This case was a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff Arloine Mayor sued defendant Dr. J.W. Dowsett, an obstetrician, after she suffered permanent paralysis from the neck down following administration of a spinal anesthetic during childbirth. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant based on a jury verdict after denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence of negligence or causation. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the evidence of the defendant's failure to follow standard positioning practices with the spinal anesthetic permitted a jury inference of both negligence and proximate cause, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could apply to shift the burden regarding the cause of the injury in the absence of contrary explanation. The court addressed evidentiary standards for expert testimony and the proper application of circumstantial evidence in malpractice claims involving anesthesia.
This case arose from a forcible entry and wrongful detainer action over possession of a city lot and dwelling, in which the circuit court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The defendants filed an appeal undertaking with three sureties, including Palma J. Whitney Guthrie and Viola W. Whitney; those two sureties later filed documents attempting to renounce and rescind their obligations under the undertaking. The plaintiffs moved to strike the renunciations, arguing that no court order authorized the sureties to withdraw their liability. The court sustained the motion, holding that the rights and obligations of sureties on an appeal bond are fixed by statute (ORS 19.040 and ORS 105.160) and cannot be unilaterally rescinded, as the undertaking serves as consideration for staying enforcement of the judgment and preventing dismissal of the appeal.
The case involved a defendant charged in district court with selling a lottery ticket under ORS 167.410; she was convicted, but the circuit court sustained her demurrer and dismissed the complaint because it did not name the purchaser. The state appealed, and the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint adequately charged a crime. The court reasoned that an indictment or complaint for a statutory offense is generally sufficient if it follows the descriptive words of the statute, and that details such as the purchaser's identity are matters of evidence rather than required pleading elements, consistent with the court's own precedents and the weight of authority elsewhere.
The case concerned disciplinary proceedings against Oregon attorney C.E. Wheelock, who had been hired by client Mrs. Williamson to assist with her mother's probate estate in New Mexico. Wheelock admitted making multiple false statements to the client about arranging a higher sale price for property, auditing crop proceeds, and taking trips on her behalf, then issuing her a personal check to simulate estate proceeds in order to end the representation. The trial committee and Board of Governors recommended a private reprimand after finding no financial harm or dishonest intent. The court adopted that recommendation but ordered a public reprimand through publication of the opinion, reasoning that attorneys must avoid falsehoods toward clients regardless of the circumstances.
This case involved a forcible entry and detainer action brought by the plaintiffs to recover possession of real property from the defendants, who claimed equitable ownership as a defense. The matter was transferred to circuit court, which ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after addressing the equitable issues first. On appeal, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss for lack of a special undertaking bond, reasoning that the defendants had already vacated the premises, making the additional bond requirement inapplicable. The court then affirmed the lower court's decision on the merits, finding no error in the procedural handling of the equitable defense or the admission of certain evidence.
This case involved a widow's claim for death benefits under Oregon's Workmen’s Compensation Law, alleging that her husband's occupational disease (lead poisoning) from employment hastened his death from lung cancer. The State Industrial Accident Commission denied the claim, and after her petition for rehearing was rejected, she appealed to the circuit court seeking a trial de novo. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The core reasoning was that, under the Occupational Disease Statute as it read in 1958, disputes over occupational disease claims were to be resolved by a medical board of review rather than through judicial appeal, in contrast to claims for accidental injuries.
