This case involved a class of oil, gas, and chemical inspectors suing their employer, Inspectorate America Corporation, under the Fair Labor Standards Act for improper use of the fluctuating workweek method to calculate overtime pay. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the employer's payment practices violated FLSA requirements for the fluctuating workweek method because salary deductions were made for certain absences and the first 90 days of employment, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages. The court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant on the method for calculating the regular hourly rate for damages and on the statute of limitations, applying the two-year period rather than three because the violations were not willful. The core reasoning was that the employer's deduction policies and premium structures did not satisfy the fixed-salary prerequisites for the fluctuating workweek method, but audits by the Department of Labor and lack of evidence of evasion meant the employer did not act willfully.
The case involved a lawsuit by the daughter of a KBR contractor killed by U.S. military friendly fire in Iraq, alleging negligence, wrongful death, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and related claims based on the company's failure to provide proper instructions and its alleged misrepresentations about the cause of death. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), holding that most claims were preempted by the Defense Base Act, which provides the exclusive remedy for accidental job-related injuries to covered contractors working overseas. The court reasoned that the DBA barred tort claims flowing from the covered accidental death but did not bar the IIED claim, which arose from a separate direct injury to the plaintiff caused by the post-death misrepresentations. The court therefore dismissed the negligence, wrongful death, fraud, survivorship, and conspiracy claims but allowed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to proceed.
In United States v. Kim, the defendant, a former employee of an energy company, moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant authorizing seizure of items related to alleged unauthorized computer access under 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The warrant was based on IP address logs linking intrusion attempts to the defendant's address after his suspension. During the search, agents discovered encrypted folders on a computer and spent months decrypting them, uncovering what appeared to be child pornography, though no evidence of computer intrusion was found on that device and the folders predated the alleged intrusions. The court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the agents exceeded the warrant's scope by searching the encrypted folders for child pornography rather than evidence of computer intrusion, as the affidavit and timeline did not support such a search and the magistrate had explicitly denied a related request.
The case involved plaintiffs Rin Tin Tin, Inc. and Daphne Hereford, who own U.S. trademarks and service marks for "Rin Tin Tin" in connection with their German Shepherd dog breeding program, museum, and related services, suing defendants First Look Studios and others for trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas law. The claims arose after defendants released a DVD movie titled "Finding Rin Tin Tin: The Adventure Continues" about the historical dog without plaintiffs' permission. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that they established the fair use defense because the title descriptively identified the film's subject matter about the real Rin Tin Tin, was used in good faith with proper attribution to the film's producers, and was protected by the First Amendment from both federal and state claims. The court further found no material factual disputes on the fair use elements and that the First Amendment defense extended to bar the state-law claims as well.
In Cushman v. GC Services, LP, plaintiff Naomi Cushman sued defendant GC Services, a debt collector, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA), and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) based on calls and communications regarding her unpaid American Express credit card debt, including claims of aggressive tactics, threats of wage garnishment, and employer contact. The court considered the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the DTPA and TDCPA claims. It granted the motion as to the DTPA claim, ruling that Cushman lacked standing because she did not qualify as a 'consumer' under the DTPA definition tied to the purchase or lease of goods or services, and the TDCPA's tie-in provision did not exempt that requirement as confirmed by Texas Supreme Court precedent like Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel. The court denied the motion as to the TDCPA claim, allowing it to proceed.
The case involved Houston Balloons & Promotions, LLC and Purtee & Associates, Ltd., businesses that lease inflatable balloons for commercial advertising, suing the City of Houston over regulations in the Sign Code and Section 28-37 governing attention-getting devices (AGDs), including inflatables, which plaintiffs claimed violated their rights to free expression and equal protection under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The City moved for partial summary judgment, arguing among other things that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a First Amendment challenge because the regulations primarily restricted their customers' speech rather than their own. The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the claim on behalf of their customers, as overbreadth standing does not apply in this commercial speech context and economic incentives would encourage customers to sue directly if their speech were chilled, but noted that a new ordinance banning all AGDs effective in 2010 would give plaintiffs direct standing. Accordingly, the court denied the motion without prejudice, granted plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to challenge the new regulations, and directed the parties to prepare a new scheduling order.
