Jeffrey King

This case involved a dispute between two insurers, Clarendon and NAC, over NAC's obligation to contribute to defense costs that Clarendon incurred defending their mutual insured, Tanamera, in a construction defect lawsuit brought by homeowners. Clarendon sought declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and indemnity after NAC refused to defend, arguing that its policy's $25,000 per-claim self-insured retention applied separately to each of the eight covered homes and had not been satisfied. The trial court granted NAC summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed, holding that NAC failed to show no potential for coverage as a matter of law because the policy language was ambiguous regarding whether the SIR applied once to the entire action or per home, and the insured could have reasonably expected single application based on other policy terms and circumstances at issuance.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Beutz v. County of Riverside, a property owner challenged a special assessment district created by the County of Riverside to fund ongoing landscaping and maintenance costs for four public parks in Wildomar, arguing that the assessment violated article XIII D of the California Constitution (enacted by Proposition 218) by failing to separate general benefits from special benefits and by not limiting the assessment to the value of special benefits conferred on the assessed parcels. The trial court granted summary judgment to the County, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that although the County correctly based its analysis on the larger master plan project rather than just the landscaping component, it failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the assessment was proportional to and did not exceed the special benefits to the assessed properties. The court reasoned that special assessments under Proposition 218 must be supported by clear evidence distinguishing special benefits from general benefits to the public at large, and that the County's approach did not satisfy this constitutional requirement.

taxesproperty

The case involved defendant Heidi Ann Traugott, who was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for sale and related misdemeanors after a trial in which only 11 jurors remained to return the verdicts, with the defendant absent from court. The trial court accepted the verdicts after defense counsel stipulated to proceeding without the 12th juror or the defendant present. On appeal, the court held that the defendant's state constitutional right to a unanimous 12-person verdict was violated because there was no valid waiver or forfeiture of that right, and the error was structural, requiring reversal of the judgment without addressing other issues raised.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Becker, the defendant was convicted of simple possession of Ecstasy (MDMA) under Health and Safety Code section 11377, along with other offenses from an assault, after police found 10 MDMA tablets in his possession. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of insufficient evidence and lack of due process notice. The court reasoned that testimony from an investigator established MDMA as either a controlled substance stimulant or an analog of methamphetamine under section 11055, providing substantial evidence for the conviction, and that the information's reference to "Ecstasy" and a "controlled substance" under section 11378 adequately notified the defendant of the charge.

criminal law

In People v. Trujillo, the defendant fired multiple shots from a semiautomatic rifle at a moving car containing a driver and a backseat passenger after mistaking its occupants for rivals; at least two bullets struck the car but no one was injured. He was charged with two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle; the jury acquitted him of the attempted murder charges but convicted him on the remaining counts and found he personally used a firearm. On appeal the court addressed whether the evidence supported two assault convictions when the defendant claimed he did not know about the backseat passenger. The court concluded the evidence was sufficient, holding that once the required mental state for assault is established as to one victim it applies to all others within the zone of harm even if unseen or unknown to the defendant. The court stayed the sentence on the discharge count under Penal Code section 654 and otherwise affirmed the judgment as modified.

criminal law

In Cooper v. State Farm, the plaintiff, insured by State Farm, was injured in a single-car accident allegedly caused by a defective tire; after settling the property damage claim, State Farm took possession of the vehicle and tire, had it examined, informed the plaintiff of the defect finding, and promised to retain the tire, but later destroyed it. The plaintiff sued the tire manufacturer but faced difficulties proving the defect claim without the evidence, then added claims against State Farm for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and negligent destruction of evidence based on the promise and reliance. The trial court granted State Farm's motion for nonsuit after the plaintiff's opening statement, finding the damages too speculative under Cedars-Sinai and Temple precedents. The appellate court reversed, holding that the facts alleged a prima facie case of detrimental reliance on State Farm's voluntary undertaking to preserve the tire, that the opening statement supported an inference the tire was defective and the underlying case could have succeeded, and that damages were reasonably ascertainable under promissory estoppel or similar theories.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In People v. Peyton, the defendant was convicted of one count of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 with duress or force and multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault on the 12-year-old daughter of his live-in girlfriend, resulting in a sentence of 66 years to life. The published portion of the opinion addressed the defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecution filed an amended information at the close of its case that added a new charge without a preliminary hearing having been held on that charge. The court reversed the lewd act conviction because the amendment violated due process notice requirements, as the new charge was not a lesser included offense of the others and the defendant lacked adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. In all other respects, including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing, the judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Amanda Laabs was injured as a passenger when the car she rode in, driven at excessive speed, was struck at an intersection, jumped the curb, and collided with a concrete light pole owned by defendant Southern California Edison Company (SCE) and placed 18 inches from the curb. Laabs sued SCE and Edison International for negligence, alleging the pole's placement too close to the curb proximately caused her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they owed no duty of care as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as to Edison International but reversed as to SCE, holding that triable issues of material fact existed regarding the existence of a duty based on factors including the foreseeability of harm to motorists from the pole's location. The court reasoned that, unlike cases involving only the pole's relationship to other traffic devices, the placement itself could create a hazard warranting further factual development on duty and breach.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., plaintiff Jess Mexia sued the boat manufacturer and seller under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, alleging that a latent defect caused engine corrosion in a boat purchased in 2003; the complaint was filed in 2006. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, accepting their argument that a statutory duration provision barred the claim. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the duration provision in Civil Code section 1791.1(c) merely sets a limited prospective period for the implied warranty and does not function as a statute of limitations or impose a deadline for discovering and reporting latent defects. The applicable four-year statute of limitations had not expired, and the plain statutory language, read in light of the Act's consumer-protection purposes, permitted the action to proceed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Jeffrey Farrar Dean appealing his recommitment as a sexually violent predator under California's SVPA based on prior convictions for forcible rape and sodomy. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing expert testimony based on inadmissible hearsay from institutional records, that appointing only one defense expert violated due process, and that the experts' evaluation protocols had not been properly adopted as administrative regulations. The Court of Appeal affirmed the recommitment order, holding that any hearsay admitted through the experts' testimony was not reversible error, that no due process violation occurred from the single-expert appointment, and that the regulatory-adoption claim lacked merit.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned Jeffrey Farrar Dean's appeal from a jury finding that he qualified as a sexually violent predator under California's SVPA, leading to his recommitment to the Department of Mental Health based on prior convictions for forcible rape and sodomy. The Court of Appeal affirmed the recommitment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing prosecution experts to testify about hearsay contained in records of the qualifying offenses and institutional files, as most of the information was admissible under the business records exception or as the basis for expert opinions. The court also rejected the due process claim arising from the appointment of only one defense expert, finding that the defendant was able to fully present his case, and it upheld the use of the experts' evaluation protocols without requiring formal regulatory adoption.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute over residential property purchased during the marriage of Michael Brooks and Annikkawa Robinson, where title was taken solely in Robinson's name despite the down payment coming from Brooks's earnings. After separation, Robinson sold the property to Executive Capital Group (ECG) without Brooks joining in the conveyance, leading Brooks to file a complaint seeking to declare the property community property and set aside the sale. The trial court rejected Brooks's claims and entered judgment for ECG, which the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the form of title created a presumption of separate property that was not rebutted, and ECG was a bona fide purchaser who had no notice of any community property interest based on the recorded deed and statements from Robinson.

family lawproperty

In this case, minor plaintiff Amanda Laabs sued the City of Victorville and the County of San Bernardino after sustaining injuries in a car collision at the intersection of Ridgecrest Road and Pebble Beach Drive, alleging that a dangerous condition of public property caused the accident under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on the dangerous condition claim, denied the City's motions for defense costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 and expenses under section 2033.420, and denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment for the City as well as the denial of the City's requests for costs and expenses, based on the absence of triable issues regarding the property condition and implied findings that the plaintiff did not act without reasonable cause or in bad faith.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, defendants Paredes and Noriega were jointly tried and convicted by separate juries of first-degree murder with special circumstances for killing Cesar Cortez during a carjacking or robbery, with Noriega also found to have used a firearm; a third participant testified after pleading guilty. Paredes challenged the sufficiency of evidence for the special circumstances and his inability to testify only before his own jury, while Noriega challenged admission of a confession and the trial court's removal of his appointed public defender. The Court of Appeal affirmed Paredes's judgment in full, finding sufficient evidence and no violation of his rights. For Noriega, the court held that disqualifying his counsel was an abuse of discretion that violated his state constitutional right to counsel of choice and was reversible per se, reversing his judgment while rejecting his other claims.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Save Round Valley Alliance to Inyo County's certification of an EIR and approval of a tentative tract map for subdividing 74 acres near Mt. Whitney into 27 parcels for single-family homes. The plaintiff argued the EIR inadequately described the project by ignoring potential second dwellings, failed to properly analyze a BLM land exchange as an alternative, and insufficiently assessed impacts on special status species and visual resources. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that the EIR's analysis of the land exchange alternative was legally insufficient because it did not adequately evaluate the alternative's feasibility under CEQA standards. The court rejected the plaintiff's other claims regarding project description and impact analyses, finding them adequately addressed in the EIR.

environmentpropertyprocedure

In People v. Scott, a jury convicted the defendant of incest under Penal Code section 285 after finding he had sexual intercourse with his 18-year-old daughter, and the trial court imposed a six-year prison term enhanced by a prior strike conviction. The defendant appealed, contending that the incest statute violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because Lawrence v. Texas (2003) protects consensual sexual conduct between adults. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that Lawrence does not invalidate laws prohibiting incest. The court reasoned that the state has legitimate interests in preventing inbreeding, preserving family integrity, and protecting persons who may not freely consent, and that section 285 applies only to opposite-sex blood relatives and thus serves those interests without the overbreadth issues present in other statutes.

criminal lawfamily lawcivil rights

The case involved defendant Timmie Lance McNeal, who was charged with generic driving under the influence under Vehicle Code section 23152(a) and per se DUI under section 23152(b) based on breath test results showing a 0.10 blood-alcohol concentration derived from the standard partition ratio. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reopen to present expert evidence on partition ratios for the generic DUI charge, relying on People v. Bransford, which had barred such evidence for per se DUI. The Court of Appeal held that evidence of a defendant's personal partition ratio is admissible in a prosecution for generic DUI because it can bear on whether the defendant was actually under the influence, as the statute incorporates presumptions tied to blood-alcohol levels rather than a fixed statutory definition. The court distinguished the two offenses based on statutory text, legislative history, and the scientific relationship between breath and blood alcohol, while noting that general variability evidence alone would not be relevant to intoxication.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a child born with severe brain abnormalities who, through her guardian, sued Desert Hospital and a nurse for wrongful life, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel. She alleged negligence in failing to detect and disclose fetal defects during prenatal care at a Medi-Cal clinic, which deprived her mother of the chance to terminate the pregnancy. The trial court granted summary adjudication on the contract and estoppel claims and, after a bench trial, ruled for the defendants on the wrongful life claim. On appeal, the court applied the substantial evidence standard of review and upheld the judgment, finding ample support for the trial court's express and implied findings that the defendants were not negligent. The opinion also addressed and rejected various procedural challenges regarding admissions, evidentiary rulings, and the statement of decision.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedureabortion

This case concerns a defendant charged under Penal Code section 32 with being an accessory after the fact to a 1996 murder, based in part on statements made during a 2004 police interview in which the defendant denied knowledge of or presence at relevant events. Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate held the defendant to answer, but the superior court granted a section 995 motion to set aside the information. The People appealed, arguing misapplication of accessory law and failure to defer to the magistrate's factual findings. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient because the defendant was present during a payment meeting involving the victim and later made affirmatively false statements to police with the intent to help the perpetrator avoid arrest and punishment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted under California Penal Code section 285 for incest after having sexual intercourse with his 18-year-old daughter. The defendant appealed, contending that the incest statute violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by criminalizing consensual sexual activity between adults, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The court rejected this argument, distinguishing Lawrence as limited to private consensual conduct between unrelated adults of the same sex and noting that incest statutes address distinct concerns such as familial relationships. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, though the matter was remanded for resentencing on procedural grounds related to the imposition of the aggravated term.

criminal law