This case concerns a cartoonist's effort to stop a newspaper company from publishing cartoons that used the names and grotesque figures of his well-known fictional characters "Mutt" and "Jeff." The plaintiff relied on equity jurisdiction to prevent unfair competition rather than copyright or trademark statutes. The court held that the characters and names had acquired substantial pecuniary value through the plaintiff's work and public recognition, making their unauthorized use by the defendant an appropriation of that value and likely to deceive the public into believing the cartoons originated with the plaintiff. It affirmed the lower court's injunction, reasoning that any civil right of pecuniary value qualifies as a property right entitled to equitable protection against unfair competition, and that this principle extends beyond the sale of ordinary goods to the publication of cartoons.
The case concerned New York's 1919 Income Tax Law, which imposed a tax on non-residents' net income from business, trade, or occupation carried on in the state, following a federal court ruling that the original statute unconstitutionally discriminated against non-residents by denying them the same personal exemptions granted to residents. The legislature amended the law in 1920 to remove the residency restriction on exemptions and reimpose the tax. Relator Stafford, a non-resident, challenged the tax assessment on his income from exporting cotton goods, arguing that orders secured by his foreign traveling salesmen were consummated outside New York and thus not taxable. The court held that the tax applies only to income derived from activities within the state and that sales consummated outside New York require apportionment based on the proportionate New York business activities of purchasing and forwarding the goods. It reversed the lower courts and remanded the matter to the comptroller for further findings on the location of sales consummation and any necessary adjustment to the tax amount.
This case involved a negligence action for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff's motorcycle collided with the defendant's automobile at the entrance to a privately owned but publicly used driveway adjacent to a railroad depot. A trial jury awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the trial judgment, reasoning that traffic statutes governing vehicle turns, signals, and right of way applied to the driveway given its appearance and common public use, that the defendant violated those rules by crossing diagonally without signaling, and that the plaintiff therefore could not be deemed contributorily negligent for failing to anticipate the defendant's path.
This case involved the interpretation of Charles Kohler's 1912 will, which established trusts from his residuary estate to provide his three daughters and widow with annual incomes of $25,000 each, plus additional lump-sum payments to the daughters at specified ages, while authorizing trustees to manage and continue his manufacturing business. The Surrogate's Court and Appellate Division had addressed questions about the size of the trust funds to be set aside and the disposition of any excess income generated beyond the required payments. The Court of Appeals reversed those decisions, holding that the trustees were limited to setting aside only the principal amount necessary to produce the specified annual income for each beneficiary. Any surplus income, whether accumulated before or after the trusts were funded, must be treated as part of the net residuary estate and distributed under the will's residuary clause to the designated legatees. This conclusion followed from the will's explicit language directing the creation of trusts sufficient only for the stated purposes, without authorizing broader accumulation or retention of excess funds.
The case involved a wrongful death claim after the plaintiff's intestate was killed when a motor truck he was riding in was struck by a train engine at a grade crossing in Irona, New York, while the railroad was under federal control by the defendant. The court found the defendant negligent for operating the engine at high speed without sounding a whistle or bell. However, it held as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily negligent because he and the driver failed to look for the clearly visible approaching train despite warnings, a clear line of sight for much of the approach, and ample opportunity to stop or avoid the collision. The court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and affirmed the Trial Term's judgment dismissing the complaint, as contributory negligence barred recovery even assuming ordinary negligence by the railroad.
The case concerned whether a New York court obtained jurisdiction over a defendant in military service through substituted service of a summons by publication in an action on a promissory note. The plaintiff sought and obtained an order for publication on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 had expired, but the court held that the federal Soldiers and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918 extended the limitations period by excluding the defendant’s time in service. Because the limitation had not yet expired when the order was granted, the specific Code provision authorizing publication did not apply. The court reversed the order and granted the motion to set aside the service, holding that federal law constitutionally modifies the state limitations period and must be strictly followed for substituted service.
