This case involved two consolidated claims of sex discrimination under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) by Katerina Levendos and her mother Elizabeth Levendos against their former employer, a restaurant operator. Katerina alleged she was fired on fabricated grounds after an incident involving customer complaints, while Elizabeth claimed she was forced to resign due to exclusion from meetings, loss of authority, false accusations of theft, and other adverse conditions. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of Katerina on liability, determining that the employer's stated reasons were pretextual and lacked credibility, but ruled for the defendant against Elizabeth, concluding that the working conditions were not intolerable enough to establish constructive discharge and that she had not given management an opportunity to remedy issues before resigning. The rulings applied precedents such as McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co. to evaluate the evidence of discriminatory intent and the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' actions.
This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act arose from a serious injury to plaintiff H. Cree Collins on January 13, 1983, leading to a complaint filed on January 10, 1985, naming the United States Department of the Army and its Corps of Engineers as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred because a May 3, 1983, letter from plaintiffs' counsel to the Army Corps of Engineers did not constitute proper presentment of the claim to the appropriate federal agency under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), and that the named agencies could not be sued in their own names. The court denied the motion, holding that the letter sufficiently presented the claim by identifying the incident, describing the serious injuries, notifying the agency of retained counsel and an intent to investigate, and requesting the agency's report, thereby satisfying the jurisdictional prerequisite even without a specific damage amount or use of Standard Form 95. The court also permitted amendment to clarify that the suit was against the United States and noted in dictum that admiralty jurisdiction might alternatively apply but was superseded by the FTCA remedy.
This case concerns whether Pennsylvania education officials provided Lindy Sue Grkman, a deaf minor, with a free appropriate public education under federal law, following an earlier district court ruling that was remanded after the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education. On remand, the district court applied the Rowley standard, which defines a free appropriate public education as specially designed personalized instruction with sufficient supportive services to allow the child to benefit educationally, provided at public expense and meeting state standards in conformity with an individualized education program. The court found the prior IEP obsolete and remanded the matter to the Secretary of Education to develop an updated factual record, conduct a current evaluation, and compare available educational alternatives under the new legal criteria, while noting the possibility of issues capable of repetition yet evading review. The decision emphasizes that education needs change over time and that state authorities should first assess facts in light of Rowley before any further judicial review.
The case involves William B. Ursic suing his employer Bethlehem Mines and related pension plan entities under ERISA § 510 (29 U.S.C. 1140) for discharging him to prevent his pension from vesting after nearly 30 years of service. The court found after a non-jury trial that the discharge, purportedly for removing company tools without permission, was a pretext contrived to interfere with his attainment of pension rights, as shown by his strong work record, the company's awareness of his planned retirement, lax enforcement of tool policies, and the timing of surveillance. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff awarding stipulated damages of $59,765.54 plus future monthly pension payments and reasonable attorney fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. 1132(g).
This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act concerned injuries to pedestrian Henry F. Reuter from a collision with a U.S. Air Corps vehicle in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, along with his wife's claim for loss of consortium. The court applied Pennsylvania tort law on pedestrian right-of-way at crosswalks, comparative negligence, no-fault offsets, and damage calculations, concluding that the government driver was negligent while the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and that the accident caused permanent disability affecting his business earnings. It awarded $250,000 to Reuter (capped by the prior administrative claim) and $45,000 to his wife after deducting benefits and compensation received. The ruling rested on findings of fact from trial evidence regarding the incident, medical causation, and economic losses.
The case involved the United States seeking to collect a $1,000 civil penalty from Thompson Bros. Coal Co. for violating a regulation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act by discharging mine drainage into a stream without using a required sedimentation pond. The defendant admitted the violation but argued that the Act's requirement to prepay the proposed penalty into escrow before contesting it violated due process and equal protection. The court upheld the provision's constitutionality, finding that operators have access to full evidentiary hearings and informal conferences without prepayment, that the requirement reasonably deters frivolous delays, and that any temporary financial burden is minimal and offset by interest on refunds. It also rejected the equal protection claim, noting the statute applies uniformly and that any disparity arises from market conditions rather than statutory classification, satisfying rational basis review.
