Robert Smith sued the City of Lubbock and its insurer St. Paul to recover additional damages under an underinsured/uninsured motorist policy after he was struck by an intoxicated driver while performing his job duties; he had already received workers’ compensation benefits for the injuries. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City, holding that Texas Labor Code § 408.001(a) makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for covered work-related injuries against an employer, and the statute’s broad language—focusing on remedies rather than causes of action—extends to contractual claims under the employer-purchased policy. It reversed summary judgment for St. Paul after the insurer conceded the ruling against it was incorrect and remanded that portion for further proceedings. The court also rejected Smith’s waiver and estoppel arguments, noting those doctrines preserve existing rights but do not create new ones beyond the statute.
In McGee v. State, Christopher McGee appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the state's peremptory strike of an African-American venireman, in admitting his written confession and drawing, and that the evidence was legally insufficient. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's explanation that the juror was struck for sleeping during voir dire was race-neutral and undisputed. It further concluded that the confession was admissible because Miranda warnings were provided, the defendant was not in custody during the interview at the police station, and claims of coercion were inadequately briefed. Finally, the court found the confession and drawing sufficient to support the verdict.
The case involved a juvenile appellant adjudicated for delinquent conduct based on participation in a burglary of a storage facility and ordered committed to the Texas Youth Commission. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle stop, holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion due to the late hour, the vehicle's position at the drive-through window of a closed business, a recent similar burglary nearby, multiple recent burglaries in the area, and the vehicle driving away upon the officer's approach. The court also found the evidence factually sufficient to establish the appellant's involvement in the offense via matching descriptions from video and physical evidence in the vehicle, and to support the commitment order based on the appellant's extensive prior record, failed treatment programs, drug use, and inadequate home supervision.
This case arose from a negligence lawsuit by Natividad Delgado against an underinsured motorist and his own insurer, Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co., seeking damages including past medical expenses after a tow dolly accident. Prior to trial, the at-fault driver's insurer settled for policy limits, and the jury awarded damages including over $52,000 in past medical expenses. Progressive argued that section 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code limited recovery of medical expenses to amounts actually paid or incurred ($4,763.77 after Medicare adjustments and write-offs), and after applying offsets for the settlement and PIP benefits, Delgado's collectible damages fell below the credits. The appellate court agreed, holding that the statute caps recoverable medical expenses at the amounts actually paid on the claimant's behalf with no further billing allowed, resulting in total collectible damages of $24,221.77 subsumed by offsets. The court reversed the trial judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Progressive.
In Tanner v. State, the appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily injury to a family member as a third-degree felony based on a prior conviction for assault, but he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felony enhancement. The court held that the State failed to prove the prior conviction involved family violence, as the judgment made no mention of it, the plea document's unexplained initials "FM" provided no evidence, and no extrinsic proof such as victim testimony or a judicial confession was introduced. The opinion explained that while an affirmative family violence finding in the prior judgment is preferred under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.013, its absence requires other evidence, which was lacking here. Accordingly, the court reversed the felony conviction and remanded for entry of a misdemeanor judgment and resentencing.
The case involved Michael Runningwolf, who was convicted by a jury of the misdemeanor offense of simulating legal process after delivering a document styled 'Non-Statutory Abatement' to a woman who had custody of a child; the document invoked ecclesiastical law, contempt of court, and default judgment in connection with an ongoing custody dispute. Runningwolf appealed on multiple grounds, including that the trial court erred by entering a not guilty plea on his behalf after he responded 'bar to prosecution,' that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient, and that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and violated his rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. The court held that the trial court properly entered a not guilty plea under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 27.16 when the defendant refused to plead, that the evidence supported the conviction because the document used legal terminology in a manner that could reasonably be perceived as simulating court process, and that the constitutional challenges failed. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence of one year in jail and a $4,000 fine.