Timothy S. Buckley

The case involved Ridgecrest Charter School's request for facilities from Sierra Sands Unified School District under the Charter Schools Act as amended by Proposition 39, which mandates that districts provide charter schools with reasonably equivalent and contiguous facilities for their in-district students. The district offered space at five different sites totaling 9.5 classrooms spread across 65 miles, while the charter school argued for a single site since some district sites could accommodate all 223 students. The trial court denied the charter school's petition for a writ of mandate, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the district failed to minimize the number of sites assigned when a single site was not used and did not adequately consider student safety or the contiguity requirements.

business & regulatory

In People v. Enos, the defendant entered a plea bargain resolving three separate criminal cases and was sentenced to five years in prison, with the trial court imposing separate restitution fines and matching parole revocation fines in each case that totaled $1,000. The defendant appealed, contending that the statutes permitted only a single set of fines because the cases were resolved by one comprehensive plea agreement at a combined sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the cases remained distinct since they were never consolidated, were treated as separate throughout the proceedings, and the total fines did not exceed the statutory maximum. The court distinguished prior authority that had limited multiple fines only where the aggregate exceeded the cap, noting that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the allocation among cases.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned defendant Allen Thomas Ayers, who was charged with spousal battery, making terrorist threats, and false imprisonment after an August 2003 incident in which he allegedly struck, choked, and threatened his partner Marisa M., the mother of his children. At trial, Marisa recanted much of her initial account, but the jury convicted Ayers solely of spousal battery under Penal Code section 273.5(a) and acquitted him on the remaining counts. On appeal, Ayers challenged the admission of records from a domestic violence shelter under the business records exception, arguing they contained inadmissible double hearsay, and contended that the standard jury instruction (CALJIC No. 9.35) should have been modified to require proof of “unlawful” injury. The court concluded that the shelter records were improperly admitted but that any error was harmless, that refusal to modify the instruction was not error or was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal law

The case involved Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control challenging the City of Bakersfield's approval of two large retail shopping centers under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), each featuring a Wal-Mart Supercenter and together totaling 1.1 million square feet. The court held that the environmental impact reports (EIRs) for the projects were inadequate, requiring their decertification and rescission of the associated project approvals and land use entitlements. The reasoning centered on the EIRs' failure to evaluate the potential for the centers to indirectly cause urban or suburban decay through economic competition and store closures, their omission of cumulative impacts from treating both projects together, and their lack of correlation between acknowledged air quality harms and resulting effects on human respiratory health.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an appeal by a father from an order terminating his parental rights to his five children in a dependency proceeding initiated after the children were exposed to methamphetamine labs on the family property. The father contended that the juvenile court had erroneously found the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) inapplicable, because the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services had not provided all available information about the children's potential Indian heritage to relevant tribes. The Court of Appeal reversed the termination order, holding that an agency's compliance with basic ICWA notice requirements is insufficient if it possesses additional identifying heritage details that were not shared with the tribes, as this information is necessary for tribes to determine a child's eligibility for membership. The matter was remanded for the department to serve complete notices, including all known Indian heritage information, and for the trial court to reassess whether ICWA applies.

family lawcivil rightsfederal power

This case involved subsequent homeowners suing the builder Anderson Homes for latent construction defects, including improper installation of chimneys, roofs, windows, and siding that caused progressive water damage to the structures, which the plaintiffs discovered only after their purchases. The trial court granted the builder's motion in limine and dismissed the negligence and strict liability claims, relying on Krusi v. S.J. Amoroso Construction Co. to conclude that any causes of action had accrued in the original owners when physical damage first occurred. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that absent proof the original owners suffered actual economic injuries from the defects, they possessed no causes of action that would bar the subsequent owners from bringing their claims. The core reasoning was that a tort cause of action for latent construction defects accrues upon the owner's compensable economic injury rather than upon the initial undetected physical damage to the property.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

Andrew Kim sued the Boy Scouts of America after he was not promoted to Eagle Scout by his 18th birthday, alleging that incomplete information and an unreasonable denial violated his common law right to fair procedure. The trial court sustained the Boy Scouts' demurrer without leave to amend, finding no valid cause of action. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the right to fair procedure applies only to arbitrary exclusion or expulsion from membership in certain private organizations affecting the public interest, not to decisions about conferring ranks, awards, or leadership roles. The court noted that Kim failed to allege any substantial economic harm or interference with his profession and could not identify supporting authority to expand the doctrine. The judgment dismissing the case was therefore affirmed.

procedurecivil rights

In People v. Avila, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of four counts of second degree commercial burglary for charging approximately $1,200 in merchandise to an unauthorized account over four days in February 2002, and the trial court found one prior strike and three prior prison term enhancements true, resulting in a nine-year sentence. The published portion of the opinion addressed the defendant's claim that debilitating back pain and headaches rendered him mentally absent during trial, violating his rights, and that the trial court erred by refusing to suspend proceedings. The court held that the record did not demonstrate the defendant was unable to understand the proceedings or assist counsel, noting his articulate responses, ability to communicate with counsel, and the trial court's reasonable accommodations, and thus found no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial or continuance. The unpublished portion determined the sentence was unauthorized due to improper handling of enhancements. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the matter was remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant who, while incarcerated, engaged in a physical altercation with two jail deputies after being ordered to sit during a visit; he claimed self-defense, including based on alleged prior assaults by deputies, and was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of the lesser offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter with a great bodily injury enhancement. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on the effect of any antecedent assaults by the victim on the reasonableness of his self-defense conduct and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request such an instruction. The court determined that an instruction on this point is available only upon a timely request and that counsel's omission was a reasonable tactical decision to avoid topics that could undermine the defense or introduce evidence of motive for revenge. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Palmer v. Zaklama, buyers who acquired a house at a sheriff's sale sued the prior owners after the owners recorded three separate lis pendens notices tied to appeals, a federal civil rights action, and a bankruptcy proceeding, all aimed at challenging the sale and clouding title. This prevented the buyers from selling or refinancing the property for years, leading to extra costs and a later sale on worse terms. The jury found the owners liable on claims of malicious prosecution, slander of title, and abuse of process and awarded damages; the appellate court affirmed, holding that the lis pendens lacked valid real-property claims under the relevant statutes and that the underlying actions were not supported by probable cause.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In People v. Moreno, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with gang and firearm enhancements and sentenced to 52 years to life in prison, with the court imposing restitution fines but no direct victim restitution order despite the state Victims of Crime Program having paid burial expenses to the victim's family. After the judgment was affirmed on appeal, the trial court granted a post-appeal request to order the defendant to reimburse the state for those payments. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Penal Code section 1202.46 authorizes such a restitution order even after final judgment and affirmance on appeal because the statute mandates full victim restitution unless the court states compelling and extraordinary reasons for not ordering it.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mills v. Forestex Co., homeowners sued the contractor who built their house and garage and the manufacturer of the hardboard siding installed on the structures, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict products liability after the siding warped, buckled, and deteriorated. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the applicable statutes of limitation had expired. The trial court granted the motions, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the limitations periods began to run no later than 1996 when the plaintiffs discovered the siding failures and contacted the manufacturer, that the 2000 filing was untimely, and that the facts did not support equitable tolling or estoppel based on repair discussions or concealment. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims were governed by the three- and four-year limitation periods for injury to real property and written contracts, respectively, and that any potential tolling arguments were either unpleaded or unsupported by the record.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved the Association of Irritated Residents and another group challenging Madera County's certification of a final environmental impact report and issuance of a conditional use permit for the construction and operation of the Diamond H Dairy. The appellants argued that the report inadequately assessed impacts on the San Joaquin kit fox, failed to require an incidental take permit, did not sufficiently analyze a reduced-herd-size alternative, and overlooked cumulative groundwater quality impacts from dairy development. The court affirmed the denial of their petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the environmental impact report met CEQA requirements by adequately informing the decision-makers and the public about the project's environmental effects.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves Ronald Eliceche's repeated efforts to challenge a 1989 foreclosure sale of property he pledged as loan security to the Federal Land Bank Association, including prior appeals that resulted in partial reversals allowing claims for breach of contract and fraud to proceed after a 1997 remittitur. Following delays, the trial court granted the bank's motion for discretionary dismissal for lack of prosecution under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.410, heard on shortened notice just before the mandatory three-year dismissal deadline, and Eliceche appealed only the notice issue. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the shortened notice was permissible under the circumstances, that any timeliness defect was waived by Eliceche's appearance to oppose the motion, and that the 45-day notice rule for discretionary dismissal motions does not strictly apply when such a motion coincides with efforts to specially set trial near the end of the mandatory dismissal period.

propertyprocedure

The case involved charges against William Gnass, the city attorney for Waterford, for 10 criminal violations of Government Code section 1090 arising from his alleged financial interest in joint powers agreements and related bond issuances made while acting in his official capacity. The trial court dismissed the indictment after finding insufficient evidence of probable cause. On appeal, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Gnass was financially interested in contracts made in his official capacity under section 1090, but that the district attorney's failure to instruct the grand jury on the required mental state of knowing and willful conduct, combined with other procedural irregularities such as unrecorded statements, likely caused the grand jury to indict without probable cause. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the indictment.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case is a dissolution of marriage action in which husband Bearl Murray appealed trial court orders on reserved issues of spousal support and division of community property. The trial court found that the husband had the ability to pay support from 1992 to 1999, had committed fraud against the wife regarding the disposition of proceeds from the sale of their home, and ordered him to pay $64,000 in retroactive support arrearages plus an equalizing payment of $28,902.91 after awarding the wife the full $82,000 from the house sale. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the husband's arguments that the 1992 support suspension was res judicata, that no changed circumstances justified reinstatement, that he lacked ability to pay, and that there was insufficient evidence of fraud connected to the property. The decision rested on evidence of the husband's financial circumstances, his evasive disclosures, the dismissal of his bankruptcy for attempted fraud, and fiduciary duties between spouses in managing community assets.

family lawproperty

In this family law case, James Lynn appealed a trial court order requiring him to pay spousal support and attorney fees to his ex-wife Patricia, with the support amount set to match an unpaid property settlement from their 1994 divorce that had been discharged in his 1999 bankruptcy. The court held that while a discharged property settlement obligation could be considered when reassessing spousal support under Family Code section 3592 and related factors in section 4320, the trial court erred by basing the order solely on the discharged debt without evaluating the parties' current financial circumstances, incomes, expenses, and other statutory criteria. The appellate court therefore reversed the support and fee orders and remanded for proper consideration of all relevant factors.

family lawproperty

Edward Kashian, chairman of a nonprofit hospital board, sued attorney Richard Harriman and Valley Advocates for unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 and defamation after Harriman wrote to the Attorney General requesting an investigation into Kashian's possible undisclosed conflicts of interest with the hospital and related entities. Harriman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted as to all claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the letter concerned an issue of public interest regarding the hospital's tax-exempt status and potential conflicts, that Kashian had not shown a probability of prevailing on the merits, and that the statements were protected by the common-interest privilege. The court further concluded that Harriman's prior litigation activities did not establish a pattern of deceit sufficient to defeat the motion.

business & regulatoryfree speechproceduretorts & liability

The case involved defendant Andre Rene Floyd, who was convicted of cocaine possession and sentenced in November 2000 to 28 years to life under California's three strikes law based on prior convictions. After voters passed Proposition 36 in November 2000, which generally requires probation and drug treatment for nonviolent drug offenses instead of incarceration and set an effective date of July 1, 2001, Floyd argued on appeal that the law should apply to him because his case was not yet final. The Court of Appeal held that Proposition 36 applies only prospectively to convictions occurring on or after July 1, 2001, and does not extend to defendants sentenced before that date even if their appeals remained pending. The court reasoned that the initiative's plain language specifies prospective application to convictions (including sentencing) on or after the operative date, and historical interpretations of the term "conviction" do not include an implied requirement that the judgment be affirmed on appeal absent any contrary evidence of voter intent.

criminal law

This case involved the Kern County Department of Human Services appealing a juvenile court's order granting reunification services to legal guardians and parents after removing two children from their care, based on prior sexual abuse of another former ward. The County argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5(b)(6) should bar services because the abuse victim qualified as a 'sibling' under an expansive legal definition of the term. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that the statute's use of 'sibling' refers to its ordinary meaning of sharing a common biological or legal parent, and does not incorporate broader definitions from unrelated code sections or include step- or foster relationships. The court reasoned that the plain statutory language, the explicit inclusion of half-siblings in the provision, and principles of statutory construction precluded a broader interpretation without legislative action.

family law