Hugh Gibson

The case involved Texas-law claims by independent dairy distributors W.G. Pettigrew and PDI against Borden for breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference, unfair competition, predatory pricing, and slander arising from a decades-long oral distribution arrangement that Borden allegedly altered by taking direct control of customers and routes. The district court granted Borden’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. On the distributors’ subsequent Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, the court refused to consider late-filed deposition excerpts because counsel’s carelessness caused the delay and the additional material still failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. The court also declined to revisit its earlier rulings, finding no manifest error of law or fact that would justify reconsideration.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved John Turco, a diabetic chemical process operator employed by Hoechst Celanese, who brought an Americans with Disabilities Act claim after his termination, alleging failure to accommodate his condition by transferring him to a daytime position. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim. The core reasoning was that Turco was not a qualified individual with a disability, as his performance had deteriorated with multiple safety violations that created serious hazards at the plant, and there was insufficient evidence that the requested accommodation would have enabled him to perform essential job functions without undue risk.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a Texas worker injured on a Louisiana work platform who received $42,819.32 in Texas workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual before filing a Jones Act suit against his employer, Fairfield Industries; the parties later settled the maritime claim by stipulating the worker's seaman status and characterizing the prior payments as maintenance and cure. Liberty Mutual intervened seeking reimbursement, arguing the worker could not retain both sets of benefits. The court granted summary judgment to the intervenor, holding that Texas workers' compensation and Jones Act remedies are mutually exclusive, that the worker's election of Jones Act benefits under Tex. Lab. Code § 406.075 barred further recovery under the state act, and that the full amount paid matched compensable elements of the maritime settlement, preventing double recovery.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In this case, Gulf Chemical and Cheminter sought a declaratory judgment that their insurer INA had a duty to defend them under a general liability policy in a products liability action brought by current and former Lone Star Steel employees alleging toxic exposure from chemicals, including molybdenum trioxide, supplied to the steel mill. The underlying Lone Star suit was filed against Gulf in October 1987, with additional plaintiffs intervening thereafter, while INA's policy coverage did not begin until June 1988. The court granted INA's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, holding that the policy excluded coverage for bodily injury expected from the insured's standpoint because Gulf had been notified of the claims and reasonably anticipated that the number of plaintiffs would grow substantially before the policy period started.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved plaintiffs Agri Export Cooperative and Bankers Trust Company seeking to enforce payment on a $1 million irrevocable letter of credit issued by Universal Savings Association in favor of Agri Export, which referenced an underlying promissory note and was governed by the UCP rules. After Universal refused payment on proper presentments in January and March 1987 without stating reasons, and after an extension of the expiration date, the plaintiffs sued; Universal was later placed under RTC receivership. The court decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full amount plus interest, fees, and costs, holding that Universal breached the letter of credit by wrongfully dishonoring the draft. The core reasoning was that presentment complied with the letter's terms, any objections were waived under UCP Article 16 due to lack of timely notice, the issuer's officer had authority to issue it, the letter of credit was independent of the underlying transaction, and neither the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) applied to bar recovery.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned the distribution of proceeds from a federal employee's life insurance policy issued under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act, where the deceased Carl Kiser had not named a beneficiary and state law defined eligibility for surviving children. Karen Tipps claimed that her daughter Lori was Carl Kiser's biological child entitled to half the funds, while his acknowledged son Steven Kiser contested this based on evidence of non-paternity. The court ruled that Lori was not Carl Kiser's child and ordered the remaining proceeds disbursed to Steven Kiser. Core reasoning centered on DNA fingerprinting tests, along with divorce records, the decedent's will, and witness testimony, that provided clear and convincing proof under applicable state law that Carl Kiser was not Lori's father.

family lawfederal power

In Smith v. Anadrill, Inc., the parents of a worker who died falling from an offshore drilling platform filed suit in Texas state court asserting claims under the Jones Act, Texas wrongful death and survival statutes, general maritime law, the Death on the High Seas Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. After a partial dismissal eliminated the Jones Act claim against the employer, the remaining defendants filed a notice of removal to federal court. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that removal was untimely because defendants did not file notice within thirty days after the federal claims under the Longshore Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act were asserted. The court denied the accompanying request for costs, fees, and sanctions, reasoning that those statutes provide federal question jurisdiction that is removable absent an express bar like the one in the Jones Act.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case is a limitation of liability proceeding arising from the structural failure of the oil tanker M/T ALVENUS in the Calcasieu Channel off Louisiana, which spilled about 66,000 barrels of crude oil that washed ashore on Texas beaches including Galveston. Various parties, including vessel owners Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. and Alvenus Shipping Co., Ltd., charterers, pilots, and the master, faced claims for pollution damages, vessel repairs, cargo loss, and cleanup costs under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and other theories. After bifurcated proceedings on liability issues, the court amended its prior findings to exonerate the owners and related entities Silver Line, Ltd. and Silver Navigation, Ltd. from all liability. The core reasoning was that the owners lacked knowledge of defective welds, performed reasonable inspections, and were not negligent, while the pilot and master followed customary procedures without fault or grounding.

environmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District, a high school senior participating in extracurricular activities sued the school district in a class action, challenging its policy of mandatory urinalysis drug testing for students in grades 6-12 who wished to join school-sponsored extracurriculars. After a bench trial, the district court granted a permanent injunction barring the district from excluding any student from curricular or extracurricular activities for refusing to submit to urine testing. The court found the policy amounted to unconstitutional warrantless searches, as the district lacked evidence of a significant drug problem tied to extracurricular activities or the school generally, and the privacy intrusion on students could not be justified by broad societal goals of substance abuse prevention, in contrast to the compelling interests identified in Supreme Court cases like Skinner and Von Raab involving high-risk employment contexts. Students' attendance at school does not reduce their privacy expectations to the degree required to uphold the program.

civil rights

The case involved American Savings seeking judgment on a promissory note guaranteed by the defendant in Texas state court, with the defendant filing a counterclaim. After American Savings was declared insolvent, FSLIC was appointed conservator, intervened in the state action, and removed the case to federal court more than thirty days after its appointment. The defendant moved to remand on grounds that removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The court granted remand, holding that the thirty-day removal period under 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) and § 1446(b) begins when FSLIC is appointed conservator rather than when it formally intervenes, because FSLIC already knows of its right to remove and to hold otherwise would permit tactical delays.

procedurefederal power

This case concerns a dispute between the trustees of the SLT Trust and two Price trusts over control of a 50% partnership interest in a Texas bank, which arose after the SLT Trust defaulted on a nonrecourse loan secured by its partnership interest. The loan and security agreement were assigned to Price II, which took possession of the collateral following default and sought to retain or sell the interest, leading to conflicts over management committee appointments, partnership continuation, and liability. The court interpreted Texas partnership statutes and UCC provisions on secured transactions to resolve multiple summary judgment issues, holding that the transfer of the interest caused dissolution of the original partnership but allowed the business to continue under the remaining partners with corresponding rules on liability and winding up. The core reasoning relied on specific sections of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act addressing dissolution, continuation of business after expulsion or transfer of interest, and the limited rights of a secured party absent default.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Patricia Hagaman suing Hasbro, Inc. for trademark infringement, claiming rights to the name "Wristimals" for a stuffed animal wristwatch toy that she conceived in January 1985 but never sold or publicly distributed. Hasbro developed a similar product called "Watchimals" and began selling it nationwide. The court granted summary judgment to Hasbro, holding that the federal Lanham Act did not apply due to lack of federal registration, and under Texas trademark law, Hagaman had not established ownership because she failed to make a sufficiently public use or distribution of the mark as required by the statute.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a quality assurance engineer at a nuclear project who reported violations of ASME and NRC codes and regulations to his supervisor, was transferred two days later, and later terminated; he sued in state court for wrongful discharge under Texas law based on Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck. The defendant removed the case to federal court, claiming the state claim was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act and the whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act, and the plaintiff moved to remand. The court granted reconsideration, vacated the magistrate's denial of remand, and remanded the case to state court, holding there was no federal question jurisdiction because the Texas wrongful discharge claim does not arise under federal law, the plaintiff's purely internal complaints fell outside the scope of the federal whistleblower statute, and removal was otherwise improvident.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Bobbye Kitchener, who borrowed a horse trailer from its owners (the Hardys) and sued the seller, T.C. Trailers, after her horse was injured by a hinge that she alleged was defectively manufactured. She asserted claims for negligence, warranty liability, products liability, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the DTPA claim. The core reasoning was that Kitchener did not qualify as a "consumer" under the DTPA's statutory definition, which requires acquisition of goods by purchase or lease; as a mere gratuitous borrower she was only an incidental beneficiary of the original sale, unlike the intended beneficiaries recognized in cases such as Kennedy v. Sale.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved the Railway Labor Executives’ Association seeking to enjoin Galveston Wharves from completing a sale/lease of its rail trackage, land, and assets to Galveston Railway, Inc., without prior notice or bargaining with employees, which the union argued violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act. The court found that the trackage constituted a rail line integral to interstate commerce, requiring Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approval, which had been granted for the transaction. It concluded that granting the requested injunction to preserve the status quo under the RLA would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the ICC’s order and inhibit a transaction within the ICC’s regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and dissolved the temporary restraining order.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a FELA and premises liability suit originally filed in Texas state court against a nondiverse defendant, Southern Pacific. After that defendant was voluntarily dismissed during trial following a settlement, the remaining diverse defendants (AT&T entities) attempted to remove the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that removal was improvident. The core reasoning was that removal statutes are strictly construed and require immediate notice of intent to remove when diversity arises during trial; the defendants' delay of at least fifteen minutes, plus their request for affirmative relief from the state court, was inconsistent with an intent to remove promptly and thus waived the right.

procedure

This case arose from a 1984 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico caused by a crack in the hull of the M/T ALVENUS, leading to over 375 claims by Galveston-area plaintiffs for various economic and physical damages. The court categorized claimants into three groups—those with only economic losses, those with tracking damages from third parties moving oil onto their property, and those with direct physical impact from the oil—and applied Fifth Circuit precedents from Testbank and Consolidated Aluminum. It granted summary judgment dismissing the first two categories on grounds that economic losses require physical damage to a proprietary interest and that tracking damages were not foreseeable due to intervening natural forces and human actions. The court allowed the third category to proceed, finding direct physical damages foreseeable and recoverable under traditional admiralty tort principles. It also denied class certification for a group of shrimpers due to insufficient numerosity and representativeness and ordered non-responsive claimants to answer interrogatories rather than entering default judgment.

environmentproceduretorts & liability

In Gagne v. City of Galveston, the plaintiffs sued the City of Galveston and its police department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after James Gagne, arrested for public intoxication, died by suicide in jail when officers failed to remove his belt or screen for suicidal tendencies, alleging negligence in training, policy, and precautions violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims. It reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to meet the required elements, including showing a constitutional deprivation inflicted pursuant to official policy with specific non-conclusory facts, as the conduct amounted only to negligence rather than deliberate indifference or a violation of federal rights.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over a specific wetland pond in Texas visited by migratory birds, and whether plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. The court declared that the pond was within federal jurisdiction, as agreed by the parties, and found that plaintiffs had standing regarding that specific pond but not for broader nationwide relief. It also held that the agency's interpretation of the statute was subject to judicial review rather than being a discretionary non-enforcement decision, but denied relief against non-federal defendants and other prayers for relief.

environmentfederal power

In this case, plaintiff Salvadore Farina sued Southwestern Bell Media after the company failed to publish an advertisement for his business as required by their contract, asserting claims for breach of contract, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, tort (including negligence and gross negligence), and antitrust laws. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were limited to contract remedies and that liability was capped by the agreement's terms. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the DTPA, tort, and antitrust claims while limiting contract damages to the amount paid for the ad. It reasoned that a complete failure to perform (nonfeasance) does not create tort or DTPA liability absent an independent duty, fraud, or physical harm, distinguishing the facts from the misfeasance in the controlling Fifth Circuit precedent of Helms v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.; the antitrust allegations also failed to state a viable claim under federal or state law. The court further upheld the contract's limitations clause despite the plaintiff's assertions of unequal bargaining power.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure