Michael G. Nott

The case concerned whether a newspaper established before 1923 could obtain an adjudication extending its status as a newspaper of general circulation to cities incorporated in Los Angeles County after 1923, without publishing notice or demonstrating it met statutory qualifications for those cities. The Metropolitan News-Enterprise had obtained an ex parte 2001 order modifying its 1952 decree to cover 40 such cities, relying on a 1964 Supreme Court decision about pre-1923 newspapers. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of a motion to vacate, concluding the extension was inconsistent with the Government Code provisions defining "established, printed and published" newspapers and with public policy favoring notice and competition, and directed the trial court to vacate the order for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this juvenile dependency case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services sought court intervention for Brooke C. based on her mother Bridget's history of substance abuse that endangered the child, resulting in an order denying family reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5(b)(13). The mother appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the denial and that the court failed to ensure proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to the parents' reported Native American heritage. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying reunification services, concluding that the conceded ICWA notice deficiency does not affect the validity of prior jurisdictional or dispositional orders. The court reasoned that ICWA violations warrant reversal only for orders terminating parental rights, not earlier orders like this one, and directed a limited remand for compliance with ICWA notice requirements.

family lawfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned the estate of Arthur M. Coplan, whose will included a clause barring compensation for the executor and a no-contest clause that disinherited any beneficiary who challenged the will or failed to defend it. Francine Coplan, serving as personal representative, petitioned for statutory compensation for her services but later withdrew the request; her sister Debra then sought to enforce the no-contest clause against Francine individually and against the estate of their brother Ronald. The probate court ruled that Francine’s actions did not violate the no-contest clause, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court reasoned that seeking compensation in a representative capacity did not amount to contesting the will or frustrating the testator’s intent, and that Francine had in any event defended the will by withdrawing her petition before any compensation was awarded.

family lawproperty

In People v. Stone, the defendant was convicted by jury of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and making a criminal threat after attacking his roommate and a prior acquaintance, resulting in a four-year prison sentence. The defendant raised multiple claims on appeal, including errors in admitting prior bad acts evidence, denying a midtrial continuance, refusing to allow withdrawal of self-representation status, and various due process issues. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings or evidentiary rulings. However, it reversed the post-trial restraining orders issued against the defendant under Penal Code section 136.2, holding that such orders require a showing of threat to ongoing criminal proceedings or participants therein, which was absent here as the assaults predated any prosecution and showed no intent to interfere with it.

criminal lawprocedure

In this juvenile delinquency case, a minor named Sheena K. was declared a ward of the court after committing misdemeanor battery and was placed on probation with conditions that she not associate with anyone disapproved of by her probation officer, not use or possess dangerous or deadly weapons, and not remain with anyone known to be unlawfully armed. The minor appealed, arguing that the conditions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of her rights to due process, association, travel, and assembly, and that they required a knowledge element to be valid. The court concluded that the association condition was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it did not specify that the minor must know which persons were disapproved, and it modified the judgment to add that requirement while affirming the other conditions and the disposition. The court also addressed but did not resolve a waiver issue regarding the failure to object in the trial court, and it corrected a clerical discrepancy in the minute order regarding the armed-person condition. The decision was based on the principle that probation conditions implicating constitutional rights must be sufficiently precise.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In People v. Richardson, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree burglary after entering an apartment shared by his sister and her roommate and stealing items from each woman's bedroom. The court reversed the conviction on the second count and struck the associated sentence, holding that entry into multiple rooms within a single apartment does not constitute separate burglaries. The core reasoning was that the bedrooms did not qualify as separate dwelling places because the occupants, as roommates rather than members of a single family unit, did not have distinct reasonable expectations of protection against unauthorized entry into each room. The trial court's jury instructions treating the rooms as separate structures were therefore erroneous under Penal Code sections 459 and 460.

criminal law

The case concerned a dispute among the children of William and Elaine Ferris over the validity of William's 1998 creation of a personal residence trust and transfer of the Newport Beach Property into it for the benefit of one daughter, Kristin, under the terms of the original 1981 Ferris Family Trust. The trial court ruled in Kristin's favor, finding the transfer valid based on William's authority to divide trust assets and value them as of Elaine's 1981 death. The appellate court reversed, holding that William lacked authority to make the split and conveyance as done, and ordered the transfers set aside so that the properties would be distributed according to the original trust terms, with Kristin receiving the survivor's trust proceeds and all four children sharing the decedent's trust proceeds equally.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether apartment owners Las Brisas and Pico timely challenged a Fair Employment and Housing Commission decision finding they violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act by discriminating against tenants on the basis of race and family status. The owners filed their petition for writ of administrative mandate on April 12, 2002, more than 30 days after the Commission's February 13, 2002 effective date. The trial court overruled the Commission's demurrer, concluding that the 30-day limit in Government Code section 11523 did not apply, but the appellate court held that section 11523 governs petitions seeking review of Commission decisions and that the petition was therefore untimely.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved a class action lawsuit by Beverly Jewett against Capital One Bank alleging deceptive and unfair business practices in sending credit card solicitations that promised pre-approved cards with high credit limits but actually issued cards with much lower limits and disproportionate fees. The trial court granted the bank's special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, finding the solicitations were protected speech on a public issue. The appellate court reversed, holding that credit card solicitations are not acts of free speech in connection with a public issue and thus not subject to the anti-SLAPP provisions. The court reasoned that such commercial solicitations do not qualify for protection under section 425.16.

business & regulatoryfree speechprocedure

The case involved Utility Audit Company, as assignee of property owners, suing the City of Los Angeles to recover interest on voluntary refunds of sewer service fees that had been improperly collected since 1972 from owners who did not use City sewers or only used them for transport to County facilities. The trial court granted summary judgment awarding approximately $850,000 in interest under Civil Code section 3287 and related provisions, finding that statutes of limitations and claims-filing periods had been waived or did not apply. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the City's voluntary payment of the principal refunds without regard to limitations periods did not waive defenses as to interest, and that the City had raised triable issues of fact regarding the timeliness of claims under Government Code section 53082 and applicable one-year claim periods. The opinion addressed two main questions: whether interest must accompany such refunds and whether voluntary repayment waives limitation defenses for the interest component.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved petitioner Donald Paul Warrick, who was arrested for possession of cocaine for sale and sought pretrial discovery of confidential personnel records from the three arresting Los Angeles police officers under Evidence Code section 1043, alleging possible misconduct such as planting evidence or false reporting. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Warrick had not shown good cause because his supporting declaration lacked a specific factual scenario with a plausible foundation for the misconduct claims, as required by City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court. The Court of Appeal upheld this denial, concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in requiring a more detailed factual basis tied to the officers' alleged actions before allowing access to the records. The opinion reviewed the statutory requirements for Pitchess motions and emphasized that broad or speculative requests do not suffice to overcome the confidentiality protections for peace officer files.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a class action lawsuit filed by David Olson against attorney Baruch Cohen and his professional law corporation, alleging that the corporation practiced law for over four years without registering with the State Bar of California as required by the Business and Professions Code. The complaint sought disgorgement of all legal fees paid during the unregistered period, along with claims for unfair business practices, rescission, misrepresentation, and related relief. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaints without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that disgorgement of fees is not an appropriate remedy where there are no allegations that any client relied on the corporate status or suffered injury from the delinquency, and that such compliance issues are primarily a matter between the corporation and the State Bar.

business & regulatory

The case concerned the constitutionality of Penal Code section 1367.1, which requires misdemeanor defendants suspected of incompetence to stand trial due to mental disorder to have proceedings suspended and undergo evaluation and treatment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act before any competency determination, a process not imposed on felony defendants. Petitioner Pederson, charged with a misdemeanor, challenged the statute after being referred for such evaluation instead of an immediate competency hearing under section 1368. The court held that section 1367.1 violates equal protection because it creates an unjustified distinction between misdemeanor and felony defendants without a rational basis, and the statute could not be reformed or construed to preserve its constitutionality. The court therefore ruled that competency issues in misdemeanor cases must henceforth follow the same procedures as felony cases under section 1368.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved Elysian Investment Group suing Stewart Title Guaranty Company for breach of a title insurance policy after discovering a recorded notice classifying the purchased property as substandard due to an illegal garage conversion without permits. The trial court granted summary judgment to Stewart, finding no coverage, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the notice did not constitute a defect in title, lien, encumbrance, or cause unmarketability of title under the policy, as it primarily addressed building code violations and potential future enforcement actions rather than affecting the legal title to the property.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns whether Leticia C., who is neither the biological nor birth mother of 12-year-old Karen C., can be declared Karen's legal mother after raising her since birth following an informal transfer from Karen's biological parents. The juvenile court denied Karen's petition for such a declaration, concluding that the law recognizes only birth or genetic mothers. The appellate court vacated the order and remanded for further hearing, holding that the Uniform Parentage Act's provisions for presumed parents—allowing a person who receives a child into their home and holds the child out as their own—apply to women as presumed mothers, consistent with the California Supreme Court's ruling in In re Nicholas H. regarding presumed fathers. The court reasoned that the identity of a presumed mother is not automatically defeated by lack of biological ties and that the juvenile court must weigh relevant public policy factors in the first instance.

family law

The case involved the Johnsons suing California Cryobank and its doctors, Sims and Rothman, for professional negligence, fraud, and breach of contract after the sperm donor they selected transmitted autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD) to their daughter Brittany, which the defendants allegedly failed to disclose despite knowing the donor's family history. In 1999, the trial court ruled that Brittany could not recover general damages or lost earnings and granted summary adjudication dismissing the fraud claims against the doctors. The appellate court addressed whether sperm banks qualify as health care providers under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, whether the defendants were acting in that capacity during genetic screening, and the availability of damages. It concluded that Cryobank and the doctors were health care providers performing professional services in this context and that Brittany was not entitled to general damages or lost earnings.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In People v. Bernal, the case concerned whether a $15,000 payment from a DUI defendant's insurance carrier to the injured victim satisfied the defendant's criminal restitution obligation under Penal Code section 1202.4, following his conviction and probation conditions requiring restitution for medical expenses and losses. The trial court ruled that the obligation was fulfilled based on the insurance settlement and a related liability release, but the People appealed, arguing the release did not affect restitution and that the court improperly deferred to the probation department without verifying full losses. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that while insurance payments qualify as made 'directly from' the defendant, the record was insufficient to confirm the total amount of the victim's losses, and a proper hearing was required to determine any remaining restitution owed beyond the settlement.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns whether a 1999 conviction for assault under Penal Code section 245(a)(1), committed by striking the victim with a fist and without a deadly weapon or against a peace officer or firefighter, qualifies as a prior serious felony strike under the Three Strikes law. The court decided that the conviction is not a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7(c)(31) and granted the petition for writ of mandate to strike the allegation. The core reasoning is that section 1192.7(c)(31) expressly limits serious felonies to assaults with a deadly weapon, firearm, or similar, or assaults on a peace officer or firefighter in violation of section 245; section 7.5 on statutory construction does not broaden the definition to encompass all violations of section 245 absent ambiguity or conflict that would require the numeric reference to control over the descriptive language.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved claims by minor plaintiffs Ashley and Alexa Arnold, through their guardian, against pesticide manufacturers and distributors for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to pesticides containing chemicals like chlorpyrifos and permethrin. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on FIFRA preemption of state claims. The appellate court held that strict liability design defect claims and breach of implied warranty claims are not preempted by FIFRA because they do not relate to labeling or packaging, while failure-to-warn claims are preempted, and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that without state claims, plaintiffs would have no remedy since FIFRA provides no private right of action, and public policy supports placing the cost of injuries on manufacturers.

torts & liabilityfederal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit in which plaintiff Henry Barnett sued Penske Truck Leasing after an industrial accident involving a milk truck lift gate; Penske had served requests for admission denying any defect or causation, which Barnett denied. After the trial court granted Penske summary judgment on the negligence and products-liability claims, Penske sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033(o) for the costs of proving the facts Barnett had refused to admit. The Court of Appeal affirmed the award of $5,362.83 in expenses and attorney fees. It held that the statute permits such sanctions following summary judgment because the moving party proves the absence of triable issues through its supporting papers, satisfying the statutory requirement of having “proved” the matter, and because denying recovery would undermine the provision’s goal of reimbursing the party forced to establish undisputed facts.

procedure