This case involved an action by Seneca Distributing Co. to foreclose a mortgage on land owned by the defendant, Mrs. Fulton. The mortgage was obtained through misrepresentations by her husband, who was short in his accounts with the plaintiff, in exchange for an extension of time to repay. The trial court found for the defendant after determining that the husband had acted as the plaintiff's agent in perpetrating the fraud, but the Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division's reversal must be treated as one on the law because it failed to specify questions of fact as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, and found no evidence supporting the agency determination. The court therefore affirmed the Appellate Division's order and directed judgment absolute against the defendant.
This case involves a miner suing his employer for injuries from a falling rock in a Pennsylvania anthracite coal mine, claiming negligence under the state's Anthracite Act of 1891. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, but the appellate court reversed and dismissed the complaint. The court reasoned that the statute's requirement for the mine foreman or assistant to inspect and secure working places involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, and any negligence in that regard cannot be attributed to the mine owner. The assistant mine foreman had examined the site, marked it safe, and directed continued work, with other supervisors concurring in that assessment.
The case involved a claim by the plaintiff against a common carrier for breach of its contract to safely transport and deliver goods, specifically jewelry lost from a cabinet during the move. The defendant relied on a clause in the shipping memorandum limiting its responsibility to $50 per article. The court held that the limitation clause did not apply because it did not plainly express an intent to exonerate the carrier from liability for its own misfeasance or that of its employees, and the plaintiff's failure to disclose the valuables did not relieve the carrier of responsibility for its own wrongful acts. The court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Appellate Term's judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The case involved a dispute over whether the plaintiff was entitled to coverage under a liability insurance policy issued by the defendant for bodily injuries occurring in the plaintiff's apartment building. A worker was struck by a freight elevator but initially reported no injury and continued working, leading the building superintendent to believe the incident was minor; notice of the accident was not provided to the insurer until three months later when a lawyer reported serious spinal injury, after which the plaintiff paid a $4,000 settlement and sued for indemnification. The jury found for the plaintiff at trial, but the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint; the Court of Appeals reversed that decision and reinstated the verdict, reasoning that the policy's immediate-notice requirement did not apply to a trivial mishap with no apparent injury or reasonable grounds to anticipate bodily harm.
This case concerned whether a deed signed by four grantors could be recorded under sections 291, 311, and 312 of the Real Property Law when one grantor's acknowledgment lacked proper authentication from another state. The Court of Appeals decided that the register must record the conveyance as to the three grantors who properly acknowledged it and issue a writ of mandamus, though without costs to the register. The court reasoned that the statute permits recording where the deed is duly acknowledged by executing parties, allowing the instrument to be treated as effective for those grantors without requiring mutilation of the document or indexing against the grantor with the defective acknowledgment, thereby preserving evidence of the conveyance.
The case involved two accident insurance policies issued in 1907 to Gustave Baumann, who died in 1914 after falling from a building; his widow sued the insurer for benefits after it denied the claim. The defense rested on a false statement in the application (treated as a warranty) that no prior insurance applications had been declined, when in fact a 1904 life insurance application had been rejected. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 1913 amendments to the Insurance Law (sections 107 and 58) did not apply to policies issued before 1914 or to their later renewals, that section 58 covered only life insurance, and that the false warranty therefore barred recovery.
