Martha Craig Daughtrey

In State v. Washington, a defendant with no prior record who was a long-time schoolteacher was charged with DUI along with simple possession of marijuana and cocaine, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm after an arrest on Christmas Eve. The district attorney denied her application for pretrial diversion on all charges based on a statute barring diversion for DUI offenses, and both the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals upheld that denial. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the statutory bar applies only to the DUI charge itself and does not extend to the other charges, even though they arose from the same incident and would normally be joined under criminal procedure rules. The court reasoned that the legislature intended only to protect mandatory minimum DUI sentences from suspension or diversion, with no indication of broader intent, and that criminal statutes must be construed narrowly in the defendant's favor. It therefore vacated the denial and remanded for severance of the DUI charge, entry of a plea on that offense, and consideration of diversion on the remaining charges.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stamper, the defendant was convicted of delivering cocaine and conspiring to sell it based in part on statements by an alleged co-conspirator admitted under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(1.2)(E). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both convictions, holding that the conspiracy was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the statements should therefore have been excluded as hearsay. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the existence of a conspiracy for purposes of admitting co-conspirator statements need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, consistent with federal precedent such as Bourjaily v. United States and analogous evidentiary standards for other preliminary facts. The court found the trial evidence sufficient under that standard and remanded for reconsideration of the convictions with the statements included. The opinion addresses criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a police officer who responded to two urgent anonymous reports of a man with a shotgun threatening to shoot someone in a trailer park. The officer located the defendant in a nearby yellow Ford, activated his blue lights to stop the moving vehicle, observed a shotgun inside, and arrested him on multiple charges including possession of a weapon with intent to go armed. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding no reasonable suspicion for the stop, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution because the tips, combined with the threat of imminent violence and partial corroboration, provided specific and articulable facts justifying a brief investigatory seizure under Terry v. Ohio standards. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In Blankenship v. State, the petitioner filed a post-conviction challenge to the validity of six prior guilty pleas used to establish his habitual criminal status and life sentence, claiming the pleas were not voluntary and intelligent under Boykin v. Alabama because he had not been advised of his right against self-incrimination or that the convictions could enhance future sentences. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to address the application of Boykin standards in a collateral attack far removed from the original convictions, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Parke v. Raley. The court held that on collateral review, final convictions carry a presumption of regularity, and the unavailability of transcripts does not require the state to prove validity through extra-record evidence or create a silent-record violation under Boykin. It distinguished this collateral context from direct appeals and noted that certain state-law advisements on enhancement were not required by federal constitutional standards at the time of the pleas.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hawk v. Hawk, married parents denied visitation to the paternal grandparents amid family conflicts over child-rearing, discipline, and associations. The grandparents sought court-ordered visitation under T.C.A. § 36-6-301, which allows reasonable grandparent visitation if in the child's best interests. The trial court and Court of Appeals granted extensive visitation despite finding the parents fit, but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed. The court held that applying the statute to these facts violated the parents' constitutional right to privacy in parenting decisions under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, because fit parents have a fundamental liberty interest in controlling their children's upbringing and associations, and the state interest in best interests alone is not sufficiently compelling to override it without a showing of harm.

family lawcivil rights

The case involved Danny Branam's convictions for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and first-degree felony murder, along with his death sentence for the murder, stemming from a 1987 shooting during a robbery in Knoxville. The Tennessee Supreme Court reduced Branam's death sentence to life imprisonment, concluding that as a non-triggerman accomplice he lacked the reckless indifference to human life required under the Eighth Amendment and state law for capital punishment in felony-murder cases, and that the sentence was disproportionate compared to similar cases. The court remanded for a hearing on a potential Brady violation regarding withheld evidence but found the defendant's confession obtained via a jail informant admissible and upheld the convictions against other challenges, including issues with counsel withdrawal and jury voir dire. The opinion addressed the adequacy of the record on severance and attorney conflicts but found no reversible error warranting a new trial absent the Brady issue.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved defendant James Singleton's conviction for selling marijuana to undercover officers, who testified that he handed over keys to a truck containing the drugs. The trial court denied defense requests for a continuance and pretrial interviews with the unwilling officers, and the defendant was convicted without having learned the details of the state's case. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding both that trial courts could order police witnesses to submit to interviews and that newly discovered evidence about the truck operating without keys warranted a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling on compelled interviews, finding no authority in Tennessee law to force unwilling police officers to be interviewed, but affirmed the new trial on the basis of the newly discovered evidence that impeached the officers' testimony and was likely to change the result in this close case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mark D. Archer, who filed a habeas corpus petition in Tennessee challenging the voluntariness of five 1981 guilty pleas on grounds that he had not been advised of certain rights and consequences, seeking to prevent their use in enhancing his Alabama sentence. The trial court converted the petition to one for post-conviction relief and dismissed it as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, ruling that errors rendering judgments voidable rather than void cannot be raised in habeas corpus. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, concluding after reviewing the history of the writ that its scope in the state is narrowly limited to void judgments and does not extend to voluntariness challenges, which must instead proceed through post-conviction channels.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant William Shelton's appeal of convictions for one count of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery against his three step-granddaughters, based on evidence of multiple instances of sexual abuse during a five-month period in 1989. Shelton argued that the state failed to elect the specific offenses for which it sought convictions, violating requirements for jury unanimity. The court held that the trial court erred by not requiring such an election, as mandated by Burlison v. State to protect the right to a unanimous verdict when evidence of multiple crimes is introduced. The error was harmless as to one count supported by proof of a single incident, but not as to the other two counts, which were reversed; one was also dismissed for insufficient evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Taylor v. Taylor, a divorced custodial mother petitioned to relocate out of state with her three-year-old daughter to join her new husband, prompting the non-custodial father to seek a change of custody. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the trial court's order barring the move to Iowa and the Court of Appeals' affirmance, while also announcing revised procedures and standards for future parental relocation disputes. The court determined that the child's best interest supported allowing the relocation, reassessing prior case law on the issue and emphasizing the need for clearer methodology in evaluating such requests.

family law

The case involves two companion interstate child custody disputes under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). In the first, Tennessee and Hawaii courts issued conflicting custody orders regarding a child after her mother's death; in the second, a Tennessee court declined to modify its prior decree while the custodial parent sought action in Georgia. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in both matters, reinstating the trial court rulings that required deference to the appropriate forum state. The core reasoning was that the UCCJA and PKPA aim to prevent simultaneous litigation, forum-shopping, and conflicting decrees by establishing rules for which state has jurisdiction and when a court should decline to exercise it, even if it has authority.

family lawfederal power

This case concerned a dispute over increasing child support payments from Charles Mulle, a high-income non-custodial father, to Helen Nash for their child Melissa, including a portion allocated to an educational trust fund. The Juvenile Court had raised support to over $8,000 monthly with part reserved for the trust, but the Court of Appeals limited it to 21 percent of $6,250 and disallowed the trust as extending beyond majority. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the child support guidelines' rebuttable presumption does not cap awards for parents earning above the schedule's explicit range and that deviation is allowed to ensure the child shares in the higher standard of living. It further reasoned that the guidelines explicitly permit trusts for high-income cases and that public policy supports funding post-majority education when the parent has substantial means.

family law

The case involved defendant William West's conviction for first-degree murder after he shot and killed Sam Jones during a roadside confrontation involving tractors, with West claiming self-defense. The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and found it lacking for the elements of premeditation and deliberation required under the pre-1989 murder statutes to elevate the offense beyond second-degree murder, as the state presented no proof of a cool, dispassionate intent to kill formed over any meaningful time. The court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder and adjusted the sentence accordingly. It also ruled that certain character evidence was not prejudicial, that the jury instruction on concealment of evidence was proper as relevant to guilt, and that the sentencing challenge was moot.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ellison, the defendant, charged with two counts of cocaine sale, objected during jury selection to the prosecution's peremptory strike of the sole Black venire member under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court denied the challenge on standing grounds due to racial difference, leading to conviction; the Court of Criminal Appeals later ordered a new trial after Powers v. Ohio expanded standing to allow such claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Powers applies retroactively and permits a prima facie case based on striking even one minority juror, but reversed the automatic new-trial remedy. It remanded for the trial court to conduct a hearing to assess whether a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination existed and, if so, whether the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation.

criminal lawcivil rights

This workers’ compensation case involved plaintiff Travis Brown, an employee of subcontractor Cofer Construction Co., who was injured on the job while performing site preparation for a residential development project owned by defendant Canterbury Corporation. After Cofer defaulted on its obligation to carry workers’ compensation insurance, Brown sought recovery from Canterbury under T.C.A. § 50-6-113, which imposes liability on principals and contractors for injuries to subcontractors’ employees. The trial court held Canterbury liable and commuted the award to a lump sum, but Canterbury appealed, arguing it was exempt due to having fewer than five employees and that it was merely a property owner. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed liability, ruling that the statutory-employer provision applies regardless of the five-employee threshold and that Canterbury qualified as a principal contractor, but it remanded for further proceedings on whether lump-sum commutation met the statutory “best interest” and prudent-management standards. The court’s core reasoning rested on the plain language of § 50-6-113 and prior precedent treating such statutes as extending coverage to upstream parties when immediate employers fail to insure.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Knox County's challenge to a 1970 private act requiring that all tax-equivalent payments from the Lenoir City Utilities Board be paid solely to Lenoir City, even though portions of the utility's property lie in Knox County. Knox County sought a declaratory judgment that the private act violated Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution by providing benefits inconsistent with general law. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling that the act was constitutional. The core reasoning was that the 1969 Municipal Electric System Tax Equivalent Law expressly preserved existing private acts from mandatory statewide application, and the 1987 law did not create a direct conflict sufficient to trigger the constitutional prohibition.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over the scope of coverage under a business-interruption insurance policy issued by Continental Insurance Company to DNE Corporation, following tornado damage to DNE's facilities in Tennessee. The Tennessee Supreme Court, answering certified questions from the Sixth Circuit in a declaratory judgment action, held that DNE was not entitled to recover its continuing normal operating expenses. The court reasoned that the policy defines business income as the sum of net income (a net loss here) and continuing expenses, so that when the projected net loss exceeds those expenses there is no actual loss of business income recoverable under the policy.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether injured motorists could recover punitive damages from their uninsured motorist insurance carrier under Tennessee law after a collision with an uninsured driver, where the policy did not explicitly provide such coverage. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the 1986 amendment to T.C.A. § 56-7-1201 limits required uninsured motorist coverage to compensatory damages only, so the insurer was not liable for the $25,000 in punitive damages awarded against the uninsured motorist. The core reasoning relied on the statutory addition of the word “compensatory,” the legislative history indicating an intent to overturn the prior Mullins precedent that had mandated punitive damages coverage, and the absence of any explicit contractual clause requiring such coverage. The court affirmed the trial court and Court of Appeals judgments for the insurer while noting that parties could still voluntarily contract for punitive damages coverage.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Potts v. State, the appellant challenged the dismissal of his post-conviction petition attacking the validity of prior 1982 and 1983 DUI guilty pleas used to enhance a 1990 DUI charge to third-offense status, arguing that Tennessee's three-year statute of limitations on post-conviction filings (T.C.A. § 40-30-102) unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus under Article I, § 15 of the state constitution. The trial court had dismissed the petition as untimely and proceeded to sentence Potts on the enhanced charge. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute of limitations applies only to post-conviction proceedings and does not affect habeas corpus petitions, which remain available without time limitation to challenge void judgments or unlawful confinement beyond the term of imprisonment. The court reasoned that the two forms of collateral relief are distinct, with post-conviction relief addressing void or voidable convictions due to constitutional violations while habeas corpus is limited to void judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the death of four-year-old Eddie Eugene Brown and the resulting conviction of his father, Mack Edward Brown, for first-degree murder and child neglect. The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the evidence from the trial and concluded it was insufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction. The court reduced the conviction to second-degree murder, citing the statutory requirement for a willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, which was not established by the facts surrounding the incident. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the reduced charge.

criminal law