The case involved Anna D., whose child Taylor was placed in protective custody after allegations of neglect stemming from the mother's mental health issues and failure to take medication. After more than a year, the State moved to terminate parental rights and appoint a guardian with power to consent to adoption; on the first day of the hearing, the mother executed a consent to adoption by specific relatives (the child's uncle and aunt). The trial court proceeded with the termination hearing, found the mother unfit, and at the best-interests stage granted the motion, appointing DCFS as guardian with authority to consent to adoption by the foster parents. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that a parent's statutory residual right to consent to adoption under the Juvenile Court Act is limited when the child is a ward of the court by the requirements of the Adoption Act and the child's best interests, so the mother's directed consent did not require staying the termination proceedings. The court reasoned that any consent must still be evaluated for best interests and that the child was not available for the private adoption sought by the mother.
Erin Moody filed a class action breach-of-contract suit against Federal Express Corporation, alleging that FedEx failed to deliver her package by the promised next-business-morning time and seeking a partial refund of her shipping charges as damages. The shipping contract incorporated by reference FedEx's service guide, which limited remedies for delayed shipments to either actual damages to the package (with a 15-day notice requirement) or a full refund under the money-back guarantee (with a 30-day request requirement); Moody pursued neither. The trial court dismissed the action. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the contract's remedies were exclusive and that Moody's requested partial-refund remedy was therefore barred by the agreement's terms and integration clause. The court did not reach the preemption question under the Airline Deregulation Act.
The case involved the Illinois FAIR Plan Association's decision not to renew property insurance policies covering hundreds of single-family houses owned or controlled by the Sieron family and related companies, based on an unusually high loss ratio. After an administrative hearing, the Director of Insurance affirmed the nonrenewals, and the circuit court upheld that order on review. The Sierons appealed, contending that the decision violated the FAIR Plan statute's purpose of making insurance available in urban areas, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and raised constitutional issues. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the nonrenewals complied with the statutory requirement that properties meet reasonable underwriting standards and that the administrative decision was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor contrary to law, while noting a statutory tension best addressed by the legislature.
The case concerns David B., who since 1986 has been subject to repeated orders for involuntary hospitalization at the Chester Mental Health Center following his 1981 conviction for indecent liberties with a child and diagnoses including schizoaffective disorder, paranoia, and pedophilia. At the June 2005 review hearing the circuit court again found him subject to involuntary admission and ordered continued commitment. On appeal he argued that the State failed to present an expert who had recently conducted a personal examination and that the evidence did not support the order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the licensed clinical social worker's reliance on medical records, treatment history, and prior examinations satisfied statutory requirements when the respondent refused to be interviewed, and that the trial court's findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
This case involved plaintiff David Carlen, a coexecutor and beneficiary of his father's estate, suing the estate's attorneys (Myers and the Law Group) and First State Bank over the handling of the bank's claims against the estate in probate proceedings. Carlen alleged breach of fiduciary duty amounting to legal malpractice by the attorneys and unjust enrichment through collusion with the bank, stemming from events including the 1998 approval of the bank's claims and subsequent asset recovery actions. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the malpractice counts were barred by the six-year statute of repose under 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) because more than six years had passed since the attorneys' last work on the matter, and the collusion count was barred by the five-year statute of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205 because any alleged agreement occurred before the 1998 orders. The court found no adequate facts pled to support tolling either period via fraud or discovery rules.
The case involved plaintiff Robert McRoberts, who was injured in a 2001 car accident allegedly caused by defective Bridgestone/Firestone tires and filed a lawsuit in March 2003 just before the statute of limitations expired. While negotiating a settlement with the defendant's adjuster, McRoberts delayed formal service of process for nearly a year after filing, informing the adjuster of the suit and offering to serve if needed; service was finally effected in March 2004 after the defendant indicated it would not settle. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) for lack of reasonable diligence in service, but the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the delay was reasonable given the ongoing negotiations, the defendant's prior knowledge of the lawsuit, the lack of prejudice, and the defendant's benefit from informal discovery during that period.