Bruce F. Beilfuss

Russell Bulgrin was injured in a fire and explosion at the jointly owned Columbia Energy Center while employed by WP&L, which provided him worker’s compensation benefits. He and his wife sued MG&E and WPSC for negligence and safe-place violations, but those defendants obtained summary judgment by arguing that the worker’s compensation exclusivity provision barred the tort action because Bulgrin was also their employee. The court of appeals reversed, holding that MG&E and WPSC failed to make a prima facie showing under Wis. Stat. § 102.07(1) that they exercised the requisite control over the details of Bulgrin’s work; the operating agreements instead showed that WP&L alone directed day-to-day operations as if the plant were its own station. Because the moving parties did not satisfy their initial summary-judgment burden, the court did not reach the Bulgrins’ opposing affidavits and remanded for trial.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a paternity action brought by Pamela Dombrowski against Mark Moser after she applied for public assistance, where Moser sought to inspect the county social services department's confidential file on her for potentially exculpatory evidence to challenge her credibility. The trial court denied access under Wisconsin statute sec. 49.53(1) protecting AFDC records, leading to a jury verdict against Moser, but the court of appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that federal and state laws on AFDC confidentiality include exceptions for purposes connected to aid administration or related proceedings, and due process requires limited disclosure of relevant evidence to a paternity defendant. It outlined a procedure for in camera review by the trial court to release only necessary information under strict protective orders, with the case remanded for such a hearing and possible new trial.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a worker injured at a construction site who sued the crane company owner and insurer, initially under respondeat superior and safe-place statute claims, which resulted in summary judgment for the defendants. After that judgment was affirmed, the plaintiffs filed a second action alleging independent negligence by the defendant in failing to inform about OSHA regulations. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that the second action was barred by res judicata because it arose from the same transaction and the claims could have been litigated in the first proceeding, adopting the transactional view from the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Therefore, summary judgment was granted to the defendants without needing to address issues of material fact.

proceduretorts & liability

Rose Zinn, owner of land surrounding McConville Lake, sued the State of Wisconsin after the Department of Natural Resources issued a ruling that temporarily expanded the lake's ordinary high water mark onto approximately 200 acres of her property, designating it as public trust land under state statute. This action, later rescinded after rehearing, allegedly deprived Zinn of all reasonable use of the land for over a year and a half. Zinn claimed an unconstitutional temporary taking without just compensation under the Wisconsin Constitution and sought damages for inverse condemnation. The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that a temporary deprivation without physical invasion or legal restriction does not constitute a taking. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief because a temporary loss of title or use due to the state's action can qualify as a compensable taking, and sovereign immunity does not bar such constitutional claims.

propertyenvironment

The case involved a private nuisance claim by Harold Krueger, who operated a lawn and garden business near the Capitol Drive Airport, against the airport's owners, Dean and Lois Mitchell. Krueger alleged that the Mitchells' construction of a new paved runway in 1978 directed aircraft directly over his property, causing excessive noise that interfered with his business operations, and he sought damages for annoyance, inconvenience, and discomfort. A jury found the airport's operation constituted a nuisance and awarded damages, which the trial court reduced and the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Federal Aviation Act did not preempt state-law private nuisance actions against airport proprietors and that damages for personal discomfort from noise were recoverable without proof of monetary loss or physical injury. The court reasoned that Congress had not clearly intended to occupy the field of aviation noise regulation to the exclusion of such common-law claims.

torts & liabilitypropertyenvironment

The case was a paternity action in which the state alleged that Daniel Mjelde fathered Rhonda Byal's child born prematurely in September 1978, based on evidence of sexual intercourse between them from late 1977 through January 1978 and Byal's testimony that she had relations with no one else. The trial court found Mjelde to be the father by clear and satisfactory evidence, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the state had not adequately established the conceptive period. The supreme court modified and affirmed the reversal, ruling that the statutory presumption of the conceptive period did not apply because the child weighed under five and a half pounds at birth, and the state therefore bore the burden of introducing competent evidence of the conception window, which it had not done. The court remanded for a new trial at which the state could amend its complaint and present such evidence.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by six-year-old Missy Giese and her parents after she was severely injured when she collided with a Montgomery Ward riding lawn mower operated in reverse by fourteen-year-old Michael Shanahan on property owned by the Shanahan family. The plaintiffs alleged strict liability and negligence in the mower's design against Montgomery Ward and negligence against the Shanahans; the defendants cross-claimed and sought contribution from the Gieses for parental supervision failures. A jury rejected strict liability but found Montgomery Ward causally negligent, apportioned fault among Montgomery Ward (52%), Michael Shanahan (10%), and the Gieses (38%), and awarded damages, though subsequent verdicts and appeals raised issues regarding agency, contribution, and inconsistent findings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and directed entry of judgment on the first verdict, holding Montgomery Ward, Michael, and Bernard Shanahan liable to Missy while upholding the negligence allocations and related contribution claims. The core reasoning centered on the validity of the initial jury findings, the conclusive presumption against contributory negligence for children under seven, and the proper scope of vicarious liability through agency.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a post-divorce dispute in which the plaintiff mother was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant prepared by the defendant attorney for her ex-husband, based on her alleged refusal to allow court-ordered visitation with the children. The trial court dismissed her complaint against the attorney for malicious prosecution and abuse of process for failure to state a claim. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting an abuse of process claim and that the attorney could be denied immunity if he acted in bad faith. The court reasoned that pleadings must be liberally construed, that the operative facts control over labels, and that the allegations created a jury question on bad faith despite the lack of termination favorable to the plaintiff in the underlying proceedings.

family lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between a partnership, PIMA, and a corporation, MPC, over unpaid invoices for plastic parts sold to MPC. While employed as a manager at MPC responsible for sourcing outside vendors, Michael Burg secretly formed PIMA with others and arranged for it to supply parts to MPC, concealing his interest. After Burg's termination for poor performance, MPC learned of the conflict and refused payment on some deliveries, prompting PIMA's suit for the balance and MPC's counterclaim for breach of loyalty and conversion. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding that PIMA could recover its costs but must account for profits from the sales due to Burg's disloyalty, while MPC failed to meet the burden to recover Burg's full salary as damages.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

The case concerned Crown Life Insurance Company's action to enforce a contractual guaranty against Jack LaBonte for $45,000, stemming from a 1971 mortgage loan to Diversified Holdings for construction of an apartment building that was later assigned to Crown. After the property was sold in foreclosure for less than the outstanding debt, Crown sought the deficiency from LaBonte under the guaranty terms, which provided for liability on the first $45,000 of principal after assignment and allowed enforcement without first exhausting other remedies or pursuing the principal debtor. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Crown, reasoning that the guaranty's explicit language made LaBonte liable as principal until the specified amount was paid, that foreclosure proceeds were properly applied to the single debt, and that statutes governing guaranties and mortgages did not require additional steps or discharge the obligation here.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a defendant charged with drunk driving under a Walworth County ordinance who pleaded not guilty, requested a jury trial, and paid the fee, but failed to appear at the scheduled trial date due to a mistaken belief about the date while traveling in Hawaii. The trial court struck the not guilty plea, entered a no contest plea, and issued a default judgment imposing a forfeiture, license revocation, and potential jail time, relying on general default judgment procedures under sec. 799.22(2). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked authority to enter the default judgment because sec. 345.36 specifically governs the procedure for a defendant's failure to appear after a not guilty plea in traffic regulation cases and requires issuance of a warrant instead. The court reasoned that the detailed statutes in secs. 345.21 to 345.53 control over the general provisions of ch. 799 when a specific procedure is provided, and remanded the case for trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Public Service Commission had authority under Wis. Stat. sec. 66.076(9) to review a municipal sewerage rate ordinance, determine that rates charged to Kimberly-Clark were unreasonable or discriminatory, and order retroactive rate adjustments or refunds for the period 1974-1976. The PSC issued a declaratory ruling that it lacked such authority, which the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize retroactive rate-making, noting that municipal sewer systems are not public utilities subject to ch. 196 regulation, that other statutes explicitly grant retroactive powers when intended, and that the incorporated procedures from secs. 196.26-196.40 prohibit retroactive rates.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether the Town of Sun Prairie could validly adopt an ordinance under Wis. Stat. sec. 236.45 setting minimum lot sizes of 80,000 square feet and 200 feet of road frontage as a subdivision regulation. The town sued to rescind a certified survey map and conveyance that created smaller lots in violation of the ordinance, while the defendants argued the measure was an invalid zoning ordinance adopted without required procedures such as a referendum. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that towns have authority under ch. 236 to regulate minimum lot sizes through subdivision ordinances, reversing the lower courts. The core reasoning was that sec. 236.45 grants local governments broad, liberally construed power to impose requirements more restrictive than state minimums in order to promote public health, safety, and orderly land development, and that such regulations are distinct from zoning.

property

This case arose from the liquidation of All-Star Insurance Corporation, a Wisconsin insurer, where the appointed liquidator sued two out-of-state insurance agencies (APS, an Illinois corporation, and Scarborough, a Louisiana corporation) to recover unpaid premiums and unearned commissions allegedly due under their agency contracts with All-Star. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing insufficient contacts with Wisconsin, but the trial court denied the motions and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff; on appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed only the jurisdiction issue as to both defendants. The court held that sec. 645.04(5)(a), Stats., which provides for personal jurisdiction over persons obligated to a domestic insurer in liquidation incident to an agency arrangement, constitutionally applies here and satisfies due process. Its core reasoning was that the defendants' agency contracts with a Wisconsin insurer created the requisite minimum contacts, the state's strong interest in efficient liquidation of domestic insurers (analogous to the insurance context in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.) supported jurisdiction, and defending in Wisconsin did not impose an unreasonable burden given the litigation's connection to the forum.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a juvenile, S.D.R., who had been adjudicated delinquent and placed in state custody under a one-year dispositional order set to expire on January 18, 1981. Six days before expiration, the state petitioned to extend the order, but the court could not hold a full hearing on the merits before the deadline, so it temporarily extended custody for up to 30 days under Wis. Stat. sec. 48.365(6) to allow time for the hearing. S.D.R. challenged the temporary extension as a violation of his due process rights to liberty and argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the statute permits such a brief extension when a timely petition is filed but a hearing cannot occur before expiration, and that this procedure does not deprive the juvenile of a protected liberty interest or violate due process, as the statutory scheme defines the duration of custody orders.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefamily law

The case involved a single count of battery against defendant Daniel Giwosky arising from a June 1980 confrontation on his property, during which he threw a piece of wood toward victim John Noldin and then struck him multiple times with his fists, knee, and feet, causing bodily harm. After a jury convicted Giwosky, the trial court granted a new trial on grounds that the complaint was duplicitous and thereby denied the right to a unanimous verdict; the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the multiple acts could properly be charged as one offense because they formed part of a single, continuous episode with a common purpose and were not separate crimes requiring separate charges. The court reasoned that the evidence supported a finding of one course of conduct and that the jury instructions adequately ensured unanimity on the elements of battery under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a 14-year-old plaintiff who became ill at a concert and was taken to a police station, where an officer negligently confined her in an unlocked cell overnight after failing to contact her parents or notify the next shift, causing her emotional distress diagnosed as traumatic neurosis but no physical injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the police officer, city, and insurer on the ground that precedent barred recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress without accompanying physical injury, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a claim for emotional distress caused by negligent confinement is actionable without physical injury under limited circumstances where the facts provide a sufficient guarantee of genuineness. The court distinguished this situation from ordinary negligent infliction of emotional distress claims and noted that the underlying negligence issues remained for trial.

torts & liability

The case concerned a defendant convicted by jury of burglary, possession of burglarious tools, and habitual criminality who later moved for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. sec. 974.06, claiming that the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself after making critical remarks to defense counsel during pretrial hearings violated due process and the right to effective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, the court of appeals affirmed, and the supreme court granted review. The court held that the judge's statements expressing irritation at counsel's motions and questioning did not demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against the defendant, as they focused on counsel's conduct outside the jury's presence, the judge disclaimed any prejudice, and the record showed no impact on the fairness of the trial. The decision applied the constitutional and statutory standards for judicial disqualification, concluding that the challenged conduct did not require reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant convicted under a Walworth County ordinance for drunk driving as a first offense, despite having a prior conviction within five years; the defendant argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the matter should have been charged as a second offense under state criminal law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed under the local ordinance. The court reasoned that the mandatory language of sec. 346.65(2)(a), Stats., requiring criminal penalties for second offenses, combined with the state's exclusive authority to prosecute crimes, meant such violations could not be handled as civil forfeitures by local authorities, even though prosecutors generally have charging discretion and localities may adopt conforming traffic ordinances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a post-conviction challenge by John Lewis Lee, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1972 after a jury rejected a heat-of-passion manslaughter defense. Lee argued that the trial court's jury instruction improperly shifted the burden to him to prove heat of passion, violating due process. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief but clarified that once a defendant presents sufficient evidence of heat of passion, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under that influence. The court reasoned from the statutory definitions distinguishing first-degree murder (intentional killing) from manslaughter and from constitutional requirements that the prosecution bear the burden on elements negating lesser offenses. Related issues of jury instructions and provocation evidence were also addressed in the opinion.

criminal lawprocedure