In Chavez v. Kincaid, the plaintiff filed suit in New Mexico state court in 1996 alleging breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and other claims arising from a business relationship involving the design and manufacture of fireplaces and related intellectual property. Defendants removed the case to federal court in October 1997, asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction under patent laws. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, finding the removal untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because defendants had notice of potential removability by at least January 1997 yet waited far beyond the 30-day deadline, and that defendants had waived any removal right through their participation in state-court proceedings. The court resolved doubts in favor of remand and left the underlying jurisdictional question for the state court, while noting that costs and fees could be assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
This case involves a railroad employee's claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for a neck injury sustained while changing a tire on a backhoe at work. The plaintiff alleged that the employer failed to provide proper tools or training. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no evidence of negligence because the plaintiff admitted the tools were not defective, there was no proof of a required special tool, and no duty to provide specific training for an experienced worker. The ruling was based on the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding employer negligence under FELA standards.
The case arose from a 1994 Business Week article criticizing the American Stock Exchange’s listing practices and focusing on Printron, Inc., a company formerly led by plaintiff Eleanor Schuler; the article discussed Schuler’s prior identity as John Huminik, her involvement in two SEC enforcement actions resolved by consent decrees, and the subsequent drop in Printron’s stock price. Schuler sued the publisher for defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, and prima facie tort. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Schuler qualified as a public figure who failed to allege actual malice for the defamation claim, that the remaining tort claims were either derivative of the deficient defamation claim or lacked required elements such as improper motive, and that prima facie tort could not be used to circumvent the stricter requirements of established tort doctrines.
In Thompson v. City of Albuquerque, plaintiff Jan Thompson, a female veterinarian employed by the city's Animal Services Division, sued the City under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, alleging she was paid less than two male veterinarians working at the Rio Grande Zoo. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. On the Equal Pay Act claim, the court found that the positions were not substantially equal because the zoo veterinarians handled more complex duties involving exotic animals, specialized equipment, research, and publications, while Thompson's role focused primarily on dogs and cats with limited facilities and no major surgeries. On the Title VII claim, although Thompson established a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination, the City provided legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay difference, and Thompson failed to show those reasons were pretextual.
This case is a civil rights action in which the plaintiff alleged national origin, age, and sex discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA against his former employer, Avnet. Avnet moved to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings based on a 1986 agreement that required arbitration of employment disputes but limited the arbitrator to awarding damages only for breach of contract. The court denied the motion to compel, holding that the agreement's explicit language excluded statutory discrimination claims from arbitration because the arbitrator lacked authority to award other damages. The court reasoned that parties may exclude statutory claims from an arbitration agreement and that doubts about scope must be resolved in favor of arbitration only when the agreement itself covers the dispute. The motion to strike an affidavit was denied as moot.
This case involved a high school student's challenge to his long-term suspension for repeatedly wearing sagging pants in violation of a school dress code adopted to address gang activity. The plaintiff, appearing through his mother, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the suspension violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and expression by wearing the pants as a statement of black cultural identity, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights due to inadequate notice of the disciplinary hearing. The court converted the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, granted that motion in favor of the school district, and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. On the First Amendment claim, the court held that wearing sagging pants did not constitute protected speech and that the dress code was a reasonable response to legitimate school safety concerns even if it were expressive. On the due process claim, the court found that the hearing procedures provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard under the circumstances.
