The case involved a Pontiac car dealership suing a customer who, after the dealer rejected his claim for transmission repairs beyond the 12,000-mile warranty, displayed a large sign on his car labeling it a 'lemon,' hung real lemons from it, and parked near the dealership while threatening negative publicity. The dealer sought a permanent injunction for alleged wrongful business interference through threats, intimidation, and coercion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of injunctive relief, ruling that equity jurisdiction does not extend to enjoining libel or slander that harms business absent clear evidence of conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion. The court reasoned that constitutional guarantees of free speech and press prohibit prior restraints on publication, and the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law through damages or criminal prosecution for defamation.
In this case, plaintiff Leonard McKee obtained a jury verdict and judgment against Midland Valley Railroad Company for property damage after his truck and loaded trailer were struck by a train at a Second Street crossing in Tulsa, Oklahoma, demolishing the trailer and destroying its cargo of onions. The railroad appealed, arguing errors including improper jury instructions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 11 referencing a 1929 Corporation Commission order requiring installation and maintenance of flasher signals at the crossing, because the order had not been pleaded, was not admitted into evidence, and the instruction could mislead the jury on negligence and the driver's contributory negligence. The court found this instructional error required reversal without needing to address other issues raised.
The case concerned three promissory notes that listed W. T. Milam individually and Braniff Engineering Corporation, with Milam signing as president and another officer as secretary-treasurer. The plaintiff sued Milam personally, while the defense maintained that the notes were intended as obligations solely of the corporation. The trial court found ambiguity in the signatures and, after admitting parol evidence, held that only the corporation was liable. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the manner of signing created sufficient doubt about the parties bound to allow extrinsic evidence of intent under the Negotiable Instruments Law and precedents interpreting it. The court reasoned that written provisions and corporate references on the instrument prevailed over printed joint-and-several language, permitting proof that the signers acted only in a representative capacity.
The case involved P & E Finance Company's suit against the Stoneciphers for possession of five automobiles sold by Slater-Mashburn Motor Company, which had given P & E recorded floor plan mortgages allowing the dealer to sell the cars in the ordinary course of trade while holding proceeds in trust. The trial court ruled that the Stoneciphers took the cars free and clear of the liens under 46 O.S.1951 §§ 91-94, finding no fraud or collusion and that the sale occurred in the ordinary course of trade. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that conflicting evidence on whether the buyers had notice of the mortgages supported the trial court's finding of no notice, and that the statute protected the buyers regardless of actual knowledge because the sale was in the seller's ordinary course of business as a used car dealer, even when made to another dealer.
This case involves a habeas corpus petition by a maternal grandmother seeking custody of her daughter's two minor sons, whom she had helped raise while the mother worked and contributed to household expenses. The mother planned to take the boys to France to join her husband, who was stationed there in military service, prompting the grandmother to allege that the mother and her husband were unfit parents. The trial court refused to find the mother unfit and awarded custody to her, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that parents may be deprived of custody only upon clear and conclusive evidence of unfitness, which was lacking here; the mother had not abandoned the children; and the trial court's assessment of the witnesses and evidence was entitled to deference as it was not against the weight of the evidence.
The case involved a dispute in which the plaintiff sought compensation for approximately 19-20 months of services caring for and breeding up to 500 mares under an alleged oral agreement with the defendant, who was to supply the animals and facilities in exchange for half the colts. After the defendant terminated the arrangement, the plaintiff sued on theories including breach of the express contract and alternatively quantum meruit for the reasonable value of her labor. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the contract was terminable at will by either party, but the plaintiff could still recover the reasonable value of services performed on an implied contract or debt theory even though an express agreement had been alleged, and that the evidence supported the verdict without prejudicial error.