Judicial data via CourtListener (Free Law Project). Social links via Wikidata.
Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Judicial activismJudicial restraint
Kostiuk [4] explicitly calls for halting 'trivial' §1983 suits that mock the statute's purpose and burden federal courts, demonstrating judicial restraint. Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Kostiuk [4] relies on Monroe v. Pape and Raymon without questioning their authority, applying established limits on §1983 scope. Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — appointed by Ronald Reagan
District Court, E.D. New York — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Party: Republican →Degree, Saint Francis Medical Center College of NursingLL.B., Brooklyn Law School
Record analysis
AI-compiled from the cited opinions below
Decisions from the District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued between 1983 and 1987. Cases addressed federal benefits claims, energy and utility regulation, agency actions, bankruptcy, and local government matters.
Federal benefits claims
Rulings on claims against the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
The case involved plaintiff Frederick Hall's motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after successfully challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Social Security disability benefits. Hall's original action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) was remanded by stipulation to apply the medical improvement standard from the 1984 Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, leading to a favorable administrative decision and reinstatement of benefits. The court decided that Hall qualified as a prevailing party entitled to $2,926.88 in fees, finding a sufficient causal connection because filing the lawsuit was a statutory prerequisite for remand under the Reform Act and the Secretary's position was not substantially justified given existing Second Circuit precedent in DeLeon v. Secretary. The reasoning centered on the Reform Act's requirement that judicial review be pending for re-evaluation, combined with Hall's correct challenge to the severity test application, making the suit a necessary factor in obtaining the award despite the legislation's role.
Petitioner Allen Lublin sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his multiple transfers from federal custody to Nassau County District Court proceedings on state charges violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The court denied the petition, concluding that the IAD did not apply to the transfers in question. The core reasoning was that the IAD is triggered only once a prisoner begins serving a term of imprisonment upon entering a federal facility, which occurred here on February 22, 1977, after the initial transfers; brief earlier movements did not affect rehabilitation, and the detainer caused no unreasonable delay or interference with programs.
The case involved Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) suing Suffolk County, alleging that the county's refusal to participate in emergency planning for the Shoreham nuclear power plant amounted to an inverse condemnation (a taking under the Fifth Amendment) of the nearly completed $4 billion facility and also breached a prior contract for developing a radiological emergency response plan. LILCO sought a $4 billion judgment. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The constitutional claim was dismissed for lack of ripeness, as it hinged on the speculative future occurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denying LILCO's license application due to the county's actions. The state-law contract claim was dismissed because it depended on pendent jurisdiction tied to the dismissed federal claim.
The case involved a challenge by Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy and intervenors LILCO and a school district to Suffolk County's resolutions refusing to develop, test, or implement any radiological emergency evacuation plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Facility, on the grounds that no adequate plan was possible. Plaintiffs claimed the resolutions were preempted by the Atomic Energy Act because they effectively regulated nuclear safety and frustrated federal policy, and also violated state constitutional and statutory duties to protect public health and safety, as well as LILCO's equal protection and liberty rights. The court granted the County's motion to dismiss, holding that the resolutions did not constitute impermissible regulation of nuclear safety or a moratorium on plant operation but were instead a legitimate exercise of local authority to decline participation in planning, that they were not in conflict with federal law, and that the County's actions satisfied rational basis review as rationally related to protecting residents' health and safety.
The case involved a pro se plaintiff with a lifelong disability who challenged the USDA's termination of her food stamp benefits under the 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act's definition of 'household,' which treated her as part of her parents' household unless one parent was elderly or disabled. She sought to invalidate the amendment and regulations on constitutional grounds, claiming they discriminated against her by denying equal protection and due process because her disability required her to live with her parents. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the amended definition was constitutional. It reasoned that legislation allocating benefits is presumed valid, the change had a rational basis in preventing fraud and managing limited resources, and there was no evidence of congressional intent to classify applicants based on disability that would trigger heightened scrutiny.
In Fernandez v. Southside Hospital, plaintiffs filed a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging violations by the defendants, but voluntarily dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i) before any answer or summary judgment motion, citing cost and the availability of state court relief. Defendants then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, claiming they were prevailing parties and that the suit lacked merit. The court denied the motion, holding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not make defendants prevailing parties for § 1988 purposes and that plaintiffs’ counsel had not acted unreasonably or in bad faith under Rule 11 standards.
