Wallace B. Jefferson

The case concerned a dispute over an attorney fee agreement in which Anglo-Dutch Petroleum engaged lawyer Gerard Swonke to assist in litigation on a contingent-fee basis. The client argued that the agreement, prepared on Greenberg Peden law firm letterhead and signed by Swonke on the firm's behalf, was a contract with the firm rather than Swonke personally. Swonke contended that the agreement's use of personal pronouns and surrounding circumstances rendered it ambiguous, requiring jury resolution as to whether it bound him individually. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the agreement was unambiguous and constituted a contract with the firm, reversing the court of appeals. The court reasoned that the document's plain terms on firm letterhead controlled and that extrinsic evidence could not override the reasonable client's understanding of those terms.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved two newspapers requesting travel vouchers from the Texas Department of Public Safety related to Governor Rick Perry's security detail under the Public Information Act. DPS sought to withhold the documents, arguing they were confidential under common law privacy to prevent substantial threats of physical harm, but the trial court and court of appeals ordered full disclosure. The Supreme Court of Texas held that common law privacy protections extend beyond highly intimate facts to information that would substantially threaten physical harm. It reversed the lower courts' judgments and remanded for further proceedings to apply this standard. The Court noted legislative developments but addressed the vouchers under existing law.

free speech

The case involved the City of Dallas seizing hundreds of vehicles from VSC, a licensed vehicle storage facility, on grounds that they appeared stolen, after which VSC sued alleging an unconstitutional taking of its storage liens without just compensation. VSC had not pursued the statutory process under Chapter 47 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows interested parties to petition a court for a hearing to determine possession rights and recover property or proceeds. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the availability of this statutory remedy bars a takings claim, reversing the court of appeals and dismissing the suit. The core reasoning was that the Legislature provided an adequate mechanism for asserting interests in seized property, making resort to constitutional takings claims unnecessary when that process is available.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved Texas voters and advocacy groups challenging the certification and use of paperless direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, such as the eSlate, on grounds that they failed to produce contemporaneous paper records of individual votes and thus violated state constitutional requirements for ballot secrecy and accurate recording. The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue most claims because they alleged only generalized grievances about the lawfulness of government acts rather than particularized, concrete injuries, and that their remaining claims failed on the merits. The court reasoned that the Secretary of State had followed all statutory certification, testing, and security procedures for the machines, which had no explicit legal requirement for paper trails despite prior unsuccessful legislative efforts to impose one. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment dismissing the case entirely.

electionsprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, a car dealership sued its insurer for breach of contract and other claims after receiving partial payments on a hail damage claim and then facing denial of further coverage; the insurer responded by invoking the policy's appraisal clause to resolve the amount of loss. The trial court denied the insurer's motion to compel appraisal, concluding that the insurer had waived the clause by failing to demand it before suit was filed. The Texas Supreme Court held that waiver of an appraisal clause requires either intentional relinquishment of a known right or conduct inconsistent with claiming the right, plus a showing of prejudice, and that mere delay in demanding appraisal does not suffice. The Court reasoned that such clauses are generally enforceable to provide an efficient alternative to litigation and granted conditional mandamus relief directing the trial court to compel the appraisal.

business & regulatoryproperty

Larry Roccaforte sued Jefferson County alleging that his termination as chief deputy constable violated rights under the Texas Constitution. The county moved to dismiss on the ground that Roccaforte failed to give the required statutory notice under Local Government Code section 89.0041 because he used personal service rather than registered or certified mail. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute does not mandate dismissal when the county judge and attorney receive timely actual notice that allows them to answer and defend the suit. The court reasoned that the purpose of the notice provision is satisfied by actual receipt, so the case should proceed on the merits rather than be dismissed for the manner of delivery.

procedurecivil rights

The case concerned a medical malpractice claim by the family of Irene Arancibia against the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center after her death from complications following hernia surgery performed by residents at a hospital affiliated with the university. The university sought dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to provide timely notice of the claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act, raising issues about whether the 2005 amendment to Government Code section 311.034 made such notice requirements jurisdictional and whether an interlocutory appeal was available. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the amendment applied to the pending suit, that actual notice to the university satisfied the statutory prerequisite, and that the trial court therefore had jurisdiction. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment denying the university's plea to the jurisdiction, reasoning that the Legislature's change to the statute rendered compliance with notice prerequisites a jurisdictional matter subject to immediate appellate review.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned contracts between residential developers and the Clear Lake City Water Authority under which the developers constructed water and sewer facilities and the Authority agreed to reimburse 70% of costs from voter-approved bond sales, including a clause requiring the Authority to place a reimbursement measure on the ballot in any bond election it held. After voters rejected reimbursement proposals in 1998 elections, the Authority omitted the measure from a 2004 election, leading the developers to sue for breach. The court held that the word "any" in the contracts means "every," so the Authority breached by failing to include the measure in each election, and that governmental immunity was waived by Texas Local Government Code section 271.152, allowing the suit to proceed. It therefore reversed the court of appeals in part on the contract claim and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming that the Authority's actions did not constitute a taking.

electionsbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether an auditor, Grant Thornton, could be held liable to certain bond investors (the Funds) for allegedly inaccurate audit reports on Epic Resorts that confirmed compliance with escrow requirements under the bond indenture, even though the investors continued purchasing bonds after learning of Epic's financial troubles and Prudential's non-renewal of credit. The Texas Supreme Court held that auditors owe no duty to provide accurate reports to unknown readers who might rely on them, only to the client corporation or known investors. It further ruled that the Funds could not demonstrate justifiable reliance on the reports for post-2000 purchases once they knew of the risks, could not substitute their escrow agent's reliance without being bound by its knowledge, and could not pursue holder claims (alleging they retained securities they otherwise would have sold) absent direct communications with the auditor. The Court reversed the court of appeals in part and rendered judgment that the investors take nothing.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

Kirk Wayne McBride, an inmate in a Texas Department of Criminal Justice facility, sued the Department after it disciplined him for possessing an alcoholic beverage and allegedly failed to notify him of the outcome of his administrative grievance, preventing him from appealing. McBride sought declaratory and injunctive relief claiming a due process violation, while the Department asserted sovereign immunity and requested attorney's fees and costs. The trial court dismissed the case on immunity grounds, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the fee request waived immunity. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that holding, ruling that a governmental entity's purely defensive request for attorney's fees incurred in litigation does not waive sovereign immunity under the standard set in Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, because it is not an assertion of affirmative claims for monetary relief.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Gary Fair slipping and falling on ice that had accumulated naturally on a roadway outside Scott & White Memorial Hospital following a winter storm, after which the Fairs sued the hospital for premises liability damages as invitees. The Texas Supreme Court held that naturally accumulated ice does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The court reasoned that such ice is comparable to other naturally occurring conditions like mud or dirt addressed in prior cases, as it results from precipitation beyond the premises owner's control, invitees are equally or better positioned to anticipate and avoid it, and imposing liability would burden owners for conditions they cannot prevent. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part and rendered judgment that the Fairs take nothing.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved an age discrimination lawsuit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act filed by James Steven Brite against USAA in a Bexar County court at law, which had a $100,000 jurisdictional limit that the claimed damages exceeded. After dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff refiled in district court and relied on a tolling statute (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.064) that extends the limitations period for cases filed in the wrong court if refiled within sixty days, unless the original filing showed intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff intentionally disregarded the county court's jurisdictional limits, so the tolling provision did not apply, and conditionally granted mandamus relief. The reasoning emphasized the plaintiff's awareness of the monetary limits, the amount of damages sought, and the statute's explicit exception for intentional disregard amid Texas's complex patchwork of trial court jurisdictions.

procedurelabor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved whether a German manufacturer of high-pressure hoses could be sued in Texas courts after one of its products, sold through a Texas distributor, ruptured and injured a Texas resident. The Texas Supreme Court held that the foreign company was subject to specific personal jurisdiction because it had intentionally targeted the Texas market by establishing an exclusive distributor in Houston, shipping products there regularly, and deriving a substantial portion of its sales from the state. The Court reasoned that the manufacturer's use of a distributor did not shield it from jurisdiction when it purposefully directed its products at Texas, and that exercising jurisdiction satisfied due process requirements of minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice. The Court affirmed the lower courts' denial of the manufacturer's special appearance challenging jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether a judgment creditor must return the difference between a large payment made by the judgment debtor to halt post-judgment interest and the much smaller amount ultimately owed after the original judgment was reversed on appeal. The court held that the creditor must make restitution of the overpayment. The core reasoning was that restitution is required to prevent unjust enrichment when a judgment is reversed, that the creditor's payment of taxes on the funds received did not create a defense, and that the creditor could have avoided the issue by declining the payment while the appeal was pending.

procedureproperty

The case involved a commercial lease dispute in which the landlord trust sued guarantors for unpaid rent and sought contractual attorney's fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001. The jury awarded the trust partial damages but zero fees; the trial court disregarded the zero-fee finding and awarded a reduced amount, while the court of appeals rendered judgment for the full fees requested as a matter of law under the Ragsdale rule. The Texas Supreme Court held that Ragsdale does not permit an appellate court to award the full amount of uncontroverted fees when the jury has awarded only about one-third of the damages sought, because reasonableness must account for the amount involved and results obtained. The court therefore reversed the fee award and remanded for a new trial on attorney's fees, noting that the jury's complete refusal to award any fees was also unsupported by the evidence.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a workers' compensation dispute in which the State Office of Risk Management paid benefits for an employee's knee contusion but later challenged coverage for pre-existing degenerative joint disease after receiving an MRI report and peer review. The court held that the sixty-day statutory period for contesting compensability under Texas Labor Code section 409.021(c) does not apply to disputes over the extent of injury, even when the basis for the dispute could have been discovered through reasonable investigation within that period. Instead, extent-of-injury disputes are governed by separate deadlines in administrative Rule 124.3(e), which allow carriers up to forty-five days from receipt of a medical bill to file a notice of dispute. The court reversed the judgments below, which had found waiver based on an appeals panel decision extending the compensability deadline to extent issues, and rendered judgment that no waiver occurred.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved attorney Boma Allison challenging a partially probated suspension imposed by a State Bar of Texas evidentiary panel for violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Allison argued that the panel, consisting of three attorney members and one public member, lacked a proper quorum under Rule 2.07 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and sought to vacate the judgment. The court held that the panel satisfied the quorum requirement, which mandates at least one public member for every two attorney members present, and affirmed the Board of Disciplinary Appeals' decision upholding the suspension. The reasoning focused on interpreting the rule's language to apply the 2:1 ratio factorially rather than requiring an exact proportion, meaning one public member suffices for three attorneys since the rule does not demand an even number of attorneys or an impossible fractional public member. The opinion examined the statutory background from Texas Government Code section 81.072(j) and related disciplinary rules to confirm the panel's composition was valid.

procedure

This case concerned whether a non-answering party in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship must be served with new citation when the petitioner files an amended petition seeking a more onerous judgment, such as sole managing conservatorship instead of joint conservatorship. After the original petition was served and the respondent failed to appear, the petitioner attempted to serve the amended petition by certified mail under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, but the mailing was returned unclaimed; the trial court nonetheless entered a default judgment granting the requested relief. The court of appeals upheld the judgment, holding that Rule 21a service sufficed and that the respondent had constructive notice. The Texas Supreme Court held that the 1990 amendment to Rule 21a eliminated the prior requirement of new citation for more onerous amended pleadings and that service under Rule 21a is now adequate, but concluded that the attempted service in this case was ineffective because the documents were never received and there was no evidence of actual or constructive notice. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Southwestern Bell, a telephone company required by Harris County and its toll road authority to move its underground facilities from a public right-of-way to accommodate construction of the Westpark Tollway. Southwestern Bell sued for reimbursement of relocation costs under Transportation Code section 251.102 and for inverse condemnation under the Texas Constitution's takings clause. The trial court ruled for the company, but the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court held that utilities have no vested property right to relocation at public expense under common law or the relevant statutes, that the county had not waived governmental immunity from suit, and that no compensable taking occurred.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Prodigy Communications Corp. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance Co., the case involved a dispute over coverage under a claims-made directors' and officers' liability insurance policy after Prodigy, as successor to the insured FlashNet, notified the insurer of a securities lawsuit more than two years after the claim was filed but within the policy's 90-day post-expiration window. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the insurer could not deny coverage based on the insured's alleged failure to give notice "as soon as practicable," reversing the court of appeals. The court reasoned that, consistent with its prior holding in PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co., the prompt-notice provision was not an essential part of the bargained-for exchange under the policy, so the absence of prejudice to the insurer prevented denial of coverage. The remaining issues were remanded to the trial court.

business & regulatory