precedent and clarified that the duty to complete registration falls on the buyer, leaving liability with the last titled owner only if those steps were not followed.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved challenges to Kentucky's intangibles tax provisions, including a corporate shares tax under KRS 132.020 and an exemption statute under KRS 136.030(1) that favored corporations paying substantial taxes within the state, as well as a bank deposits tax under KRS 132.030. After the U.S. Supreme Court vacated an earlier decision and remanded in light of Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the corporate shares tax and exemption statute facially discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The court reasoned that the taxes were not valid compensatory measures under the three-prong test from Oregon Waste Systems because they imposed unequal burdens without proper justification or apportionment. The bank deposits tax was already deemed unconstitutional in the prior ruling. Taxpayers who paid the invalid taxes were entitled to refunds limited to two years before filing a refund application under KRS 134.590(2).

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute over ownership of mineral rights beneath a tract of land in Knox County, Kentucky, where the Slushers owned the surface rights, the Stewart heirs held record title to the severed mineral estate, and Great Western held mining leases from both parties. The Slushers sued to quiet title to the minerals based on adverse possession and sought royalties from Great Western. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Slushers could not acquire the mineral estate by adverse possession because, under KRS 381.430, a surface owner holds the minerals in trust for the record owner and must make an explicit, open repudiation of that trust to start the limitations period. The court also ruled that the attornment statute did not apply to bar Great Western from recognizing the Stewarts' superior title and that the champerty statute could not be used offensively by the Slushers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the reversal of the trial court's adverse-possession ruling and damages award while rejecting any need for remand.

property

The case involved homeowners who sued a garage construction company in Kentucky district court for breach of contract, negligence, and violations of building codes after the garage was completed, despite a forum selection clause in the pre-printed contract designating Illinois as the exclusive forum and governing law. Lower courts dismissed the action, applying precedent that such clauses are enforceable unless shown to be unfair or unreasonable. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the limited record prevented a proper determination of reasonableness under the factors from Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett and that the circuit court should have remanded for a factual hearing rather than affirming the dismissal.

procedure

In Reis v. Campbell County Board of Education, the case involved a school board's challenge to KRS 161.790(8), which allows tenured teachers to appeal a tribunal's decision on contract termination but is silent on a board's appeal rights; the board sought a declaratory judgment after a tribunal reinstated a teacher terminated for inefficiency. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the circuit court's dismissal, holding that the board has an inherent right to appeal the tribunal's decision. The court reasoned that boards of education qualify as protected entities under Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, which bars arbitrary power, that the tribunal is not the board's agent, and that precedent such as American Beauty Homes permits judicial review of administrative actions for arbitrariness even without explicit statutory language, rendering the statute constitutional as interpreted.

labor & employmentprocedurecivil rights

In Hedges v. Commonwealth, the appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary after entering his estranged wife's apartment with her permission under a Domestic Violence Emergency Protective Order (DVO) that barred violence or property damage but allowed contact; once inside, he damaged jointly owned items and grabbed her neck without causing injury. The trial court denied a directed verdict, the jury found him guilty (enhanced by a persistent felony offender charge), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that the elements of KRS 511.030 were not satisfied because the appellant lacked the requisite intent to commit an independent crime upon entry or while remaining, the facts did not establish an assault, and mere violation of the DVO without such intent could not support a burglary conviction. The core reasoning emphasized that burglary requires prior intent to commit a separate crime, not merely criminal conduct occurring on the premises after lawful entry.

criminal lawfamily lawproperty