
Masterson v. VIRGINIA BEACH BD. OF ZON. APP.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1987-03-06
The case involved Virginia Beach residents challenging a building permit for a 17-story hotel and adjoining conference center, claiming violations of local zoning rules on front, side, and rear setbacks as well as parking. The Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the permit after requiring adjustment to meet a 35-foot oceanfront setback, and the circuit court affirmed the Board's action on the merits while dismissing a separate chancery suit for failing to meet the 15-day filing deadline under Code § 15.1-496.3. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the site plan complied with the ordinance because the conference center lot was not required to provide additional setbacks along Ocean Avenue or the 20-foot easement, nonconforming uses were not impermissibly expanded, and any error in dismissing the chancery suit was harmless given the parallel appeal proceeding.
propertyprocedure
Blake Const. Co., Inc. v. Alley
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1987-03-06 · cited 116×
In this case, general contractor Blake Construction sued architects Ballou and Justice for over $3.8 million in economic losses allegedly caused by the architects' negligent performance of duties under their contract with the project owner, the Commonwealth of Virginia, even though Blake had no direct contract with the architects. The trial court sustained the architects' demurrers and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that no cause of action exists for a contractor to recover purely economic losses from an architect or engineer in the absence of privity of contract. The court reasoned that Code § 8.01-223 eliminates the privity requirement only in negligence actions involving injury to person or property, not economic loss alone, and that architects owe no common-law duty to protect contractors from such losses, which are instead governed by contract.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Duggin v. Williams
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1987-03-06 · cited 10×
The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of land from Williams to Duggin, contingent on zoning for development, with Duggin later assigning his interest to a third party for a fee. After Williams canceled the contract for failure to settle by the deadline and sold the property elsewhere, Duggin sued for breach seeking damages based on the lost assignment fee. The trial court excluded Duggin's evidence of damages and entered judgment for Williams. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, reasoning that lost profits from the assignment were not recoverable because they were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was executed, as Williams had no knowledge of any plan to assign the contract for profit.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Correll v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1987-01-16 · cited 132×
The case involved Walter Milton Correll, Jr., who was tried without a jury and convicted of capital murder during the commission of an armed robbery and of robbery, resulting in a death sentence for the capital murder after the court found the killing outrageously vile and a life sentence for the robbery. Correll appealed, primarily challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's capital murder statutes under Furman v. Georgia on the basis that prosecutorial discretion in charging could lead to arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument, reaffirming prior precedents such as Gregg v. Georgia that such discretion does not invalidate the statutes or render the death penalty arbitrary. The court reviewed the evidence from accomplice testimony detailing the robbery and stabbing of the victim, addressed issues including the admissibility of statements and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and found no error warranting reversal. It therefore affirmed both convictions and the death sentence.
criminal lawprocedure
Carter v. Carter
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-10-10 · cited 13×
The case concerned efforts by Vivian Carter to enforce a 1964 Florida divorce decree awarding her a money judgment against her ex-husband Newman Carter, which she revived in Florida in 1977, by obtaining a Virginia judgment in 1981. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the action was time-barred by the 10-year statute of limitations in Code § 8.01-252 for suits on foreign judgments, which runs from the date the original judgment was rendered rather than from any revival. The court reasoned that Florida law treated the revival proceeding as a continuation of the 1964 judgment, not a new one, and that Virginia's shorter limitations period for foreign judgments compared to the 20-year period for domestic judgments under § 8.01-251 did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause or Equal Protection Clause because the statute is procedural and rationally related to legitimate state interests in finality of litigation.
procedurefamily law
Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-10-10 · cited 41×
This case consolidated two appeals addressing the duty of care owed by landowners or occupiers to firefighters and police officers injured while performing official duties on the premises. In the first, firefighter Pearson fell through an obscured hole in a building under demolition; in the second, officer Jones fell when a wooden platform collapsed during a search. The court adopted a limited-duty rule patterned on the standard for licensees, holding that an occupier owes a duty to warn of a hidden danger only upon actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and actual knowledge of the privileged person's presence on the premises. Applying this standard, the court sustained the demurrers and dismissed Pearson's action while upholding the jury verdict in Jones under a licensee instruction. The reasoning rests on the traditional trespasser-licensee-invitee framework, the assumption of inherent risks by public safety officers, and the need for a workable rule distinct from general invitee or licensee duties.
torts & liability
Lewis v. House
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-09-05 · cited 11×
This case involved a creditor's attempt to garnish joint checking and savings accounts held by a husband and wife to satisfy a $300,000 personal injury judgment against the husband from a car accident, after the husband's insurance paid part of the amount. The trial court allowed garnishment of most of the $9,909.46 in the accounts (after the husband's homestead exemption), but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The court held that under Code § 6.1-125.3, joint bank accounts between spouses are presumed to belong to them equally (one-half each), creating a rebuttable presumption that a creditor must overcome with clear and convincing evidence showing the debtor owns more than half; here the presumption was unrebutted, so the wife owned half the funds and the creditor could reach only the remaining balance after the exemption. The decision interpreted the statute's equal-ownership rule for married couples as protecting one-half of such deposits from the other spouse's creditors regardless of contribution amounts.
propertyprocedurefamily lawtorts & liability
Frye v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-06-13 · cited 272×
The case involved Gregory David Frye, who was convicted by a jury of capital murder of a Virginia State Police sergeant during a traffic stop and of using a firearm in a felony. The jury sentenced him to death based on a finding of future dangerousness, and the trial court imposed that sentence along with two years for the firearm conviction. On appeal, Frye challenged the admission of his confession, arguing it was obtained after an unreasonable delay in presentment to a magistrate, without proper Miranda warnings, and under coercive conditions. The court examined these claims under Virginia and West Virginia law, reviewed the trial evidence including forensic findings linking Frye's gun to the shooting, and addressed additional issues such as jury instructions on appellate review in capital cases.
criminal lawprocedure
Miller v. Johnson
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-04-25 · cited 44×
The consolidated cases concern two mothers who underwent failed abortion or sterilization procedures allegedly due to physician negligence and subsequently gave birth to healthy children; each sought damages for pregnancy-related harms plus the costs of raising the child to age 18 under a 'wrongful pregnancy' theory. The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that such tort actions are cognizable in the Commonwealth. Recoverable damages include pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost wages, and similar direct consequences of the pregnancy and birth, but not the expenses of rearing a healthy child to majority, as those costs are deemed too speculative, difficult to offset against the benefits of parenthood, and distinguishable from recoveries allowed when a child is born with foreseeable defects. The Court therefore reversed the damages award that included child-rearing costs and affirmed dismissal of the parallel claim seeking those same costs.
abortionhealthcaretorts & liabilityfamily law
Gudnason v. Life Insurance Co. of North America
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-04-25 · cited 11×
Pamela Gudnason filed a contract action seeking $50,000 under a group insurance policy issued by Life Insurance Company of North America for the death of her husband, which she alleged was accidental. The trial court held that the policy was an accident policy rather than a life insurance policy and that coverage had ended when Gudnason voluntarily terminated her employment and declined to convert the group policy to an individual policy. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, ruling that the policy documents expressly provided coverage only for losses from bodily injuries caused by accident and excluded losses from illness, and that the company's references to the policy as one of group life insurance were not binding admissions on the legal classification of the coverage. The court further held that the statutory provisions on conversion rights did not apply because the policy was not a life insurance policy under Virginia law.
business & regulatory
Crist v. Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-04-25 · cited 17×
The case involved a dispute over an assumption agreement in which Viking Construction assigned its interest in a 33-acre tract to Metropolitan Mortgage Fund in exchange for a promise to pay $250 per dwelling unit if Metropolitan successfully rezoned the property for higher residential density. Crist, a Viking partner, sued Metropolitan for breach of contract after it sold the land without attempting rezoning, and the buyer later obtained rezoning and site-plan approval for units. The trial court found a breach but awarded only $100 in nominal damages, concluding that compensatory damages were unproven. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that any actual damages were too speculative and contingent because there was no certainty Metropolitan would have obtained rezoning even if it had retained the property. The decision rested on the principle that damages must be established with reasonable certainty.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Ross v. Craw
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-04-25 · cited 90×
This case involved a divorced couple's dispute over whether their 1974 property settlement agreement, incorporated into the 1976 divorce decree, required the father to increase monthly child support payments annually in line with the Consumer Price Index. The agreement stated that support amounts "may be increased" based on the index, and the mother sought to enforce increases after the father ceased paying them starting in 1980, while the father petitioned to reduce payments. The trial court interpreted the language as mandatory and awarded the mother over $12,000 in arrearages. The appellate court reversed, ruling that "may" was permissive and the clause precatory, based on the agreement's use of "may" versus "shall" in other provisions and the lack of any requirement to treat the language as creating a legal obligation. The case was remanded for further determination of support payments.
family law
Brady v. HUMAN RESOURCE INSTITUTE OF NORFOLK
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-03-07
Alva Brady, a registered nurse, was discharged by her employer after attempting to refill a personal thyroid prescription by having another employee call the company pharmacy using her physician's name, leading her to apply for unemployment benefits. A deputy, appeals examiner, and the Virginia Employment Commission all found her eligible, determining that her employer had not proven misconduct connected to her work. The trial court reversed this decision, holding that the Commission's factual findings lacked evidentiary support and that its legal conclusion was untenable. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court, ruling that the Commission's findings were supported by the evidence, including testimony that Brady had her doctor's ongoing authorization to request refills, and therefore the Commission correctly concluded there was no disqualifying misconduct under Code § 60.1-58(b). The court emphasized that judicial review is limited to questions of law when factual findings are supported by evidence and there is no fraud.
labor & employmentprocedure
Basile v. American Filter Service, Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-03-07 · cited 20×
In Basile v. American Filter Service, Inc., plaintiff Santo Basile obtained a default judgment against nonresident defendant American Filter Service, Inc. for personal injuries allegedly caused by negligent cleaning services at his business. The trial court set aside the default judgment on the defendant's motion, finding it had not received actual notice despite substituted service on the Secretary of the Commonwealth under Code § 8.01-329, which was returned unclaimed. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Code § 8.01-428 permits setting aside a default judgment by motion only on grounds of fraud on the court, voidness, or accord and satisfaction, and that any equitable relief based on lack of notice requires a separate independent action rather than a motion in the same case; service was valid and complete under the statute even without actual notice. The court reinstated the default judgment.
proceduretorts & liability
Barnes v. Barnes
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-03-07 · cited 9×
The case concerned whether a husband could rescind a separation agreement after learning of his wife's prior marital misconduct. The trial court allowed rescission, finding fraudulent inducement based on the wife's concealment of her actions. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that once spouses separate, retain separate counsel, and negotiate a property settlement at arm's length, the confidential marital relationship ends and there is no duty to disclose past infidelity. The court reasoned that the parties become adversaries, any duty to discover relevant facts rests on each side, and the agreement contained no express or implied condition regarding fidelity. The case was remanded to enforce the agreement's payment terms.
family law
Stamie E. Lyttle Co., Inc. v. Hanover County
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-03-07 · cited 24×
The case involved a contractor, Stamie E. Lyttle Co. (Selco), that performed sewer system work for Hanover County under two contracts and later sought additional compensation for cost overruns and delays. Selco submitted a July 1980 letter proposing settlement of claims for $45,080.28, which the Board of Supervisors denied; Selco did not appeal within the statutory deadlines. The trial court dismissed Selco's subsequent suit as barred by Virginia Code provisions requiring timely presentation and appeal of claims against a county. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that the July 1980 submission was a settlement offer rather than a formal "claim or demand" under Code §§ 15.1-552 to -554, so the statutory bar did not apply and Selco could proceed with its later-presented claims in an original action.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Marchand v. DIV. OF CRIME VICTIMS'COMP.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-01-17
The case involved Scott Marchand, who lost sight in one eye due to a criminal act while a passenger in a car, seeking compensation under Virginia's Crime Victims' Compensation Act. The Division awarded him medical expenses and lost wages for the nine weeks he missed work, but Marchand claimed he was entitled to 100 weeks of compensation per the incorporated workers' compensation schedule for permanent loss of vision in an eye. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Industrial Commission's decision, holding that the Act's provision for loss of earnings is mandatory and requires awards according to the workers' compensation schedule, while the undue hardship provision only determines whether an award should be denied entirely. The court reasoned that this interpretation reconciles the statutory sections without conflict, giving effect to the mandatory language for calculating awards once eligibility is established.
criminal law
Metcalf v. AM EXP. MOVING SYSTEMS
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1986-01-17 · cited 1×
In Metcalf v. A.M. Express Moving Systems, a truck driver sought workers' compensation benefits after being shot multiple times while sleeping in his parked truck outside a company agent's office in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, holding that the claimant failed to prove his injuries arose out of his employment. The court reasoned that the assault, which involved no robbery attempt and appeared targeted at the claimant personally, did not support a presumption that it was work-related, as conflicting inferences could be drawn from the facts.
labor & employment
GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. AT&T Communications of Virginia, Inc.
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1985-11-27 · cited 11×
The case concerned appeals by GTE Sprint and MCI challenging a State Corporation Commission order that required interLATA carriers to compensate local exchange companies for intraLATA traffic under an interim plan and authorized AT&T of Virginia to set rates competitively. Following the federal divestiture of the Bell System, Virginia amended its laws to permit competition in intrastate long-distance service, and the Commission adopted implementing rules allowing certification and relaxed rate regulation where service would be provided on a competitive basis. The Commission considered statutory factors such as the number of providers and geographic availability before approving the applications and compensation plan. The court affirmed the order, holding that the interim compensation mechanism fairly addressed access disparities during the transition to equal access and that the competitive-rate authorization complied with the statutory criteria and public-interest requirements.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Hopkins v. Commonwealth
Supreme Court of Virginia · 1985-11-27 · cited 31×
In Hopkins v. Commonwealth, Jerry Wayne Hopkins appealed his convictions for the abduction of Rose Marie Kretschman in Martinsville and her first-degree murder in Franklin County, both stemming from events on May 1, 1983, involving a fishing trip that turned violent. The Virginia Supreme Court reviewed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the admissibility of testimony from a witness exposed to hypnosis prior to trial, and the admission of dental records and other evidence identifying the victim. The court upheld the convictions, determining that the evidence was sufficient and that pre-hypnotic recollections could be admitted under certain conditions without violating established evidentiary standards. Core reasoning centered on the consistency of witness accounts, the reliability of identification methods, and precedents allowing limited use of hypnotically influenced testimony when based on prior memory.
criminal law