This case involved criminal charges against four defendants for allegedly violating a temporary injunction by protesting within a restricted zone outside a Fargo clinic that provided abortion services, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. The trial court dismissed the charges, ruling that the injunction had expired by operation of law under N.D.C.C. § 32-06-03 after six months without a hearing on making it permanent. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the injunction remained valid at the time of the alleged violations because the six-month limit does not automatically dissolve an injunction absent a timely motion to dissolve or hearing demand, and the defendants' challenge came too late to affect the criminal case. The court noted that prior civil proceedings had affirmed the injunction's validity and a trial judge had explicitly stated it remained in effect after a mistrial.
Wachter Development sued Arnold Gomke and other owners of real property for specific performance of a purchase agreement, damages, or other relief after three of the four owners signed the agreement but the fourth did not, and the owners later refused to complete the sale. The district court granted summary judgment to the owners and dismissed the complaint. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to enforceability under the statute of frauds and part performance, precluding summary judgment as a matter of law.
The case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney William E. Gray for violating DR 9-102 of the North Dakota Code of Professional Responsibility by improperly transferring $65,000 in client funds from a trust account to personal and firm accounts without the client's knowledge or a proper accounting, then withdrawing funds for personal expenses while failing to bill or document the work performed on an estate matter. A hearing panel recommended a six-month suspension of Gray's law license, which the Disciplinary Board accepted, but the North Dakota Supreme Court instead imposed a public reprimand along with an order to pay costs. The court reasoned that Gray's actions breached the rules requiring client funds to be safeguarded and accounted for, but considered factors such as the level of injury, Gray's partial performance of legal services that benefited the estate, and the applicable sanctions standards to conclude that a reprimand was the appropriate discipline rather than suspension.
This case arose from medical malpractice claims by three patients against Trinity Medical Center and related parties, alleging that a neurosurgeon negligently performed surgeries on the wrong spinal locations and that the hospital was liable for negligent credentialing and supervision. The dispute focused on discovery requests for information and documents related to the hospital's internal review of the surgeon's care, with Trinity asserting protection under North Dakota's peer review and quality assurance privilege statutes. The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction over the non-appealable district court discovery order, directing the lower court to vacate its broad June 30, 1995 order and issue a new one defining the privilege's scope to cover only specific committee communications and records. The core reasoning emphasized the statutory text limiting the privilege, the burden on the party claiming it, and the need for precise application rather than blanket assertions.
The case involved William Moran challenging the North Dakota Department of Transportation's suspension of his driving privileges following an arrest for driving under the influence. A deputy sheriff stopped Moran after observing his vehicle weaving and crossing the center line four times in two miles, noted an odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes, conducted field sobriety tests including HGN, and arrested him after an Intoxilyzer test showed a blood alcohol concentration of .16 percent. The hearing officer suspended Moran's license for 365 days based on probable cause, the district court reversed finding insufficient evidence due to improper reliance on certain test results, and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court to reinstate the suspension. The court reasoned that the officer's observations of erratic driving, alcohol odor, and bloodshot eyes independently established probable cause to arrest for DUI, even excluding disputed sobriety test evidence, and that these findings supported the agency's decision under the applicable review standards.
In State v. Barnett, the defendant appealed his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, challenging the trial court's handling of his warrantless arrest in his home, the loss of an audio recording from an informant's wire, and the prosecutor's closing argument. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the trial court properly suppressed only evidence obtained after the illegal arrest, denied the motion to suppress all evidence from the wire, and refused the requested jury instruction on lost evidence. The court reasoned that under Payton v. New York and New York v. Harris, suppression is limited to evidence that serves the warrant requirement's purpose of protecting the home, that the lack of bad faith in losing the tape raised no due process violation, and that the given instruction was more favorable to the defendant than the one requested. The court also held that any potential issue with the closing argument was not obvious error preserved for review.