This case involved a judicial discipline proceeding against Nebraska County Court Judge Kent E. Florom, who engaged in improper conduct by intervening in a misdemeanor theft case against a softball coach he knew, including discussing the case ex parte with prosecutors and attorneys, offering to pay restitution, suggesting ways to avoid public court appearance, and threatening a school board member with repercussions if action was taken against the coach. The Nebraska Supreme Court decided to remove Judge Florom from office. The court's reasoning centered on the judge's repeated violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, his disregard for ethical rules despite warnings from others including a fellow judge, and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary, as a suspension would be insufficient given the course of misconduct over time.
The case involved a juvenile adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation in a court-supervised drug treatment program; after she failed drug and alcohol tests and served short detentions as sanctions, the state moved to revoke her probation based on the same violations. The juvenile court dismissed the revocation motion, finding the prior detentions barred further sanctions, and the state appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that because the juvenile had already been placed legally in jeopardy through the delinquency proceedings and detentions, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01(2)(d) required the state to pursue an exception proceeding in the district court rather than a direct appeal. As the state failed to follow that procedure, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
The case involved William E. Smith’s appeal of his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver after police discovered pills during a pat-down at a nightclub entrance. Smith argued that the district court should have suppressed the evidence because the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, first determining that the search implicated the Fourth Amendment due to the involvement of an off-duty police officer. It then held the search reasonable because Smith had consented by approaching the entrance after seeing the posted notice and observing other patrons being patted down, and the officer’s actions did not exceed the scope of that consent.
This case involved a juvenile, Dakota M., adjudicated under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-247(1) and placed on probation with conditions including school attendance. After a school suspension, the juvenile court added a requirement that future suspensions be served in detention, which Dakota challenged for lack of statutory authority. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and vacated the detention order, holding that the juvenile code does not authorize confinement as a condition of probation. The court reasoned that its prior precedent in In re Interest of Dustin S. controlled, that the code's listed dispositions do not permit detention, and that § 29-2270 provides no additional authority for such an order regardless of whether the purpose was protection or punishment.
This case involved a juvenile, Tyler T., who had been adjudicated multiple times under Nebraska's juvenile code and placed on probation with a condition to complete a juvenile drug treatment court program. After he allegedly failed a drug test, the county court sitting as a juvenile court ordered him to serve one day in detention, prompting appeals claiming the sanction violated due process and exceeded statutory authority. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and vacated the detention orders in each case, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that meaningful de novo appellate review was impossible because no verbatim record existed of the June 23, 2009 hearing and the resulting order was not part of the court file. It noted that proceedings affecting a juvenile's liberty in problem-solving courts must be on the record to protect due process rights, while also referencing prior precedent that juvenile courts lack authority to impose detention as a probation sanction.
The case involved Lonnie Kocontes suing Sean McQuaid and Edward Bujanowski for libel per se after the defendants sent a letter to the Nebraska Board of Pardons opposing Kocontes' application to pardon his prior felony convictions; the letter contained statements alleging misconduct by Kocontes in Florida legal matters. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the Board of Pardons functions as a quasi-judicial body because it investigates facts, weighs evidence, and renders decisions on applications for clemency in a manner analogous to judicial proceedings. As a result, an absolute privilege protects communications made to the Board in connection with its proceedings from defamation claims, even if the statements are alleged to be false or made with malice. This privilege applies to encourage complete and candid submissions without fear of subsequent litigation.