Born 1973
Drilex Systems, Inc. v. Flores
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1998-02-09 · cited 5×
In this personal injury lawsuit, Jorge Flores and his family sued Drilex Systems and related companies after Flores was injured by a falling drilling bucket while working on an oil rig, alleging product defects and negligence in the equipment leased by Drilex, following a settlement with Amoco. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on issues including the exclusion of an expert witness, the jury charge, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the product liability and negligence claims. However, the court sustained the challenge to the allocation of the settlement credit, holding that under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.012(b), the credit for the full settlement amount must be applied to the total damages awarded to all claimants before apportioning the reduced judgment among the plaintiffs according to the jury's verdict percentages. The case was remanded for reformation of the judgment to reflect this proper credit application.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Burns v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston) · 1997-12-18 · cited 12×
Appellant Keivin D. Burns was convicted of bail jumping and failure to appear and sentenced to ten years confinement after being released on bond for attempted burglary of a building. He appealed on three grounds: a Batson challenge alleging racially motivated peremptory strikes of two African-American venire members, legal insufficiency of the evidence regarding intent and the underlying offense's classification, and factual insufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected the Batson challenge because the prosecution provided uncontradicted, race-neutral explanations that the struck jurors knew the appellant or his family and one was a minister who had dealings with them, with the trial court's ruling supported by the record. On the sufficiency claims, the court found the evidence factually insufficient because the underlying offense was classified by statute as a Class A misdemeanor rather than a felony, so the conviction for felony-level bail jumping could not stand. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Lively v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1997-02-26 · cited 6×
The case involved Ricky Austin Lively's conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, based on incidents where he allegedly directed his five-year-old son and niece to engage in sexual acts with each other and had inappropriate contact with his twelve-year-old step-niece. Lively appealed, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdicts, the trial court's decision to allow his son to testify via videotape rather than live, and the admission of certain testimony during the punishment phase as hearsay. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding that the evidence permitted a rational jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that public policy considerations justified the video testimony to protect the child witness without violating confrontation rights, and that the challenged statements were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
criminal law
Flores v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-12-31 · cited 13×
The case involved Mary Jane Flores, who was convicted of murder after a jury trial in Bexar County for the shooting death of her roommate, Debbie Padilla. Flores claimed the death was a suicide and appealed on grounds including the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the State violated due process under Brady v. Maryland by withholding statements from a neighbor who overheard Flores urging the victim not to shoot herself just before the incident. This evidence was deemed favorable, material to guilt, and not equally available to the defense despite the defendant's discovery requests and file review. The court did not address other points of error regarding jury instructions on lesser offenses.
criminal lawprocedure
Clemments v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-12-31 · cited 14×
In Clemments v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of injury to a child after her four-month-old son died from head traumas, though acquitted of murder, and sentenced to forty years in prison. On appeal, she challenged the trial court's limitation of voir dire to one hour per side, which prevented her from individually questioning many potential jurors, including four who were seated. The court applied the Ratliff test and found that the appellant did not attempt to prolong voir dire, was prevented from asking relevant questions about topics like child abuse and punishment ranges, and could not examine jurors who served, leading to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded.
criminal lawprocedure
Brown v. McGonagill
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-12-26 · cited 28×
This case involves an appeal from a county court judgment in a dispute over a contract to build an awning on a mobile home, where the contractor sued for the unpaid balance and the homeowner counterclaimed for breach of contract and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, along with other claims. The trial court ruled in favor of the contractor for $1,000 and denied the homeowner's claims, but the appellate court found that the trial court failed to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law despite proper requests. The court decided to abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to enter the findings and conclusions, reasoning that the absence of these filings, combined with conflicting evidence in the record, would force the appellant to guess at the basis for the trial court's rulings, causing presumed harm.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Alaniz v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-12-11 · cited 7×
In Alaniz v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and one count of possession of cocaine, resulting in sentences of 99 years and 20 years confinement, respectively. The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that trial counsel's failure to prevent the seating of a venireperson who had been struck for cause after expressing clear bias against the defendant constituted deficient performance that deprived the appellant of his right to an impartial jury, as no reasonable trial strategy could explain the omission.
criminal lawprocedure
Garza v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-11-27 · cited 16×
This case is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery in which the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the State failed to prove the assault occurred in the course of committing theft, as no property was taken and no demand for property was made. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 60-year sentence, holding that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for a rational jury to find the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that conduct 'in the course of committing theft' includes attempts, that actual theft is not required, and that intent to obtain or control property can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the victim unloading valuable jewelry at a flea market early in the morning when few people were present. The court distinguished the facts from cases where robbery elements were not met and aligned them with precedents where similar circumstances supported an inference of intent to steal.
criminal law
In the Interest of A.M.
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-11-27 · cited 29×
This case involved an appeal by Drew Engelke challenging the dismissal of his petition to establish a parent-child relationship with A.M., a child born to Tami Malatek during her marriage to Dennis Malatek, who is the presumed father. The trial court dismissed the suit under Texas Family Code section 160.110(f), which requires dismissal of paternity suits filed more than two years after the child's birth if the presumed father has established a relationship with the child. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Engelke waived his right to a jury trial by proceeding without objection, consented to a pre-trial hearing on the limitations issue, and that the statute applied to his pending suit filed after its effective date without improper retroactive application.
family law
State Farm Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Maldonado
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-10-28 · cited 6×
This case arose after Adelfa Maldonado obtained a $2 million defamation judgment against Curtis Robert, who was insured by State Farm Lloyds under a policy covering slander arising from his CPA business but excluding statements made with knowledge of falsity. Robert and Maldonado then sued State Farm for breach of contract, negligence, Insurance Code violations, and bad-faith failure to settle within the $300,000 policy limits, alleging the insurer ignored its attorney's recommendation to settle and made only a token offer. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a large judgment against State Farm that included treble damages and post-judgment interest on the full underlying award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified and affirmed the judgment in part and reversed and rendered in part, holding that the insurer's duty to settle turned on whether its liability had become reasonably clear under the policy and the Stowers doctrine.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Ex Parte Zigmond
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-10-04 · cited 9×
In this case, the appellants were convicted of arson after pleading guilty and received concurrent fourteen-year sentences under a plea bargain. The trial court denied their request for bond pending appeal, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the appellants had not obtained permission to appeal and were not raising jurisdictional issues. The appellate court determined that the appellants were eligible for bond under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.04 since their sentences did not exceed fifteen years and were suitable based on prior findings, with no evidence of flight risk or future offenses. It further reasoned that a trial court may limit the scope of an appeal but cannot deny the right to appeal entirely or decide the appellate court's jurisdiction. The court reversed the denial of bond and remanded the cases to set reasonable bond pending appeal.
criminal lawprocedure
Grothues v. City of Helotes
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-08-14 · cited 24×
The case concerned whether the general-law City of Helotes could award an exclusive solid-waste collection franchise to a private company and enforce resident payments through fines. After the Texas Legislature amended the County Solid Waste Control Act to expressly authorize such contracts and validate existing ones, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment upholding the city's ordinances. The core reasoning was that the statutory amendments mooted the authority challenge, while separate provisions of the Health and Safety Code and Local Government Code section 54.001 grant municipalities police power to impose fines up to $2,000 for violations of public-health and sanitation rules, including refuse collection.
business & regulatoryenvironmentcriminal law
Thomas v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-06-26 · cited 8×
In Thomas v. State, the appellant was charged with the felony offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon on licensed premises, entered a guilty plea under a plea agreement, and was sentenced to six years in prison and a fine. On appeal, he argued that his plea was involuntary because his attorney misled him about receiving probation and because the trial court failed to properly admonish him about the range of punishment and immigration consequences as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 26.13. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the attorney's alleged statements were not supported by any admissible evidence in the record and the point was inadequately briefed, that the written admonitions signed by the appellant substantially complied with the statute on punishment range, and that the missing immigration admonition caused no harm because the appellant was a U.S. citizen. The court concluded it had jurisdiction and that the record showed the plea was knowing and voluntary.
criminal lawprocedure
Henderson v. Viesca
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-04-18 · cited 14×
This case involved an appeal from a probate court's approval of a guardian's final accounting and awards of additional fees for services as both guardian and attorney to the estate of an incompetent ward, Mary Lou Heep Henderson. The guardian had been appointed in 1988 under an order allowing dual roles and compensation, and she had successfully litigated to increase trust distributions to the estate. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings that the accounting was accurate, the fees were reasonable, and dual compensation was permissible under Texas probate law, while also sustaining the guardian's cross-point to award fees incurred in defending the final account after her resignation. The decision rested on statutory provisions for guardian commissions and attorney fees, the absence of objections at appointment, and the necessity of the services rendered over the guardianship's duration.
family lawpropertyprocedure
San Antonio Express News v. Dracos
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-04-17 · cited 81×
This case arose from a defamation lawsuit filed by Ted Dracos, a former KENS-TV reporter, against the San Antonio Express-News and columnist Jeanne Jakle over a 1993 article reporting that Dracos had quit his job suddenly and without communication with his news director. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, leading to this interlocutory appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Dracos, as a public figure, failed to present evidence raising a fact issue on actual malice, as the newspaper's reporting was based on statements from station employees and was substantially true or believed to be true at the time of publication.
free speechtorts & liability
Esquivel v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-03-29 · cited 34×
This case is an appeal from a trial court's denial of a habeas corpus application seeking reduction of pre-trial bail set at $150,000 for a defendant indicted on fifteen counts of sexual assault, indecency with a child, and prohibited sexual conduct. The court affirmed the denial of bail reduction. It applied the factors in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.15, including the need to reasonably assure the defendant's appearance (considering his recent travels and lack of permanent residence or job), the serious nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses against his daughter, the defendant's limited financial ability to post bond, and concerns about potential threats to the victim. The court concluded that the bail amount was not excessive under the Texas Constitution, Texas statutes, or the U.S. Constitution.
criminal lawprocedure
Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp.
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-02-28 · cited 60×
This case involved appellant Terry Stroud's suit against his former employer and related parties for wrongful termination, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and interference with contract, along with the defendants' counterclaims for sanctions. The trial court granted summary judgments in favor of the defendants and imposed sanctions on Stroud's attorney for violating a protective order from a separate case that had been removed to federal court. On appeal, the court addressed issues of judgment finality arising from a nonsuit of the sanctions counterclaims and severance, ultimately determining that it had jurisdiction and that the appellate timetable had begun upon the nonsuit. The court reversed the sanctions order, holding that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the protective order after the case's removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), but affirmed the final summary judgment disposing of all claims.
procedurelabor & employmentfederal power
Bouchet v. Texas Mexican Railway Co.
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-02-12 · cited 5×
This case involved an employee of the Texas Mexican Railway Co. who suffered an on-the-job back injury in 1987, continued working until surgery in 1990, and then filed an FELA personal injury lawsuit in December 1991; after the filing, the railroad discontinued salary continuation and travel expense benefits (while continuing medical payments), prompting the employee to add a claim under Texas Labor Code § 451.001 for wrongful discrimination. The jury found the employee 80% responsible for his injury and found no violation of the Labor Code, but the trial court had submitted the discrimination question over the railroad's objection that it was improper in an FELA case. The court of appeals held that § 451.001 creates an independent cause of action untethered from workers' compensation laws and therefore may be asserted in an FELA proceeding. Although some evidence (such as continued payment of medical bills) prevented a ruling that discrimination was established as a matter of law, the court determined that the jury's no-discrimination finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence showing differential treatment based on the lawsuit filing, and it reversed and remanded for a new trial on that claim.
labor & employmentprocedure
Mikulich v. Perez
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1996-01-10 · cited 8×
This case involved a former spouse's post-divorce suit against her ex-husband and subsequent property transferees, seeking division of undivided community property, to set aside alleged fraudulent transfers of that property, and to partition it. The trial court granted a general summary judgment to the defendants on grounds of res judicata and the plaintiff's prior knowledge of the transfers negating her fraud claim. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were not barred by res judicata because they were independent of the divorce decree and did not form a convenient trial unit with it, and that the motion failed to address the distinct fraudulent transfer cause of action. The court also noted procedural concerns about whether the judgment disposed of all parties and issues.
family lawpropertyprocedure
Williams v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) · 1995-12-01 · cited 24×
In Williams v. State, the appellant appealed two convictions for indecency with a child under Texas Penal Code § 21.11, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence because the child complainants did not use the term 'genitals' and alleging error in the trial court's handling of the prosecution's jury argument about 'rabbit trails.' The court granted rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and held that the evidence was sufficient under precedents like Clark v. State because the children's testimony using terms such as 'penis' adequately communicated touching of a body part within the statutory definition of sexual contact. It further found no reversible error in the jury argument, as the defense failed to preserve the issue by requesting additional instructions and the court's charge properly stated the burden of proof. Finally, the court reformed the judgment to correct the sentence from seven years to two years, probated for seven years, to match the jury's verdict and trial pronouncement, then affirmed the judgment as reformed.
criminal lawprocedure