The case involved Texas-law claims by independent dairy distributors W.G. Pettigrew and PDI against Borden for breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference, unfair competition, predatory pricing, and slander arising from a decades-long oral distribution arrangement that Borden allegedly altered by taking direct control of customers and routes. The district court granted Borden’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. On the distributors’ subsequent Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, the court refused to consider late-filed deposition excerpts because counsel’s carelessness caused the delay and the additional material still failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. The court also declined to revisit its earlier rulings, finding no manifest error of law or fact that would justify reconsideration.
The case involved John Turco, a diabetic chemical process operator employed by Hoechst Celanese, who brought an Americans with Disabilities Act claim after his termination, alleging failure to accommodate his condition by transferring him to a daytime position. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim. The core reasoning was that Turco was not a qualified individual with a disability, as his performance had deteriorated with multiple safety violations that created serious hazards at the plant, and there was insufficient evidence that the requested accommodation would have enabled him to perform essential job functions without undue risk.
This case involved a Texas worker injured on a Louisiana work platform who received $42,819.32 in Texas workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual before filing a Jones Act suit against his employer, Fairfield Industries; the parties later settled the maritime claim by stipulating the worker's seaman status and characterizing the prior payments as maintenance and cure. Liberty Mutual intervened seeking reimbursement, arguing the worker could not retain both sets of benefits. The court granted summary judgment to the intervenor, holding that Texas workers' compensation and Jones Act remedies are mutually exclusive, that the worker's election of Jones Act benefits under Tex. Lab. Code § 406.075 barred further recovery under the state act, and that the full amount paid matched compensable elements of the maritime settlement, preventing double recovery.
In this case, Gulf Chemical and Cheminter sought a declaratory judgment that their insurer INA had a duty to defend them under a general liability policy in a products liability action brought by current and former Lone Star Steel employees alleging toxic exposure from chemicals, including molybdenum trioxide, supplied to the steel mill. The underlying Lone Star suit was filed against Gulf in October 1987, with additional plaintiffs intervening thereafter, while INA's policy coverage did not begin until June 1988. The court granted INA's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, holding that the policy excluded coverage for bodily injury expected from the insured's standpoint because Gulf had been notified of the claims and reasonably anticipated that the number of plaintiffs would grow substantially before the policy period started.
This case involved plaintiffs Agri Export Cooperative and Bankers Trust Company seeking to enforce payment on a $1 million irrevocable letter of credit issued by Universal Savings Association in favor of Agri Export, which referenced an underlying promissory note and was governed by the UCP rules. After Universal refused payment on proper presentments in January and March 1987 without stating reasons, and after an extension of the expiration date, the plaintiffs sued; Universal was later placed under RTC receivership. The court decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full amount plus interest, fees, and costs, holding that Universal breached the letter of credit by wrongfully dishonoring the draft. The core reasoning was that presentment complied with the letter's terms, any objections were waived under UCP Article 16 due to lack of timely notice, the issuer's officer had authority to issue it, the letter of credit was independent of the underlying transaction, and neither the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) applied to bar recovery.
The case concerned the distribution of proceeds from a federal employee's life insurance policy issued under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act, where the deceased Carl Kiser had not named a beneficiary and state law defined eligibility for surviving children. Karen Tipps claimed that her daughter Lori was Carl Kiser's biological child entitled to half the funds, while his acknowledged son Steven Kiser contested this based on evidence of non-paternity. The court ruled that Lori was not Carl Kiser's child and ordered the remaining proceeds disbursed to Steven Kiser. Core reasoning centered on DNA fingerprinting tests, along with divorce records, the decedent's will, and witness testimony, that provided clear and convincing proof under applicable state law that Carl Kiser was not Lori's father.