Richard Unis

In State v. Vasquez-Rubio, the defendant was charged under ORS 166.272 with unlawful possession of a machine gun after officers seized the weapon during a search of his home. The trial court convicted the defendant without requiring the state to prove that the machine gun was not registered as required under federal law, treating that aspect as a matter for the defense rather than an element of the offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory text makes non-registration part of the crime's definition. The court reached this conclusion through textual analysis of the statute and application of longstanding interpretive rules requiring the prosecution to prove exceptions that are descriptive of the offense.

criminal lawguns

In State v. Dahl, police responded to an anonymous report of a man waving a gun and ordered the defendant to exit his house with his hands raised; after he complied, officers observed signs of intoxication, obtained his admission to driving, and charged him with driving under the influence of intoxicants. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order amounted to an unlawful seizure inside his home without probable cause under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, finding no forced entry and upholding the arrest, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's compliance with the police command constituted a seizure that required probable cause, which the officers lacked at the time of the order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Oregon Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review a local apprenticeship committee's cancellation of a non-probationary apprentice pipefitter's agreement under the state Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Supreme Court held that the committee's decision constituted a final order in a contested case, granting the Court of Appeals jurisdiction and reversing its dismissal of the petition for review. The court reached this conclusion after noting respondents' concession that the cancellation implicated the apprentice's legal rights and privileges under ORS 183.310(2)(a)(A) and (B), finding no statutory exemption from contested-case procedures in ORS 660.060(7) or elsewhere in the APA, and determining that the written cancellation notice was not merely preliminary agency action.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Double Eagle Golf, Inc. v. City of Portland, the plaintiff sued the City of Portland under ORS 279.067, alleging that the City violated ORS 279.029(1) by awarding a concession contract to operate concessions at a municipal golf course to a bidder other than the lowest responsible bidder. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the City, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The court held that ORS 279.029(1), which requires public contracting agencies to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidder, does not apply to the award of concession contracts at municipal golf courses. The core reasoning was that the statute's text and purpose address situations where an agency purchases goods or services and seeks to minimize costs, whereas concession contracts involve leasing to raise revenue, so the agency properly seeks the highest responsible bidder.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the automatic review of a death sentence imposed on Randy Lee Guzek after his 1988 convictions for aggravated murder. On remand for a new penalty-phase trial, the trial court admitted victim impact testimony from the victims' family members describing their personal characteristics and the effects of the deaths. The Oregon Supreme Court vacated the death sentence, holding that such evidence was not admissible under ORS 163.150 because it was irrelevant to the three statutory questions the jury was required to answer regarding the defendant's deliberateness, future dangerousness, and mitigating circumstances focused on the defendant and the offense. The court reasoned that the statute's text and history limit the sentencing inquiry to factors concerning the defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of the crime, without authorizing consideration of victim impact evidence, and that this conclusion is a matter of state statutory law following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a petition for post-conviction relief after the petitioner was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse based on allegations by a 12-year-old girl with a learning disability. The petitioner argued that his trial counsel provided inadequate assistance under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution by failing to interview school staff and classmates who could have impeached the complaining witness's account of reporting the incident and her behavior afterward, and by not obtaining a medical examination to assess whether the petitioner was impotent at the time. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to relief because the case turned on credibility, and counsel's omissions in investigation would have had a tendency to affect the outcome. The decision rested on the standard that inadequate assistance includes acts or omissions with a tendency to affect the result, without requiring proof that the outcome would have changed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the admissibility of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test results as evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). The trial court excluded the evidence after finding it was scientific evidence that failed to meet the admissibility standard under State v. Brown due to risks of error and prejudice, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held it admissible for both proving impairment and corroborating blood alcohol content. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that HGN evidence is admissible to establish that a defendant was under the influence of alcohol, provided the officer was qualified, the test was properly administered, and results were accurately recorded, but is not admissible to prove a specific blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more under ORS 813.010(1)(a). The court's reasoning centered on whether HGN qualifies as scientific evidence requiring validation under the Brown factors, its limited probative value for impairment versus BAC, and the need for foundational requirements to ensure reliability without undue prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

In Holcomb v. Sunderland, the plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming entitlement to release from a 90-day jail term imposed as a condition of probation for fourth-degree assault because he had not received credit for time served in jail after arrest and before judgment. The court issued the writ, concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to such credit. The core reasoning rested on the text and context of ORS 137.320(4), 137.390, and 137.370, which require the sheriff to compute and credit pre-judgment confinement time toward the term of a sentence of imprisonment in county jail; statutory changes since State v. McClure had made probation with a jail condition a sentence, removing the prior distinction that had barred credit.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Fish, the defendant was stopped for erratic driving, showed signs of intoxication, and refused to perform field sobriety tests after being warned that his refusal could be used as evidence in court; he was then charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants. The trial court suppressed evidence of the refusal on both statutory and constitutional grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the suppression order. The court first found that the officer's advice satisfied the statutory requirements of ORS 813.135 and 813.136, but then held that admitting the refusal evidence would violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the adoption of a young child by Carl and Yvonne Stubbs after the child's mother, facing housing instability, placed the child in foster care in Washington and later signed an informal document allowing the Stubbses to care for the child during an adoption process. The mother later attempted to revoke any consent and sought return of the child, leading the Stubbses to file an adoption petition in Oregon that also alleged willful neglect by the mother. The trial court granted the adoption, the Court of Appeals affirmed on consent grounds, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decision but on different grounds, first confirming jurisdiction under the UCCJA and then reviewing the record to conclude that the mother had willfully neglected to provide proper care for the child for the year before the supplemental petition without just and sufficient cause. The court applied Oregon law after determining it had authority to proceed and exercised de novo review on the neglect issue.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to a Court of Appeals decision that directed Ballot Measure 13, an initiative on government treatment of homosexuality, to appear on the November 1994 Oregon ballot. Plaintiffs had sought to block the measure on state constitutional grounds, including the single-subject rule and limits on constitutional revisions, as well as federal constitutional claims. After the election was held and the measure was defeated, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review as moot, reasoning that the controversy no longer had any practical effect on the parties' rights. A dissent argued that the lower court decisions should be vacated to prevent them from having precedential effect.

electionscivil rights

This case concerned whether the Oregon Department of Revenue could issue a notice of deficiency for additional personal income taxes for the 1981 tax year after the standard three-year statute of limitations had expired. The taxpayer had claimed losses from tax shelter investments that the IRS later disallowed as shams, leading to a federal audit report received by the department more than three years after the return was filed. The Oregon Tax Court had upheld the department's assessment under an exception in ORS 314.410(3) for federal corrections, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exception applies only if the federal correction occurs within the original state limitations period, which it did not here.

taxesprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, plaintiff-relator Anderson sought to compel a circuit court judge to vacate a protective order that prohibited videotaping depositions in an underlying civil action and required stenographic recording only. The Oregon Supreme Court held that ORCP 39 C(4) grants a party the right to record depositions by non-stenographic means such as videotape, with the trial court having discretion only to require stenographic recording if necessary for accuracy, not to ban videotaping. The court further noted that ORCP 36 C permits protective orders limiting discovery methods only upon a showing of good cause such as annoyance or undue burden, but the trial judge's stated concerns about logistics, witness appearance, and trial efficiency did not justify prohibiting videotape under that standard. Accordingly, the court directed issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the protective order to be vacated.

procedure

This case involved a third-party claim by Raymond Kuhl against his insurer, Northwest Farm Bureau Insurance Company, seeking defense costs and indemnity after Northwest refused to defend him in a malicious prosecution lawsuit filed by Bill Ledford. The trial court granted summary judgment to Northwest, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The court held that Northwest had no duty to defend or indemnify because the policy covered only accidental occurrences resulting in unintended harm, whereas malicious prosecution by definition requires the defendant to have acted with malice, meaning a primary purpose other than justice, implying subjective intent to cause harm, which is excluded from coverage. The analysis focused solely on the allegations in the complaint and the policy language to determine coverage.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In this declaratory judgment action, Allstate Insurance sought a ruling that its automobile liability policy did not cover personal injury and property damage claims arising from a collision in which its insured intentionally drove head-on into an oncoming semi-truck to commit suicide. The trial court held the policy's exclusion for injuries 'caused intentionally by' the insured did not apply and entered judgment for the injured parties; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that the exclusion requires proof the insured subjectively intended to cause the resulting harm, not merely that the insured intended the act itself. Because the parties had stipulated the insured had no subjective intent to injure the truck driver, the court concluded the exclusion was inapplicable and rejected the lower court's use of an objective 'natural and ordinary consequences' test.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned whether covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs) establishing servitudes and assessment powers for a homeowners association in a planned unit development survive a county's acquisition of lots through tax foreclosure under ORS 312.270(1), which vests title free from liens and encumbrances. Lane County argued that the CCRs and assessment liens were extinguished by the foreclosure, while the Association contended that the servitudes themselves persisted even if pre-foreclosure liens were cleared. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the CCRs and the Association's authority to levy assessments under them are not liens or encumbrances extinguished by tax foreclosure, allowing the Association to collect post-foreclosure assessments and foreclose its lien on the lots. The court reasoned that the CCRs run with the land to protect property values and bind successors, distinguishing them from mere money or security interests addressed by the statute.

propertytaxesprocedure

In State v. Hampton, the defendant was charged with second-degree assault for striking a police officer with a bottle during an arrest attempt. The trial court admitted evidence that the defendant was on parole, had not contacted his parole officer, and had an outstanding parole violation warrant, which the state offered to show motive. The Oregon Supreme Court held that this evidence was properly admitted under OEC 404(3) because it was relevant to a non-character purpose (motive to avoid detection and arrest), satisfied the three-part test for uncharged misconduct evidence, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under OEC 403. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the evidence had a tendency to make it more probable that the defendant acted to evade law enforcement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the City of Portland ordering the demolition of a vacant residential structure owned by Lincoln Loan Company after finding multiple building code violations that rendered it a dangerous nuisance. The city's hearings officer directed demolition and imposed related costs without making findings on whether less drastic remedies like repairs would suffice. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the city cannot demolish such a structure without a record finding that demolition is a reasonable remedy choice. The core reasoning centered on the requirement for adequate factual findings in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings to support orders by substantial evidence and enable meaningful judicial review under writ of review procedures.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Castrejon, the defendant was charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle under ORS 164.135, and the trial court gave a jury instruction stating that the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but not beyond all doubt, while declining to give the defendant's requested uniform instruction defining the term. The defendant appealed, contending that the instruction was circular and misleading, that ORS 10.095(6) required the uniform instruction, and that the instruction violated due process by allowing conviction on a diluted standard of proof. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the given instruction satisfied the statutory requirement to instruct that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and did not mislead the jury into applying a lesser standard of proof, consistent with precedents such as State v. Williams and State v. Pratt. The court noted that ORS 10.095(6) does not mandate any particular definition of reasonable doubt and addressed preservation rules for appellate review of unpreserved claims.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the City of Roseburg's storm drainage utility fee constituted a tax on property subject to the limitations of Article XI, section 11b of the Oregon Constitution, enacted by Ballot Measure 5. Taxpayers including the Roseburg School District petitioned the Tax Court, which granted summary judgment declaring the fee a tax. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed on review, holding that the fee is not a tax on property. The court reasoned that the fee is charged for services to the person paying water utility bills rather than imposed directly on property or as a direct consequence of ownership, with enforcement through withholding water service and no lien on the property itself.

taxesproperty