This case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Harley-Davidson Motor Company in a patent infringement lawsuit over motorcycle clutches. After the District Court entered a pro forma interlocutory injunction order to facilitate an appeal without independently deciding the issues, the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court of Appeals had acquired jurisdiction through the appeal under Section 129 of the Judicial Code and was required to decide it rather than dismiss, even though the underlying order was made pro forma. The Court reasoned that the statute provides a right to appellate review after the District Court has exercised its own judgment, and dismissal improperly left the injunction in force without resolution. Mandamus was issued directing the Circuit Court of Appeals to entertain and determine the appeal.
The case involved the United States suing the Southern Pacific Company and related entities, alleging that Southern Pacific's acquisition of a controlling interest in the Central Pacific Railway Company, along with its lease and operation of those lines, created an unlawful monopoly and restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act; the suit also claimed violations of 1862 and 1864 federal acts that required the Central Pacific to maintain a competitive through line with the Union Pacific to the Pacific Coast. The District Court dismissed the petition after hearing evidence on the history of the railroads' construction, consolidations, financing, and operations from the 1860s onward. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the combination eliminated competition between the systems and breached statutory obligations for equal facilities and non-discrimination on the transcontinental route.
This case involved the United States suing United Shoe Machinery Corporation and related entities under Section 3 of the Clayton Act to enjoin the use of certain restrictive clauses in leases of shoe machinery. The District Court granted an injunction against clauses including restricted use, exclusive use, supplies, patent insole, additional machinery, factory output, and royalty provisions, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decree. The Court found that the defendant controlled a dominant share of the relevant market and that the leases conditioned access to its machinery on lessees not using competitors' products or supplies, with the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly. The Court rejected arguments that lessees were necessary parties, that alternative leases justified the restrictions, or that the transactions fell outside interstate commerce. It held that the leases were made in the course of interstate commerce and that the enjoined provisions violated the Act.
The case involved a contract between Standard Fashion Co., a manufacturer of garment patterns, and Magrane-Houston Co., a retailer, granting the retailer exclusive rights to sell Standard patterns and prohibiting sales of competing patterns. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that the contract violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The Court reasoned that the agreement constituted a sale with a restrictive condition that could substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, particularly given that the petitioner and related companies controlled about two-fifths of pattern agencies nationwide, potentially leading to monopolies in many communities.
The case involved a licensed and registered physician charged under the Narcotic Drug Act of 1914 with unlawfully selling large quantities of heroin, morphine, and cocaine to a known addict without a proper written order form. The indictment alleged that the physician issued prescriptions intending for the drugs to be used by the patient through self-administration over several days to satisfy addiction rather than to treat any other disease, with no administration or supervision by the doctor. The Court held that these acts constituted an offense under the statute, reasoning that the exception for dispensing drugs in the course of professional practice does not cover distributions meant to cater to an addict's cravings, as established in prior decisions such as Webb v. United States and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States. The majority reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment, while a dissent argued that the prescriptions were issued in good faith within the statutory language.
The case involved a railway receiver suing to recover five-dollar refrigerator car rental fees charged under tariffs for potato shipments from Minnesota to Oklahoma and Texas, after the railway had refunded some fees to the shipper. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the fees could not be collected because the relevant tariffs and circulars were not properly filed or posted at the points of origin as required by the Interstate Commerce Act and ICC rules. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the state court's decision turned on statutory interpretation rather than any challenge to the validity of federal authority under the Act. The Court explained that jurisdiction via writ of error requires a direct question about the power to create the authority exercised, which was not present here.