This case involved a dispute over whether a deed executed in 1824 by Champlin to the Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. was a mortgage and whether a private sale of the property under a power of sale without notice to the mortgagor or heirs extinguished the right of redemption. The court held that the instrument was a mortgage, the sale did not cut off redemption rights, and the heirs could enforce redemption on equitable terms. The core reasoning was that equity protects the mortgagor's right of redemption except through release, foreclosure, or lapse of time; state statutes from 1774 onward regulate powers of sale by requiring public auction after notice, rendering inconsistent private-sale agreements inoperative; and the power here did not expressly authorize a sale without notice.
The case involved a dispute over a landlord-tenant lease that conditioned the landlord's right of re-entry on the tenant's failure to pay rent or the lack of sufficient distress on the premises to satisfy arrears. After the 1846 statute abolished the remedy of distress for rent and substituted a new procedure allowing re-entry after fifteen days' notice, the tenant argued that the law unconstitutionally impaired the obligations of the original contract. The court held that the statute did not violate the contract clause. It reasoned that the parties had contracted against the background of the legislature's power to alter legal remedies, that abolition of distress rendered the original condition impossible to perform, and that the new statutory remedy properly substituted for the old one without altering the underlying duty to pay rent.
The case Russell v. Allen involved a replevin action in which the plaintiff sought to recover possession of jointly owned property (hogs) from the defendant, who represented a co-owner and carrier responsible for the goods under a bill of lading. The trial judge instructed the jury to award the full value of the property if finding for the defendant and refused to limit recovery to the co-owner's partial interest. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that one joint owner cannot lawfully deprive another of possession through replevin proceedings, that the defendant was entitled to a return of the property or its full value to meet obligations to the consignee, and that evidence supported the possibility of an agreement allowing disposition of the entire property. The decision relied on statutes governing replevin actions and precedents distinguishing special interests from general ownership responsibilities.
The case involved the validity of an attachment issued by a superior court justice against non-resident debtors for a debt owed to a partnership that included both New York residents and a French resident. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that superior court judges retained authority to issue attachments after 1847 under a statute preserving their prior powers as supreme court commissioners. It further held that the statutory residency requirement for creditors was met because at least one partner qualified as a resident creditor, even if not all did, allowing the attachment to proceed against non-resident debtors.
The case involved a dispute over whether the state auditor of the canal department could refuse to issue a warrant for payment on a draft drawn by a canal commissioner for damages allegedly caused by the appropriation of water from the Black River to supply the Erie and Black River canals. The court held that the auditor's powers were not strictly ministerial and that he had both the right and duty to determine whether the draft was authorized by law before acting on it. The reasoning centered on statutes requiring that warrants reference specific authorizing laws, the auditor's role as a fiscal check on commissioners, and the facts indicating that the appropriation was permanent and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of canal appraisers rather than direct payment via draft. The court reversed the lower court's grant of mandamus compelling payment and allowed the relator an opportunity to contest the auditor's return.
This case concerned whether Andrew H. Newcomb acquired an inheritable interest in land from the Onondaga salt springs reservation that would pass to his heirs upon his death intestate. The court held that he did not, as the commissioners' action of setting apart the land under the relevant statute created no estate or right of possession, but only a revocable occupancy at the will of the state. The reasoning centered on the 1821 state constitution's prohibition against the legislature selling or disposing of such lands, which must remain state property; the statutory language was designed to avoid granting any transferable interest, and any improvements or conditions did not alter this. Consequently, no interest descended to the heirs, and the complaint for partition of the land should have been dismissed.
