This case involves a personal injury lawsuit filed by Jeffrey Wilson against Thomas Walker and FedEx Custom Critical, Inc., stemming from a car accident. The plaintiff sought to keep the case in state court by claiming damages under $50,000, but the defendants removed it to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction after discovery revealed potential damages exceeding $75,000. The court denied the motion to remand, reasoning that under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff could recover more than the pleaded amount in a de novo trial, and evidence of significant income loss and medical expenses met the federal jurisdictional threshold to a legal certainty.
In this case, plaintiff William Nolde alleged that defendants, including Joyce Sheed, Silver Buckman, and various companies, tricked him into signing documents that transferred ownership of his Philadelphia home under the false pretense of a home repair loan, resulting in a mortgage, fees paid to defendants, default, and foreclosure. Multiple defendants moved to dismiss the eleven-count complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7), challenging jurisdiction, failure to state claims, joinder, and timeliness of claims including those under RESPA. The court denied the motions, finding that the complaint sufficiently pled the fraud and related claims, that certain statutes of limitations issues could not be resolved at the pleading stage based on the alleged facts, and that the quiet title claim was viable under Pennsylvania law despite the recorded sale.
This case is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which relator John Underwood alleges that Genentech defrauded Medicare and Medicaid by inducing off-label prescriptions of Rituxan through improper marketing and kickbacks to physicians. After the government declined to intervene, the relator sought to amend his complaint with details drawn from millions of documents obtained by the DOJ during its investigation, while Genentech moved to dismiss for failure to plead specific false claims with particularity under Rule 9(b) and opposed the amendment. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the existing complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) by detailing the fraudulent scheme even without identifying individual claims submitted by third parties. In the alternative, the court ruled that amendments based on documents obtained from the government are permissible, unlike those based solely on discovery from the defendant. The court therefore granted leave to file the second amended complaint.
The case involved a court-appointed Receiver seeking to recover over $1.1 million in assets allegedly transferred to Malvern Preparatory School from a Ponzi scheme run by Joseph Forte, either directly as charitable donations or indirectly through limited partners. The Receiver brought claims under Pennsylvania's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act for actual fraud and for common-law unjust enrichment. The court denied the school's motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint adequately alleged transfers made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors under PUFTA and that retention of the funds would be inequitable given their origin in the scheme. The decision rested on the particular facts of a Ponzi scheme, where the transfers lacked any legitimate consent or expectation from the defrauded partnership.
In this case, the defendant, who had previously pled nolo contendere to statutory sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, was before the court for sentencing on a federal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court had to decide whether the prior conviction qualified as a 'crime of violence' under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would raise the base offense level from 14 to 20. The court held that it did qualify, relying on the charging document's indication that the victim was eight years old to conclude that the offense involved conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and typically purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct under the Supreme Court's Begay decision. The court rejected arguments based on the categorical approach and the absence of a force element, limiting its analysis to the elements of the offense without considering plea colloquy details.
The case involved a reinsurance dispute between PMA Capital Insurance Co. and Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd., concerning the validity and application of a deficit carry forward provision in their 2003 agreement that allowed Platinum to offset prior losses against funds in an experience account. An arbitration panel eliminated the provision from the contract and ordered PMA to pay Platinum $6 million as compensation. PMA petitioned to vacate the award, and the court granted the petition. The court reasoned that the award was completely irrational because arbitrators may not eliminate material contract provisions or grant payments to which a party is not contractually entitled, even under an honorable engagement clause granting broad discretion.