Charles Bayley Adams

This case involves a tort action by Mary Foster against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont for injuries from slipping on ice formed on a public sidewalk due to water flowing from the church's driveway. The defendant argued it was immune from liability as a charitable and religious organization that exercised due care in selecting its agents. The Vermont Supreme Court held that privately conducted charitable institutions, including religious ones, are not exempt from liability for negligence or nuisance. The court reasoned that there was no established precedent or constitutional requirement for such immunity in Vermont, and after examining conflicting authorities from other jurisdictions, determined that standard tort rules should apply without special exemptions for charities.

torts & liabilityreligious liberty

This case involves a lawsuit by plaintiff Bressett against defendant O'Hara for property damages from a nighttime car collision at the intersection of Berlin and Smith streets in Barre, Vermont, on May 4, 1948. After a jury trial resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because he failed to look effectively before entering the intersection and that certain jury instructions were improperly denied. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff showed he slowed to 5-10 mph, looked both ways seeing no vehicle within 100 feet, and had the right to assume the defendant would obey traffic laws regarding speed, lights, and brakes, making contributory negligence a factual question for the jury rather than a legal bar. The court also rejected exceptions to the denial of a directed verdict and to the failure to give requested jury instructions on blind intersections and contributory negligence.

torts & liability

The case involves a taxpayer in Burlington suing the city and its mayor to enjoin the issuance of $650,000 in bonds for a sewerage disposal plant, which had been authorized by a 1948 city meeting vote, while a petition for a special meeting to rescind that vote remained pending. The defendants demurred, arguing that the original vote authorized the bonds, the city charter did not require a rescission vote, prior rescission attempts had failed, and the city council had already voted to issue the bonds. The court affirmed the overruling of the demurrers, holding that voters retain an unlimited right to rescind such votes through petitioned special meetings so long as no contracts have been made and no third-party rights have vested. This conclusion rested on precedents recognizing towns' authority to reconsider unexecuted resolutions and on the absence of statutory limits on repeated rescission petitions.

electionsprocedure

This case was a trespass action under Vermont statute seeking treble damages for cutting and removing timber from the plaintiffs' land, with the central dispute concerning the location of boundary lines and corner monuments between the Noble lot (owned by plaintiffs) and adjacent lots. The trial court found for the plaintiffs after making findings about stone monuments at the corners and boundary establishment by acquiescence, awarding treble damages. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the findings described different monuments at the southeast and northeast corners than those specified in the 1873 deed and the plaintiffs' declaration, which must control if ascertainable, and that the plaintiffs were required to prove the boundaries exactly as alleged without the court supplying missing facts by inference. The court further determined that related findings on acquiescence and possession were immaterial to the pleaded issues and could be disregarded.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over payment for lumber and trucking services under an oral contract between plaintiff Curran and defendant Bray Wood Heel Co. The plaintiff claimed a balance due after delivering over a million feet of lumber, while the defendant sent a check for a lesser amount ($118.87) accompanied by a letter stating it was full and final settlement, omitting disputed items like an alleged shortfall in tally. The plaintiff received but did not cash the check, retained it for over sixteen months without returning it, and later sued for the full balance. The court held that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted because the plaintiff's prolonged retention of the check tendered in full payment constituted an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law, reversing the judgment for the plaintiff and entering judgment for the defendant.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an appeal by the executor of Nellie M. Peters' estate from a probate court decision allowing a claim by Leah Lawrence for services rendered. The county court held a jury trial and admitted testimony from Dr. Berkley, who was unable to appear in court due to illness, by having the judges and attorneys take his statements at his home without the jury present and without following statutory deposition procedures such as proper notice. The estate objected to this process as irregular and contrary to the common-law requirement that witnesses testify in open court, as well as to the specific statutory rules for depositions in cases of infirmity. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted because it deviated from the strict requirements of the deposition statute, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case to allow the claimant an opportunity to present the evidence in a compliant manner.

procedureproperty

This case involved a negligence action by Appleyard Motor Transp. Co. against Ray Co. for damages to its milk tank trailer sustained in a 1947 head-on collision with Ray's truck on a curved Vermont highway. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff's driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for crossing the center line in violation of state traffic statutes. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motions for directed verdict and to set aside the verdict were properly denied because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that the trailer's deviation resulted from a pre-existing, undiscoverable defect in its torque arm of which the driver had no knowledge or reason to know, thereby rebutting any presumption of negligence from the statutory violations and presenting a jury question.

torts & liabilityprocedure