The Town of Waterford, which draws drinking water from the Hudson River, filed a FOIL request with the DEC seeking records about the EPA-led PCB dredging project, including alternative water supply options, permissible PCB levels, and responses to General Electric’s water supply analysis. The DEC withheld hundreds of documents exchanged with the EPA, invoking the exemption for inter-agency or intra-agency deliberative materials under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g). The Court of Appeals held that this exemption does not apply to communications with the EPA. The court reasoned that the statutory terms “inter-agency” and “intra-agency” refer to New York State agencies, and that the EPA—a federal lead agency in a joint but independent remediation effort—cannot be treated as the functional equivalent of a retained outside consultant whose advice is protected to safeguard internal state deliberations. The court therefore modified the lower courts’ rulings and directed disclosure of the withheld records.
In the appeal of Matter of Smith v. Tormey, the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed a motion seeking leave to submit an amicus curiae brief. The court granted the motion and accepted the proposed brief for filing, directing the association to serve two copies on the parties and file nineteen copies within seven days. Chief Judge Lippman took no part in the matter.
The case concerned whether an excess insurance policy issued by Federal Insurance to IBM covered settlement payments IBM made in a class-action lawsuit alleging that its 1995 and 1999 amendments to employee pension plans violated ERISA's age-discrimination rules. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's grant of summary judgment to Federal, declaring that the policy provided no coverage for the amounts IBM sought to recover. The Court held that the policy's definition of a covered "Wrongful Act" was limited to breaches of fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA or related laws, and that IBM had acted solely as a plan settlor or sponsor when it amended the plans, not as a fiduciary. Because the underlying Zurich policy (which the Federal policy followed) was unambiguous on its face and did not extend to non-fiduciary conduct, no duty to indemnify arose.
In Vega v. Restani Construction Corp., a New York City park maintenance worker sued several contractors, including subcontractor General Fence Corporation (GFC), after she suffered a torn rotator cuff while trying to move a garbage barrel containing heavy construction debris in a Bronx park. She alleged that GFC negligently placed concrete chunks in the public trash can during a park renovation project. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of GFC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the case must proceed to trial. The court reasoned that GFC failed to meet its burden of showing the absence of material factual issues, as its principal’s affidavit did not conclusively establish that the company performed no concrete work or disposed of no debris at the site, and the plaintiff’s evidence—including a coworker’s observation of the debris and the timing of the work—created triable questions when viewed in the light most favorable to her.
The case concerned whether defendant Gilberto Sosa was eligible to seek resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (CPL 440.46) for his 2003 conviction on class B drug felonies. The key dispute was the starting point for the statute’s 10-year “look-back” period used to determine if a prior violent felony conviction (here, from 1995) qualified as an “exclusion offense” that would bar relief; the People argued the period ran from the date of the original drug crimes, while Sosa contended it ran from the date of the resentencing application. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling that Sosa was eligible, holding that the statutory text measures the look-back from the application date and that any periods of incarceration are excluded from the calculation. The court reasoned that the Legislature had not categorically barred all defendants with prior violent felonies and that the People’s interpretation would improperly extend the exclusion beyond the language of the provision.
The case involved a defamation lawsuit brought in New York by the SPCA of Upstate New York and its director against an Ohio-based collie welfare organization and its Vermont president. The claims arose from critical statements posted on the defendants' website about the care of rescued collies that had been placed with the New York SPCA. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the action, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants under CPLR 302(a)(1). The court reasoned that, although the defendants had some contacts with New York—including brief visits, donations, and volunteer assistance—those activities did not constitute the purposeful business transactions with a substantial nexus to the allegedly defamatory statements that the long-arm statute requires, particularly given New York's narrow approach to jurisdiction in defamation cases.