In Rygg v. United States, the plaintiffs sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for property damage caused by flooding of their North Dakota farmland, which allegedly resulted from the negligent placement of excavated soil during construction of missile cable trenches in 1964. The United States moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) as it existed before the 1966 amendments. The court granted the motion, holding that the claim accrued no later than July 1964 and that the early complaint forms submitted to the Army Corps of Engineers could not toll the limitations period because they did not seek a monetary amount not exceeding $2,500. The court further rejected the argument that ongoing flooding constituted a continuing tort, noting that all damages were recoverable from the date of accrual.
This case involved a negligence lawsuit and counterclaim arising from a 1965 truck collision at a North Dakota missile site construction project. Plaintiff Floyd Lovelette, who owned and drove one truck, sued defendant Herman Braun, who owned and drove the other, along with their common employer Morrison-Knudsen; Lovelette's wife also claimed loss of consortium. Both drivers had applied for and received workers' compensation benefits as Morrison-Knudsen employees. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act barred suits against the employer or co-employees for on-the-job injuries once benefits were awarded, and that the compensation bureau's determination of employee status was conclusive under principles of res judicata. The court separately dismissed the consortium claim as likewise barred by the Act and dismissed the counterclaim on the same grounds, while leaving truck-damage claims for later proceedings.
The case involved a North Dakota professional corporation and its incorporators seeking a declaratory judgment that the entity was a valid corporation under Internal Revenue Code §401(a), which would qualify its employee pension trust for tax-exempt status, along with an injunction barring the IRS District Director from denying that corporate status. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action. It held that federal courts lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2201 because the suit sought a declaration of rights with respect to federal taxes, that the Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C. §7421(a)) barred the requested injunctive relief, and that the complaint failed to allege the jurisdictional amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C. §1331.
This case was a wrongful death action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by the administrator of Eloise A. Newgard's estate against the United States, seeking damages for the benefit of her three minor children after she was killed by her husband in July 1965. The husband, a veteran with a history of psychotic episodes and threats against his wife, had been committed to state and then VA psychiatric facilities; the suit alleged negligence by VA staff, particularly in granting him an unsupervised one-week pass without proper evaluation or notification. The court found that the VA hospital's gross negligence in handling the patient's release and supervision was the sole proximate cause of the death. It awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages based on the loss of the mother's services, guidance, and future earnings.
This case involved a criminal indictment against Roger S. Bandy for violating 18 U.S.C. § 3146, where he moved to dismiss due to an alleged unreasonable delay in bringing him to trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. The reasoning was that the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends on circumstances, the delay was not shown to be purposeful or oppressive, and it is the defendant's duty to request a speedy trial if desired.
This case is a product liability action brought by Shane Stromsodt, a minor, against Parke-Davis and Company concerning injuries the child allegedly sustained after receiving two doses of the company's Quadrigen vaccine in 1959. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded $500,000 in damages. It held that the manufacturer breached an implied warranty and was negligent because the quadruple antigen product had known stability problems with its pertussis component that caused serious adverse reactions, applying strict liability principles under both tort and warranty theories without regard to privity or traditional contract defenses.