Jeffrey L. Amestoy

This case involved a lawsuit by Marcel and Raymonde Rochon against the State of Vermont for injuries from a collision with a state trooper's vehicle en route to a domestic assault emergency. The trooper was driving at the speed limit with lights on but no siren and attempted to pass the plaintiffs' car, which turned left into their driveway. The trial court granted summary judgment to the state, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under 23 V.S.A. § 1015(c), plaintiffs must prove recklessness rather than ordinary negligence to overcome sovereign immunity in such cases. The court reasoned that the statute's emergency vehicle privileges require a showing of reckless disregard for liability to attach, which was not pleaded here.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a restrictive covenant in defendants' deed, which prohibited installing 'mobile homes, campers or trailers' for residential use, barred placement of a modern manufactured home on their lot in a Vermont subdivision. Plaintiffs, neighboring lot owners, sought and obtained a permanent injunction from the trial court, which interpreted the covenant as intending to exclude all non-site-built homes based on the overall deed language and the historical context of covenants in the area. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by relying on the grantor's intent from 1982 rather than the parties' intent at the time of defendants' 2002 deed conveyance, and by finding a common development scheme where none existed across the subdivision's deeds. The court reasoned that absent evidence of intent to include manufactured homes and given industry changes, the covenant could not be extended by implication, and remanded for additional findings on the specific parties' understanding.

property

The case involved Marine Midland Bank's attempt to domesticate and enforce a 1991 New York judgment against David Bicknell in Vermont after he relocated there around 2000. The trial court dismissed the action, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was barred by the eight-year statute of limitations under 12 V.S.A. § 506. The court reasoned that Vermont's tolling provision in 12 V.S.A. § 552 did not extend the time because both parties were New York residents at the time the cause of action accrued, and the plaintiff had other enforcement mechanisms available in New York. It rejected arguments that the action had not accrued under New York law or that tolling should apply due to the defendant's later move.

procedure

This case concerned the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of plaintiff Anne Will's condominium unit by the Mill Condominium Owners' Association for unpaid dues under 27A V.S.A. § 3-116. The trial court confirmed the sale to the Seiples for $3,510 and granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the sale was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner as required by the UCIOA, based on the large disparity between the sale price and the $70,000 fair market value, the lack of efforts to obtain a higher price, and the disclosure of a minimum bid to the sole bidder. The court remanded for entry of judgment voiding the foreclosure sale.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of driving under the influence after police responded to a report of erratic driving, located his vehicle, and questioned him at a hotel parking lot, obtaining statements that he had driven and been drinking. The trial court denied the defendant's motions to suppress pre-arrest statements on Miranda grounds, to dismiss for lack of evidence of operation, and for a mistrial after an officer testified about the erratic driving complaint despite a prior exclusion ruling. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the interaction was a permissible investigative detention rather than custodial interrogation requiring warnings, the statements provided prima facie evidence of operation, and any improper evidence did not prejudice the defense that someone else had been driving.

criminal lawprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, firefighter Paul Crosby sought benefits for a psychological injury he attributed to workplace events including a building collapse during a fire and a shift transfer, claiming it triggered post-traumatic stress disorder. The Commissioner of Labor and Industry denied the claim, finding the stress was not objectively unusual compared to other firefighters and lacked an objectively sound basis. On appeal, a jury in superior court found in Crosby's favor under an instruction requiring comparison to the general employee population, but the Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the jury instruction used an incorrect standard inconsistent with the Commissioner's approach in prior cases like Bedini, which requires showing stress significantly greater than that faced by similarly situated employees. The court also rejected the City's constitutional argument that the Vermont Constitution bars compensation for purely psychological injuries without physical trauma.

labor & employmentprocedure