Greg W. Abbott

In Bradford v. Vento, the Ventos sued Bruce Bradford, Simon Property Group, and Golden Ring Mall Company for fraud, tortious interference with prospective contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, DTPA violations, and civil conspiracy after their attempt to purchase a sports memorabilia store in a Texas mall was disrupted by disputes over lease ownership and store access. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the Ventos substantial actual and exemplary damages, which the court of appeals largely affirmed with some reductions. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that no legally sufficient evidence supported any of the liability findings against the defendants. The Court reasoned that Bradford's statements and actions did not constitute fraud or extreme conduct, there was insufficient proof of interference or conspiracy, and the DTPA claim failed for lack of evidence of unfair practices.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Tammy White suing the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) for property damage from a fire that destroyed her business, which she alleged was caused by gasoline fumes migrating onto her property after the TNRCC installed and then removed a motor-driven pump to dissipate fumes from leaking underground tanks. The TNRCC moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act because the pump was not motor-driven equipment and its operation or use did not cause the damage. The trial court and court of appeals denied the motion, but the Supreme Court of Texas held that although the pump qualified as motor-driven equipment under section 101.021, the fire occurred six days after the pump's removal and thus was not proximately caused by its operation or use. The Court therefore reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Rhonda Bonner, who was injured by an uninsured motorist and sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits from Allstate after already receiving personal injury protection (PIP) payments under the same policy. Allstate failed to timely acknowledge her UM claim as required by Texas Insurance Code article 21.55 but denied the claim because the prior PIP payments exceeded the jury's $1,000 UM damages award under the policy's nonduplication provision; the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment on the benefits and denied attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed the take-nothing judgment but awarded fees based on the acknowledgment violation. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the fee award, holding that section 6 penalties apply only when the insurer is liable on the claim, which Allstate was not here because the PIP offset defeated any UM recovery.

business & regulatory

In Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., the case involved a dispute over the validity of a mechanic's lien on a homestead for the construction of a new home under the Texas Constitution. William Spradlin sought to invalidate the lien held by Jim Walter Homes because it did not comply with procedural requirements in Article XVI, Section 50(a)(5)(A)-(D), such as a cooling-off period and execution at a third-party office. The court decided that these protections apply only to work and material for repairing or renovating existing improvements, not to constructing new improvements, and thus upheld the lien's validity. The core reasoning was a plain-language interpretation of the constitutional text, using the doctrine of last antecedent to limit the subparts to the immediately preceding phrase about existing improvements, supported by the disjunctive "or" separating the two types of work.

property

This case involved a nursing home negligence and gross negligence suit brought by a resident's estate against Horizon/CMS Healthcare, resulting in a jury verdict of over $2 million in actual damages and $90 million in punitive damages. The Texas Supreme Court held that punitive damages awards in health-care-liability claims are capped by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 41.007 (limiting them to four times actual damages), not by Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 4590i section 11.02(a), and that article 4590i does cap prejudgment interest on damages falling under its limit. The court reasoned from the plain language and distinct purposes of the two statutes that section 41.007 specifically governs exemplary damages while article 4590i applies to certain actual damages and related interest, and it affirmed the lower court's rulings on other issues such as constitutionality while remanding for recalculation of interest.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved whether Continental Casualty Insurance Co. could obtain judicial review of a Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Hearings Division decision ordering it to pay for medical treatments provided to an injured worker by Functional Restoration Associates and PRIDE after the carrier denied preauthorization. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, the court of appeals reversed on the ground of an inherent right to review, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the dismissal. The Court reasoned that the Workers' Compensation Act provides no statutory right to judicial review of medical benefits disputes resolved under Chapter 413, in contrast to other benefit disputes, and that Continental had not adequately pleaded a constitutional due process claim for inherent review. The opinion examined the separate medical dispute resolution procedures in the Act and concluded they do not authorize court review of final hearing officer decisions.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved whether Royal Indemnity Company was obligated under a commercial automobile liability policy to pay prejudgment interest in addition to the exhausted $1 million policy limits on a claim arising from a fatal vehicle collision. The trial court granted summary judgment to Royal, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court reasoned that the policy's insuring agreement limited coverage to damages the insured became legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury up to the stated limits, while the supplemental payments provision covered only post-judgment interest and costs, and a State Board of Insurance order requiring prejudgment interest coverage did not apply to automobile liability policies. The court concluded the explicit policy language precluded recovery of prejudgment interest once the principal limits were exhausted by the agreed judgment.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved whether DEL Industrial, Inc. was required to pay workers' compensation insurance premiums for employees it leased from a staff leasing company (ARL) that had declined to purchase coverage for those workers, under a policy DEL had obtained for its direct employees. The trial court held DEL liable for the premiums based on the Staff Leasing Services Act's coemployer language, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the staff leasing company holds the exclusive right to elect or decline coverage for leased employees, and the coemployer provision applies only to the extent of the consequences of that election. The Court further held that the Act supersedes the common-law right-of-control test in defining the employment relationship for workers' compensation purposes under the statute.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Robert and Olga Osterberg violated Texas Election Code reporting requirements by making over $28,000 in direct campaign expenditures against judicial candidate Peter Peca without filing required reports, and whether Peca could recover civil damages in a private suit under section 253.131. The Supreme Court of Texas held that a plaintiff need only prove the defendants knowingly made the expenditures, not that they knew the expenditures violated the law. The court concluded that the Election Code's reporting mandates and private enforcement mechanism are constitutional as applied to the Osterbergs, with the sole exception that requiring a husband and wife to form a political committee before jointly spending unconstitutionally burdens their associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed liability against Robert, reversed as to Olga, and remanded to the court of appeals.

electionsfree speech

The case concerned whether the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) had statutory authority to enter into two direct contracts with VitaPro Foods, Inc., a Canadian company, to purchase a soy-based meat substitute for use in prisons and for resale by Texas Correctional Industries using inmate labor. The trial court ruled the contracts invalid, finding no obligation for TDCJ to purchase additional product and no authority to pay for already-shipped goods. The court of appeals reversed, identifying a fact issue on whether VitaPro qualified as an "agricultural commodity" under the Direct Purchasing Statute. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that VitaPro was not an agricultural commodity as a matter of law and that neither the Direct Purchasing Statute nor other provisions (such as those governing resale or prison industries) authorized TDCJ to bypass the General Services Commission and contract directly with the supplier.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved DSC Communications (now Alcatel) suing Samsung for allegedly stealing trade secrets in telecommunication technology by recruiting a team of DSC engineers. DSC sought apex depositions of two high-level Samsung executives, claiming they were involved in the alleged plan. After the trial court denied Samsung's motion to quash and allowed the depositions, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief to Samsung. The Texas Supreme Court denied Alcatel's mandamus petition, holding that DSC presented no evidence the executives possessed unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable facts, so the trial court abused its discretion under the Crown Central guidelines by permitting the depositions without first requiring less intrusive discovery.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge by landowners in Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction to the city's Save Our Springs Ordinance, a 1992 water pollution control measure enacted via citizen referendum that limited impervious cover on land and imposed other development restrictions to protect Barton Springs and the Edwards Aquifer. Petitioners argued the ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, and inefficient under the Texas Water Code, was enacted without required procedures such as a public hearing, and violated limits on regulating buildings in extraterritorial areas. The trial court declared the ordinance null and void based on jury findings and legal conclusions, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment upholding its validity. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the ordinance was validly enacted by referendum, did not exceed the city's authority under state law, and was not subject to the additional approvals or procedural hurdles claimed by petitioners.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryproperty

In Drilex Systems, Inc. v. Flores, Jorge Flores and his family sued multiple companies after Jorge suffered a severe hand injury while working on a drilling operation, alleging negligence by the defendants. Before trial, one defendant settled, and during trial the court excluded one of Drilex's expert witnesses after finding he had violated the sequestration rule by remaining in the courtroom and later discussing the case with a corporate representative. The jury apportioned responsibility and awarded damages, but disputes arose over the exclusion of the expert and the proper application of settlement credits under Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code when multiple plaintiffs seek recovery for injury to one person. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, that the excluded evidence was cumulative in any event, and that the settlement credit must be applied to the family's aggregate recovery after first reducing damages by the injured party's percentage of responsibility; it therefore affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as reformed and remanded for entry of judgment.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved consolidated challenges by out-of-state Alabama plaintiffs to Texas statutes governing asbestos personal injury suits filed in Texas courts, including a borrowing statute that applied Alabama's limitations period, provisions allowing forum non conveniens dismissals for non-residents, and mandatory dismissal rules for claims arising outside Texas. The trial court found certain provisions unconstitutional as retroactive or violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that section 71.051's forum non conveniens rules do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that sections 71.031(a)(3), 71.052(b), and 71.052(c) do not violate the asserted constitutional provisions on retroactivity, open courts, privileges and immunities, equal protection, or special laws. The core reasoning centered on the statutes' application to claims pending or filed around their 1997 effective date, the Legislature's authority to address forum shopping by non-residents, and distinctions based on residency and filing timing that did not trigger the claimed constitutional violations.

proceduretorts & liabilitycivil rights

This case involved three GTE Southwest employees who sued their employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that their supervisor subjected them to repeated abusive, profane, and humiliating conduct that caused severe emotional distress requiring medical treatment. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's damages award for the employees, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court also affirmed. The court held that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act did not bar the claims because the employees' mental trauma injuries did not arise from a specific accidental event and thus were not compensable under the Act. The court further concluded that the supervisor's ongoing pattern of extreme and outrageous behavior satisfied the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

labor & employmenttorts & liability