Amy Coney Barrett

In Watson v. Republican National Committee, the Supreme Court considered whether federal election-day statutes (3 U.S.C. §1 and 2 U.S.C. §§1, 7), which set a uniform Tuesday in November for choosing federal officeholders, preempt a Mississippi law allowing certain voters to cast absentee ballots by mail or common carrier if postmarked by election day and received within five business days. The Court held that the statutes do not bar Mississippi from counting such ballots. It reasoned that the term "election" has long been understood to refer to the electorate's act of choosing candidates by casting votes, not to the later receipt or counting of ballots; this reading is reinforced by related federal law such as UOCAVA (which treats receipt deadlines as a state matter), constitutional provisions separating the day of voting from receipt, and the absence of any explicit nationwide receipt deadline in the election-day statutes themselves.

electionsfederal power

In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco and its executives, alleging that the company aided the Chinese government’s persecution by supplying surveillance technology used to identify and detain them, and sought damages under the Alien Tort Statute for aiding and abetting violations of international law as well as under the Torture Victim Protection Act for aiding and abetting torture. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that courts may not create new causes of action under the ATS for violations of international norms, including aiding-and-abetting liability, and that the TVPA does not authorize aiding-and-abetting claims. The Court reasoned that the ATS is strictly jurisdictional and that fashioning new rights of action would improperly intrude on Congress’s authority to create causes of action and on the political branches’ conduct of foreign policy; it further concluded that the TVPA’s text, which imposes liability only on those who “subject” another to torture, does not encompass aiding and abetting because it lacks any express reference to that form of liability.

civil rightsfederal powertorts & liability

The Supreme Court case addressed whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA) creates an implied private right of action allowing shareholders to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the statute. Petitioners, closed-end funds incorporated in Maryland, had adopted resolutions limiting voting rights of large shareholders under the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act; respondents Saba Capital sued under Section 47(b), claiming these resolutions violated the ICA’s equal-voting-rights rule for shares. The Court held that Section 47(b) does not authorize such private suits. It reasoned that the provision is a directive to courts about when to grant the remedy of rescission for already-performed contracts, rather than “rights-creating” language aimed at protecting a particular class of persons, and that the ICA’s structure—designating the SEC as primary enforcer while expressly authorizing only two narrow private actions—precludes implying additional ones. The decision reversed the lower courts’ contrary rulings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Rutherford v. United States, petitioners Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter were each convicted of multiple §924(c) firearm offenses tied to crimes of violence and received stacked mandatory minimum sentences of 32 and 57 years, respectively. After Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which ended the 25-year stacking rule for first-time offenders but did not make the change retroactive to previously sentenced defendants, both men moved for sentence reductions under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that the resulting disparity qualified as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason. The Supreme Court held that a nonretroactive sentencing amendment cannot serve as such a reason, either alone or in combination with other factors. The Court explained that nonretroactivity is the ordinary practice when Congress changes penalties, that the statute’s text requires reasons sufficiently unusual and convincing to warrant relief, and that the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement treating unusually long sentences as qualifying grounds conflicts with the statute and is therefore invalid.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case concerned Joe Fernandez, who was convicted in 2014 of murder for hire and a firearms offense based on testimony from an alleged co-conspirator and sentenced to consecutive life terms; after losing a direct appeal and two motions under 28 U.S.C. §2255, he sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that doubts about the trial evidence and his possible innocence constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s grant of relief, holding that a prisoner may not attack the validity of a conviction through a compassionate-release motion. The Court reasoned that Congress channeled collateral attacks on federal convictions exclusively through the specific, tightly constrained procedures of §2255—including its one-year limit, bar on successive petitions, and procedural-default rules—and that allowing such claims under §3582 would let prisoners evade those limits; it further noted that the text, structure, and history of §3582 focus on personal circumstances such as age, illness, or rehabilitation rather than legal challenges to the conviction itself.

criminal lawprocedure

In Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts a state-law negligent-hiring claim against a transportation broker. The case arose after petitioner Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when a truck driven by an employee of motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC—which had been hired by broker C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.—struck his vehicle; Montgomery alleged that Robinson negligently selected the carrier despite its poor federal safety rating. The lower courts held that the FAAAA’s preemption provision barred the claim. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which preserves state regulatory authority over motor vehicle safety. The Court reasoned that negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of care in selecting carriers and directly concern the trucks used in transportation, thereby qualifying for the exception and avoiding preemption.

business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

In Berk v. Choy, a plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim under Delaware law in federal court but failed to submit the “affidavit of merit” that Delaware statute requires to accompany the complaint. The district court dismissed the suit and the Third Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, directly answers the question of what must be included in a complaint at the pleading stage. Because Rule 8 is valid under the Rules Enabling Act, it displaces the conflicting Delaware requirement even though the state rule would otherwise be considered substantive. The Court rejected arguments that the state affidavit could be recharacterized as an evidentiary or non-pleading obligation enforceable through other Federal Rules.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned challenges by individuals, organizations, and states to President Trump’s Executive Order limiting birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. Lower courts issued nationwide “universal injunctions” blocking enforcement of the order against anyone, and the government sought partial stays limiting relief to the named plaintiffs. The Supreme Court granted the stays, holding that federal courts likely lack authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue such broad injunctions. The Court reasoned that equitable remedies available to federal courts are confined to those traditionally granted by courts of equity at the founding, which were generally limited to the parties before the court rather than extending to non-parties nationwide. The decision did not address the constitutionality of the Executive Order itself.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned challenges by individuals, organizations, and states to President Trump’s Executive Order 14160, which directed that certain U.S.-born persons would not be recognized as citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. Lower courts issued nationwide “universal injunctions” barring enforcement of the order against anyone, and the Government sought partial stays to confine relief to the actual plaintiffs. The Supreme Court did not address the order’s constitutionality or statutory validity. Instead, it held that federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue such universal injunctions. The Court reasoned that the statute’s grant of equity jurisdiction is limited to remedies traditionally available in English courts of equity at the founding, which were party-specific rather than nationwide in scope, and therefore stayed the injunctions to the extent they exceeded complete relief for plaintiffs with standing.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned challenges by individuals, organizations, and states to President Trump’s Executive Order limiting birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nationality Act of 1940. Lower courts issued nationwide “universal injunctions” blocking enforcement of the order against anyone, and the Government sought partial stays to confine relief to the actual plaintiffs. The Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of the Executive Order itself. It held that federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions, granting partial stays that limit the injunctions to providing complete relief only to plaintiffs with standing. The Court reasoned that equitable remedies available in English courts at the founding were traditionally party-specific and did not include broad injunctions barring enforcement against non-parties.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned challenges by individuals, organizations, and states to President Trump’s Executive Order 14160, which directed that certain children born in the United States would not be recognized as citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. Lower courts issued “universal injunctions” that blocked federal officials from enforcing the order against anyone, not merely the plaintiffs in each suit. The Supreme Court granted the government’s applications for partial stays, limiting the injunctions to relief for the specific plaintiffs who had standing. It held that federal courts lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue such nationwide injunctions, because that statute incorporates only the party-specific remedies traditionally available in equity courts at the time of the founding, and universal injunctions have no sufficient historical analogue. The Court did not address whether the executive order itself is constitutional.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In Trump v. CASA, Inc., plaintiffs including individuals, organizations, and states challenged President Trump’s Executive Order 14160, which directed federal agencies not to recognize birthright citizenship in certain circumstances under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. Lower courts issued nationwide “universal injunctions” blocking enforcement of the order against anyone, and the government sought partial stays to limit those injunctions to the actual plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that federal district courts likely lack authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue such broad relief. The Court reasoned that Congress granted courts only the equitable powers traditionally exercised by English courts of equity at the time of the founding, which were limited to providing party-specific remedies rather than nationwide blocks on executive action. It therefore stayed the injunctions to the extent they extended beyond complete relief for plaintiffs with standing, while leaving the underlying constitutional question about the executive order unaddressed.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The Supreme Court case FDA v. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co. addressed whether retailers, in addition to manufacturers, may challenge an FDA order denying approval to market new tobacco products such as e-cigarettes under the Tobacco Control Act. After the FDA rejected R.J. Reynolds Vapor’s application for its Vuse Alto products, the company joined with a Texas retailer and a Mississippi retailers’ association to file suit in the Fifth Circuit; the FDA moved to dismiss or transfer, arguing that only the manufacturer was “adversely affected” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 387l(a)(1) and that venue was therefore improper. The Court held that retailers who would have sold the products but for the denial order qualify as “any person adversely affected” and may therefore seek judicial review in the circuit where they reside or do business. It reasoned that the statutory phrase is a term of art interpreted under the zone-of-interests test, which the Court has consistently applied broadly in both the APA and similar provisions in other statutes, without limiting standing solely to the disappointed applicant.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Esteras v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether a district court may consider the sentencing factor in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(A)—which addresses retribution by reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just punishment—when deciding to revoke a defendant's supervised release after a violation. Edgardo Esteras had his supervised release revoked and received an additional prison term partly based on that factor. The Court held that judges may not consider §3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation proceedings. It reasoned that §3583(e) expressly lists only eight of the ten §3553(a) factors for such decisions, and under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the deliberate omission of the retributive factor shows Congress intended to exclude it. This aligns with supervised release's rehabilitative purpose rather than punitive goals, as confirmed by prior cases interpreting the same statutory structure for imposing supervised release.

criminal law

The case concerned whether retailers (along with a manufacturer) could challenge an FDA order denying approval to market new e-cigarette products under the Tobacco Control Act. The Supreme Court held that retailers who would sell a product but for the FDA denial qualify as “any person adversely affected” and may therefore petition for judicial review in a court of appeals, including the Fifth Circuit. The Court reasoned that the statutory phrase “adversely affected” incorporates the longstanding zone-of-interests test, under which a plaintiff need only be arguably protected or regulated by the statute; prior decisions applying the same language in the APA and other laws had construed it broadly rather than limiting it to the disappointed applicant alone. This interpretation permitted the joint petition filed by RJR Vapor and the retailer parties to proceed in the Fifth Circuit.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

In Esteras v. United States, the defendant pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy, was placed on supervised release after serving a prison term, and had that release revoked after new arrests; the district court imposed additional prison time partly to promote respect for the law under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(A), and the Sixth Circuit upheld that approach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court deciding whether to revoke supervised release may not consider §3553(a)(2)(A). The Court reasoned that §3583(e) expressly directs courts to weigh only eight of the ten §3553(a) sentencing factors when revoking supervised release, deliberately omitting the retributive factor in (2)(A); under the canon expressio unius, this omission means Congress excluded retribution from the analysis. That conclusion aligns with supervised release’s rehabilitative purpose and with the Court’s earlier decisions interpreting the same omission in the provision governing imposition of supervised release.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the U.S. Tax Court retains jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(1) to decide a taxpayer’s dispute over tax liability or credits after the IRS abandons a proposed levy that prompted the collection due process hearing. Jennifer Zuch challenged an IRS levy to collect her 2010 taxes, arguing the agency had misapplied estimated payments and later overpayments; after those offsets reduced her liability to zero, the IRS sought dismissal of her Tax Court appeal as moot. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction once no levy remains, because the statute limits the “determination” subject to review to the binary decision whether the levy may proceed, while treating underlying liability issues only as inputs to that decision. The Court reasoned that §6330’s text and title focus exclusively on levies, that Congress preserved the default pay-first rule for tax disputes outside the levy context, and that the Tax Court’s remedial authority under the provision extends only to enjoining a levy rather than ordering refunds or declaratory relief.

taxes

In Commissioner v. Zuch, the dispute arose when Jennifer Zuch challenged the IRS's application of estimated tax payments to her former husband's account instead of hers, leading the IRS to seek collection of her 2010 tax liability through a levy under 26 U.S.C. § 6331. After Zuch requested a collection due process hearing under § 6330, the IRS appeals officer sustained the levy; she appealed to the Tax Court, but during the proceedings her outstanding liability was eliminated through application of later overpayments, prompting the IRS to move to dismiss the case as moot. The Supreme Court held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under § 6330(d)(1) once the IRS abandons the levy, because the statute grants authority only to review the appeals officer's binary determination on whether the levy may proceed, not to resolve standalone disputes over tax liability. The Court reasoned that the hearing's statutory scope is limited to levy-related issues, consistent with the default rule requiring taxpayers to pay disputed taxes before seeking refunds in other forums, and that § 6330 does not authorize the Tax Court to order refunds or issue declaratory judgments on liability once no levy remains. The Court therefore affirmed the Tax Court's dismissal.

taxesprocedurefederal power

The case involved Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting, who won Pennsylvania Department of Transportation contracts for painting projects by falsely claiming they would subcontract supplies to a certified disadvantaged business enterprise. In reality, they used the business only as a pass-through entity, violating federal regulations, though they completed the work to the state's satisfaction and earned over $20 million in profit. They were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349 on a fraudulent-inducement theory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal wire fraud does not require proof that the defendant intended the victim to suffer net economic loss. The statute is satisfied when a defendant obtains money or property through materially false pretenses, as the deception here induced the award of contracts and payments that would not otherwise have been made.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved petitioners Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting, who secured two PennDOT painting contracts by falsely claiming they would subcontract paint supplies to a disadvantaged business enterprise (Markias) as required by federal regulations; in reality, they used Markias only as a pass-through entity to submit invoices while obtaining supplies elsewhere, though they completed the projects to PennDOT’s satisfaction and earned over $20 million. They were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§1343 and 1349 on a fraudulent-inducement theory—that they had obtained the contracts and payments through material misrepresentations. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that federal wire fraud does not require proof that the defendant intended the victim to suffer net economic loss. The Court reasoned that the statute’s text requires only a scheme to obtain money or property by false pretenses, which was satisfied here, and that common-law fraud precedents likewise treat deception-induced deprivation of the promised bargain as sufficient without mandating economic harm.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory