Steven M. Colloton

In this bankruptcy case, debtor Lawrence Danduran sold his North Dakota home along with listed personal property for a combined price, paid off the mortgage, and deposited the remaining proceeds—including an estimated $7,700 attributable to the personal items—into a single savings account, which he then claimed as exempt under North Dakota’s $100,000 homestead exemption. The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption for the personal-property portion, and the bankruptcy court sustained the objection, ruling that amount was not homestead proceeds. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed that reversal. The court held that the trustee failed to carry his burden of proving the claimed exemption was improper, because the sale proceeds were commingled and the record contained no evidence that the personal-property funds (rather than homestead funds) ended up in the savings account instead of being applied to the mortgage.

propertyprocedure

Levi Alan Smith, who had a 1998 Iowa conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse of a minor and a later failure-to-register conviction, moved to Nebraska and was indicted for violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) by knowingly failing to register there; he entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to challenge the indictment. The district court imposed 15 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release with 14 special conditions, after granting a downward departure on criminal history. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Smith’s constitutional challenges to SORNA (including under the Commerce Clause, Ex Post Facto Clause, and Tenth Amendment) were either foreclosed by circuit precedent or failed on the merits because SORNA does not commandeer state officials but instead conditions federal funding on compliance. The court upheld most special conditions of supervised release as reasonably related to Smith’s history and the goals of supervised release, but vacated and remanded Condition 6—which barred him from coming within 500 feet of schools, parks, and similar places—because the district court had not made adequate individualized findings supporting its breadth.

criminal lawfederal power

In Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, a Guatemalan native petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision that upheld an immigration judge’s order removing him from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without admission or parole. He argued that evidence of his alienage, obtained after a 2008 traffic stop and subsequent ICE questioning, should be suppressed because the stop, arrest, and interrogations violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, or at minimum that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his suppression motion. The court denied the petition, holding that Lopez-Gabriel had not made a prima facie showing of a constitutional violation. The police report established that the stop was based on a cracked windshield rather than any racial motive, and the circumstances of his questioning—custody, uniformed officers, and lack of Miranda warnings—did not establish involuntariness or coercion sufficient to require suppression or a hearing in immigration proceedings.

immigrationcivil rightsprocedure

Chane Christenson was charged with two counts of threatening the life of the President after sending emails to the White House in December 2009 and January 2010 that expressed hatred for President Obama, wished for his death and that of his family, and called for violence. He pleaded guilty to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) in exchange for a sentencing recommendation, but later moved to withdraw the plea, arguing there was no sufficient factual basis because the statements were conditional political hyperbole rather than true threats and because he suffered from a delusional disorder. The district court accepted the plea and sentenced him to three years’ probation; the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the emails’ language, when viewed in context, supplied an adequate factual basis for finding a knowing and willful true threat, as they lacked the mitigating features of protected speech in Watts v. United States and were not so deficient that the plea was plainly invalid.

criminal lawfree speech

This case concerns the bankruptcy estate of Qualia Clinical Service, Inc. The Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid, as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547, a security interest in Qualia’s accounts receivable that Inova Capital Funding recorded via a UCC-1 financing statement on February 19, 2009, roughly one month before Qualia’s bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held the lien avoidable, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the parties’ Invoice Purchase Agreement was a disguised loan (not a true sale) because it gave Inova full recourse against Qualia, that perfection of the security interest occurred within the 90-day preference period for an antecedent debt, and that Inova could not rely on the § 547(c)(5)(B) exception because it had first given “new value” under the agreement well before the preference period began.

business & regulatoryproperty

In United States v. Jefferson, John E. Jefferson was convicted by a jury in the District of Minnesota of wire fraud, money laundering, and failing to file tax returns after he devised a scheme in which he obtained over $8.8 million from investors by falsely claiming the funds would support a Liberia resource-contract renegotiation project involving high-level officials. The district court imposed a 90-month prison sentence and ordered full restitution. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient because witness testimony from the intermediary who raised the funds, along with Jefferson’s own statements to IRS agents and other corroboration, allowed a reasonable jury to find the elements of wire fraud and related offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further ruled that restitution properly encompassed all losses from the charged fraudulent scheme, including unindicted conduct, and that the within-Guidelines sentence was both procedurally sound and substantively reasonable.

criminal lawtaxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Murphy v. King, John Patrick Murphy sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after Minnesota state courts revoked his probation and executed the full balance of a 450-month stayed sentence stemming from his 1994 guilty plea to multiple counts of terroristic threats. Murphy argued that the sentence structure—under which any probation violation could trigger execution of the entire probationary term—violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, holding that the claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been properly raised in state post-conviction proceedings. The court found that Murphy had not shown cause to excuse the default, as ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not qualify, nor had he demonstrated actual innocence or any fundamental miscarriage of justice. The opinion also noted that a direct challenge to the original 1994 sentence was barred as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved landowners (the Andersons) suing Hess Corporation, the lessee of mineral rights on their North Dakota land, seeking to quiet title after the primary terms of five identical oil and gas leases expired. The Andersons argued that the leases required actual drilling to extend the terms via the habendum and Pugh clauses, while Hess claimed its preparatory activities qualified as "drilling or reworking operations." The district court granted summary judgment to Hess, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court interpreted the disputed lease language according to the majority view in oil and gas law, holding that "drilling operations" encompasses bona fide preparatory acts like site location and equipment movement if done with intent to drill, rather than requiring the drill to penetrate the ground. The Andersons conceded that Hess had engaged in such operations before the terms expired.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved David West Dixon, who was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting bank robbery in violation of federal law after his associate testified that Dixon suggested the crime, wrote the demand note, and acted as getaway driver, with forensic evidence and police testimony corroborating his involvement. Dixon appealed his conviction and 220-month sentence, arguing insufficient evidence to support the verdict, failure to dismiss a potentially biased juror, and procedural and substantive errors in sentencing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find guilt, that the district court did not err in handling the juror or sentencing calculations under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the sentence was reasonable.

criminal lawprocedure

Jose Rene Constanza, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order affirming an immigration judge's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief after he was placed in removal proceedings based on his 2009 domestic assault conviction. The Eighth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's timeliness ruling on the asylum application and that Constanza had not established eligibility for the other forms of relief. The court reasoned that his proposed particular social groups—persons resistant to gang membership, persons returning from the United States perceived as affluent, and persons fearing harm to their families from gangs—were too broad and indeterminate to qualify under the Immigration and Nationality Act, that he had not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground, and that he failed to demonstrate government acquiescence to torture for CAT purposes.

immigrationcriminal law

The case involved the conviction of juvenile B.A.D. for two counts of aggravated sexual assault against his young nephew on an Indian reservation. B.A.D. appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient because the victim failed to identify him in court as the perpetrator. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court could reasonably discredit the victim's in-court failure to identify the defendant while crediting other testimony describing the assaults and establishing the defendant's access and opportunity. The court reasoned that the trial judge's credibility determinations were entitled to deference and that the overall evidence supported a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal law

The case involved rental property owners in St. Paul, Minnesota, suing city officials and the municipality under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that aggressive enforcement of the housing code increased costs for landlords, reduced the supply of affordable housing, and thereby had a disparate impact on racial minorities seeking rentals. The Eighth Circuit panel ruled that the plaintiffs had presented a submissible case on a disparate-impact theory, even absent evidence of discriminatory intent by the city. The full court denied rehearing en banc, leaving the panel decision intact, though a dissent argued that important questions remained unresolved about whether housing code enforcement qualifies for disparate-impact analysis under the FHA and whether the plaintiffs had shown causation or a viable less-discriminatory alternative.

civil rightsproperty

The case concerns Ana Rosa Ochoa's petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision regarding her motion to reopen removal proceedings. The panel majority held that the BIA had merely declined to reopen the case on its own authority, a discretionary action not subject to judicial review under circuit precedent. In denying the petition for rehearing, the court stood by that characterization. Judge Colloton dissented, contending that the BIA's action was instead a denial of a party's timely motion to reopen and therefore reviewable for abuse of discretion, noting that the government had not defended the panel's premise.

immigrationprocedure

This case concerns whether Missouri offenses of auto theft without consent and tampering by operation qualify as 'crimes of violence' under USSG § 4B1.2 or 'violent felonies' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for purposes of enhanced federal sentencing. A panel opinion overruled prior Eighth Circuit precedent by concluding that these offenses no longer meet the definitions after the Supreme Court's decision in Begay v. United States. The dissenting opinion argues that Begay, which addressed driving under the influence as a strict-liability offense, does not justify disregarding circuit precedent that had compared the theft crimes to burglary and found they present a serious potential risk of physical injury. The dissent asserts that only the en banc court may overrule precedent absent a directly inconsistent Supreme Court ruling and that the issues warrant rehearing due to their exceptional importance.

criminal law

This case concerns Frederick Revels, who was acquitted by reason of insanity after killing family members in 1988 and later sought unconditional release from Missouri state custody through a federal habeas petition. The Eighth Circuit panel granted relief, concluding that the state courts unreasonably applied Foucha v. Louisiana by requiring Revels to prove he was not likely to suffer from mental disease or defect in the future. Dissenting judges from the denial of rehearing en banc argue that the state decisions actually rested on findings that Revels presently had a mental disease (in remission) and remained potentially dangerous due to substance issues and behavior, grounds they view as consistent with Foucha and prior circuit precedent. The dissent further contends that the certificate of appealability does not bar review of these independent state-court findings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights