Florence Kerins Murray

This case is a wrongful-death suit brought by the parents of a minor murder victim against Motoring Technical Services, Inc., a private vocational school, after an inmate participating in a state-run community placement program at Motoring left the premises, entered the victim's nearby home, and committed the crime. The Superior Court granted Motoring's motion for summary judgment, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that Motoring owed no duty of care to the victim because it was not in the business of supervising inmates, had been told to treat the inmate like any other student without special monitoring, and had not been informed of his prior sexual-assault adjudication. The opinion reviewed the summary-judgment standard, emphasizing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding duty, a required element of negligence.

torts & liability

The case involved defendant Robert Sabetta's appeal from jury convictions on three counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder, arising from a 1993 shooting at an auto garage in Foster, Rhode Island, where witnesses identified Sabetta (a suspended police officer) as the gunman and linked the crimes to his motive from a prior assault indictment. He received consecutive life sentences on the murder counts and a twenty-year sentence on the assault count. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial justice's comment referencing the prosecutor's suggestion that defense counsel was misleading the jury did not imply the judge's own belief in misconduct and that any potential prejudice was cured by the subsequent cautionary instruction to the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Wickes Asset Management appealing from Superior Court rulings in seven consolidated tax-abatement actions challenging Lincoln's assessments on its 29.5-acre industrial property for tax years 1985 through 1991. The trial justice found Wickes had failed to file required annual accounts, barring most challenges under the relevant statute, but granted limited equitable relief for the 1991 assessment due to delayed revaluation and denied relief for other years after evaluating appraisals and property conditions. On cross-appeals, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that equity jurisdiction was unavailable because an adequate legal remedy existed under the tax-abatement statute, vacated the 1991 reduction, and remanded for the trial court to determine if the account-filing defense was properly raised, to address constitutional challenges, and to reconsider the 1990 assessment without regard to the owner's fault in property deterioration.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case involved a per-diem substitute teacher who had been laid off from full-time employment and was already receiving unemployment benefits, which were offset by her substitute earnings; the Department of Employment and Training Board of Review disqualified her from those prior benefits during school vacation periods under G.L. 1956 § 28-44-68. The District Court reversed the board's decisions, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the statute's disqualification applies only to school employees who plan for periodic unemployment during recesses and does not reach individuals already collecting benefits from prior full-time separation, whose existing awards are unaffected except for the standard earnings offset under § 28-44-7.

labor & employment

This case is an appeal by both parties from a Rhode Island Family Court decision granting an absolute divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences after a lengthy trial. The Family Court awarded the wife sole custody of the couple's child with no visitation rights for the husband, divided marital property including the home and retirement accounts, determined the husband's income at $85,000, and ordered him to pay weekly child support plus certain fees and sanctions. The Supreme Court upheld the divorce, custody, property division, and most other rulings, finding the trial justice did not abuse discretion and that the husband's conduct warranted the outcomes. It sustained the appeals only on the child support amount, remanding for proper application of the child-support guidelines worksheet.

family lawproperty

This case involved Koch Fuels, Inc., a Delaware corporation, challenging a Rhode Island gross-earnings tax assessment on its sales of fuel oil delivered to Narragansett Electric Company in Providence between 1982 and 1984. The Tax Administrator imposed the tax under the Gross-Earnings Tax Act, the District Court upheld the assessment after finding it did not violate the Commerce Clause or Due Process Clause and that Koch qualified as an importer, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari. The court reasoned that the tax functions as a sales tax on transactions where shipments occur to points within the state, Koch caused the oil to be imported by negotiating sales and retaining title until delivery at the Rhode Island terminal, and the statute's plain language applied to Koch as the entity bringing the product into the state for sale there.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Antonio Yelland's appeal from his Superior Court convictions on seven counts of first-degree child molestation against his biological daughter, for which he received concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling decades of imprisonment with suspended portions. The defendant challenged the trial justice's denial of motions to pass the case based on alleged prejudicial prosecutorial remarks in opening statements and witness testimony, as well as the denial of a motion in limine to exclude testimony about shared sleeping arrangements at a family residence. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that any potential prejudice from the remarks was curable by instructions or not inexpiable, that the testimony was relevant to the charged conduct and not improper other-crimes evidence under Rule 404(b), and that the trial justice did not abuse discretion in these evidentiary and procedural rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Anthony Cardarelli's claim for unemployment benefits after being laid off in 1992. The Department of Employment and Training disqualified him from benefits under G.L. 1956 § 28-44-19.1 because his private pension exceeded his weekly benefit amount. The District Court reversed, finding that Cardarelli had contributed to his pension by forgoing other benefits in collective bargaining, which would allow a partial offset under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(15). The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the District Court's judgment, holding that the term "contributions" in FUTA refers only to monetary contributions by the employee, not non-monetary trade-offs, and that no such monetary contributions were shown in the record. The court therefore affirmed the board's decision disqualifying Cardarelli from benefits.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case involved a property owner suing the Rhode Island Department of Transportation after the agency eliminated a street-level railroad crossing and built an overpass, which the owner alleged substantially impaired vehicular access to his business without any physical taking of the land. The Superior Court, sitting without a jury, awarded damages measured by the difference in the property's fair market value before and after the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that expert evidence established the access changes forced cumbersome maneuvers for tractor-trailers, reduced the property's utility, and caused a $104,000 diminution in value. The court found the before-and-after valuation method proper and the evidence sufficient to support the award.

property

The case involved Kimberly Jenkins, who was acquitted of driving under the influence in District Court after arguing that police lacked probable cause to stop her vehicle, and was subsequently charged in the Administrative Adjudication Court with refusing to submit to a chemical test under G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1. Jenkins moved to dismiss the refusal charge on collateral estoppel grounds, claiming the District Court’s findings precluded the state from prosecuting her, but the AAC trial judge and appeals panel rejected this argument and sustained the charge with a license suspension. On certiorari review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that collateral estoppel did not apply because there was no record of a final District Court determination on probable cause and because the legal standards differed—the refusal statute required only reasonable suspicion for the stop, not probable cause. The court further found that the officer’s observations of erratic driving satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard. It therefore denied the petition and upheld the appeals panel’s decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Wayne Distributing Co. challenging a Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights ruling that it had unlawfully terminated employee Dennis Santos due to his handicap after he entered a substance-abuse treatment program for alcohol and drug dependency. The Commission found discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act and ordered back pay, a decision later affirmed by the Superior Court. On certiorari, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the lower court's decision, holding that alcoholism or drug dependency does not qualify as a handicap under the statutory definition in G.L. 1956 § 28-5-6(7). The court reasoned that the Legislature intentionally excluded current substance abusers from protection, particularly in roles requiring driving, and noted the Commission's failure to issue its complaint within the mandatory one-year statutory deadline. The matter was remanded to the Superior Court.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In State v. Grabowski, the defendant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder after a retrial, challenging the trial court's jury instructions on malice and the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal following his earlier acquittal on first-degree murder and convictions on related firearm charges. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the defendant failed to preserve a timely objection to the jury instructions under Rule 30, waiving the claim on appeal, and that the instructions were not erroneous because they did not impermissibly presume malice from the use of a deadly weapon. The court further determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, so the trial justice properly denied the acquittal motion. The judgment was affirmed and the case remanded.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families seeking review of a Family Court order directing that a minor child in its custody be placed in a foster home in Florida. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Family Court justice erred by ordering the placement without first obtaining written approval from Florida authorities as required by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. The court reasoned that the compact explicitly prohibits sending a child into a receiving state until the appropriate public authorities there notify the sending agency that the placement does not appear contrary to the child's interests, and that state courts are among the entities bound by these rules. Although the specific facts had become moot by the time of decision, the court emphasized that deviations from the compact's procedures constitute illegal placements subject to penalties.

family law

The case involved the appeal of Gelardo G. Mastracchio from convictions for three counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, two counts of receiving stolen goods, and one count of possession of a firearm after a conviction of a violent crime. The defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his apartment, arguing that police violated the knock-and-announce requirement by using a ruse to gain entry without identifying themselves or their purpose. The Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained the appeal in part, vacating the denial of the suppression motion and remanding for findings on whether the unannounced entry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, while denying the appeal as to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the convictions on the other counts.

criminal lawproceduregunscivil rights

This case arose from a personal injury suit filed by Richard Giroux against Purington Building Systems and Inland Buildings after he was struck by prefabricated roof decking on a job site in 1987, alleging negligence in design and manufacture. After Inland filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1992, Giroux moved under Rhode Island General Laws § 27-7-2.4 to substitute Inland's liability insurer Aetna as the defendant in place of Inland. The Superior Court granted the substitution, and on certiorari the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute permits direct action against the insurer upon the tortfeasor's bankruptcy filing without requiring prior relief from the automatic stay, that the substitution is not discretionary in a manner barring the motion here, and that the statute is not preempted by federal bankruptcy law because substituting the insurer does not harm other creditors when there is only a single claimant against the policy. The court rejected arguments that the statute was unconstitutional or that the bankruptcy court's later modification of the stay rendered substitution unnecessary.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

This case is an appeal from a Rhode Island Family Court divorce judgment based on irreconcilable differences, involving the division of marital assets including the family home and the husband's chiropractic practice. The court sustained the husband's appeal in part, ruling that the goodwill value of the professional practice and any enhanced earning capacity from his professional degree or license are not marital property subject to equitable distribution under the applicable statute, and it reduced the wife's award by approximately half the goodwill amount; it denied the remainder of the husband's appeal and the wife's cross-appeal. The core reasoning was that professional goodwill and future earning capacity cannot be capitalized for distribution because they are affected by unpredictable future events such as illness, death, or market changes, and the statute does not authorize treating them as divisible assets. The parties received joint custody of their child with physical placement to the wife, along with alimony and child support orders that were not disturbed on appeal.

family lawproperty

In State v. Evans, the defendant appealed his Superior Court conviction on five counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy arising from a 1991 bank robbery, claiming the state violated discovery rules by failing to disclose the witness Kroll's complete criminal record and the full terms of a leniency deal made in exchange for his testimony until the middle of trial. The trial court denied the defendant's motions to bar Kroll's testimony or declare a mistrial. The Supreme Court sustained the appeal, vacated the conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the state's negligent nondisclosure under Rule 16 prejudiced the defendant by denying him adequate time to investigate and prepare cross-examination of the state's sole identifying witness.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an employee, Arlene Toolin, who worked as a nursing assistant for Aquidneck Island Medical Resource and was injured in a car accident while driving between patient homes as directed by her employer. Toolin sought workers' compensation benefits, which a trial judge denied under the going-and-coming rule, but the Appellate Division reversed and awarded benefits, finding the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Aquidneck petitioned for certiorari, arguing the travel was outside the scope of employment since Toolin used her own vehicle and was unpaid for travel time. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that a nexus existed under the Di Libero criteria because the travel occurred at the employer's direction, at an expected location, and was integral to fulfilling job duties, creating an exception to the going-and-coming rule even without compensation for travel.

labor & employment

The case involved a breach-of-contract dispute in which plaintiff Martino alleged that defendants Ronci failed to pay the balance due under an interior-design services agreement and fraudulently induced him to enter the contract, while the Roncis counterclaimed that Martino had not completed the required work. After a bifurcated trial, a jury found the defendants liable for breach of contract but could not reach a verdict on the fraud count, leaving damages undetermined. The Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the absence of a final judgment resolving all claims and the unresolved damages issue meant the appeal was premature and did not qualify for any recognized exception to the final-judgment rule.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Sharon Vater petitioned for workers' compensation benefits from her employer HB Group, claiming right carpal tunnel syndrome caused by repetitive lifting and packing tasks at work. The trial judge awarded her partial disability compensation at 25 percent, attributing the occupational disease to her employment and apportioning liability under the statute because prior employers were outside Rhode Island's jurisdiction. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence that the disability stemmed from employment after her time at Kidde Fenwal. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted certiorari, quashed the Appellate Division decree, and directed affirmance of the trial decision, reasoning that the Workers' Compensation Act makes the last employer liable for compensable occupational diseases peculiar to the employment and permits apportionment when information on prior employers is insufficient.

labor & employment