This case involved an appeal by Jerry T. from a trial court order terminating his parental rights to his son Chad under Family Code section 7822, which accompanied a stepparent adoption petition; the termination was based on abandonment after Jerry T. left the family and was later imprisoned for murder. Court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues but requested independent review of the record under People v. Wende standards applicable to certain criminal appeals. The Court of Appeal held that no such independent review is required in Family Code parental rights termination cases, noting that the right to appointed counsel derives from state statute rather than constitutional mandates that trigger Wende review, and dismissed the appeal. The court urged the California Supreme Court to clarify the rule uniformly for all parental rights terminations.
The case concerned whether Joanne Schmidt was entitled to continue receiving her deceased husband's city retirement benefits under the San Francisco Charter, which required proof that the couple had been married for at least one year before his death. Schmidt obtained an ex parte court order under Health and Safety Code section 10550 et seq. declaring that the marriage occurred in 1975, but the Retirement Board denied her claim after an administrative hearing found no valid 1975 marriage. The trial court ruled that the ex parte order was conclusive proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 1908(a)(1) and issued a writ directing the Board to pay the benefits. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that such an ex parte marriage order is merely a statistical record with no presumptive or conclusive evidentiary effect against third parties like the Board, whose due process rights would be impaired, and remanded for consideration of whether Schmidt qualified as a putative spouse.
The case involved Michael Ray Rogers, who was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm after an incident where he fired a flare gun at a wharfinger and police officers attempting to post notices on his illegally docked boat. Rogers appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California. The court found that the motion, made after jury selection had begun, was untimely and that its denial was erroneous, but concluded the error was harmless because the evidence against Rogers was strong, including his admissions and a videotape, and he was convicted of lesser offenses than charged.
This case was a declaratory relief action brought by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company seeking a determination that Lester Davis was not covered under a commercial general liability policy issued to the Meyer companies. The trial court found that Davis was not an "employee" under the policy at the relevant times and thus not insured, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Davis was an independent contractor rather than an employee, based on factors including his control over the manner and means of his work, lack of set hours or reporting requirements, commission-only compensation, and the companies' limited supervision focused only on results. The court applied California precedents distinguishing employees from independent contractors and concluded it was unnecessary to address other coverage issues that had been severed.
This case involved a dispute over legal paternity of a child named Michael, where Matthew (the mother's husband and biological father) and Steven (the man who raised the child from birth) both claimed fatherhood under the Uniform Parentage Act. The trial court ruled that both men qualified as presumed fathers but determined Steven's presumption was controlling due to his more extensive and ongoing relationship with the child, and it found Matthew estopped from rebutting that presumption. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that former Evidence Code section 621 did not apply, that the paternity issue was properly bifurcated and decided before custody matters, and that the strong policy favoring preservation of an established father-child relationship supported Steven's status as legal father. The court noted that best interests regarding custody and visitation could be addressed later. The judgment designating Steven as the father was affirmed.
In Jue v. Patton, purchasers of apartment buildings sued the seller and her agent after a lender initiated foreclosure, filing a cross-complaint with tort and contract claims arising from the real estate sales agreement; the cross-complaint was later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice before trial. The trial court initially awarded attorney fees to the seller and agent as prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5 but reversed itself on reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the denial of fees, holding that Civil Code section 1717 and the rule from International Industries, Inc. v. Olen preclude recovery of contractual attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed prior to trial, and that a 1990 amendment to section 1033.5 did not alter this longstanding practice. The court reasoned that the parties must bear their own fees in such pretrial dismissal scenarios regardless of the breadth of any attorney fee provision in the underlying contract.