This case involved a challenge by competing motor carriers to an Interstate Commerce Commission order granting certificates of public convenience and necessity to three applicants for general commodities operations between points in the Southwest and Southeast. The district court set aside the order under the Administrative Procedure Act, finding the Commission's findings and conclusions arbitrary and capricious despite being supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission had articulated a rational connection between the facts and its decision to grant the applications based on applicants' fitness and evidence of service inadequacies by existing carriers. The Court emphasized the narrow scope of review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard and concluded that the district court had improperly substituted its judgment for the agency's on matters such as the weight given to evidence of existing service and applicants' performance elsewhere.
The case concerned whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with a union that presents authorization cards signed by a majority of employees, when the employer has not engaged in other unfair labor practices and instead insists on a secret-ballot election conducted by the NLRB. In both consolidated cases, unions obtained cards or struck for recognition, the employers declined to bargain without an election, and the unions filed refusal-to-bargain charges; the Board ruled that employers need not accept card evidence alone, but the D.C. Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that an employer may lawfully insist on a Board election to determine majority status absent any employer misconduct that would make a fair election impossible. The Court reasoned that while authorization cards can sometimes reflect employee sentiment, the Act and Board precedent do not compel an employer to forgo the preferred election process when it has a good-faith doubt and has not interfered with employee rights.
The case concerned whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service could lawfully allow aliens residing in Canada or Mexico to commute daily or seasonally to jobs in the United States by treating them as "special immigrants" under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Act defines a special immigrant as one "lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad," which exempts them from certain documentation, numerical limits, and labor certification requirements. The Supreme Court held that both daily and seasonal commuters qualify under this definition because they have been admitted for permanent residence, retain that status, and are returning after temporary absences. The Court based its conclusion on the statute's text, the agency's longstanding administrative practice, and indications from legislative history that Congress did not intend to bar the practice. It affirmed the lower court as to daily commuters and reversed as to seasonal commuters.
This case involved a Tennessee-based cotton merchant, Allenberg Cotton Co., that contracted through a local Mississippi agent to buy cotton from farmers like appellee Pittman, with the cotton then entering interstate commerce after ginning and warehousing in Mississippi. Pittman refused delivery, and Allenberg sued for breach in Mississippi courts, but the state Supreme Court dismissed the suit because Allenberg had not registered to do business in the state under a local qualification statute. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute could not be applied to bar the suit. The core reasoning was that the contracts were part of a continuous flow of interstate commerce, so denying court access under the state law violated the Commerce Clause.
This case was a civil rights suit brought by the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee and individual organizers against Texas Rangers and local law enforcement officials, alleging a conspiracy to suppress union activities during a 1966-1967 farmworkers' strike through repeated unlawful arrests, detentions, physical assaults, and harassment that violated rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court found the challenged conduct unconstitutional, declared five Texas statutes facially invalid, and issued permanent injunctions barring enforcement of those statutes as well as the pattern of abusive practices. On appeal by five Texas Rangers, the Supreme Court examined the jurisdictional basis for the three-judge district court, the propriety of injunctive relief against ongoing official misconduct, and limits on enjoining judicial officers, while upholding the core prohibitory injunction against the unconstitutional conduct.
civil rightsfree speechlabor & employmentcriminal law
The case concerned whether a Colorado air pollution inspector's warrantless entry onto a company's outdoor premises to conduct a visual test of smoke emissions from its chimneys violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that no unreasonable search occurred, as the inspector observed only plumes of smoke visible to the public from open fields without entering any buildings, offices, or examining private records or equipment. The Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts setting aside the cease-and-desist order and remanded for consideration of remaining state-law and due-process questions.