Rosemary Barkett

This case involves the Florida Supreme Court's ongoing implementation of family court divisions in the state's circuit courts, following its 1991 opinion that required each circuit to establish such a division or coordination mechanism for family law matters. After reviewing local rules and administrative orders submitted by the circuits and convening a 1993 workshop with circuit delegations, the court clarified expectations for a unified approach. The court directed that each circuit create an administratively coordinated family division to handle cases including dissolutions of marriage, custody, support, adoption, paternity, domestic violence, juvenile delinquency and dependency, and termination of parental rights, with two key requirements: dedicated case management staff and an appointed administrative judge responsible for oversight and planning. The reasoning centers on accommodating local variations in geography, resources, and caseloads while ensuring comprehensive coordination of all matters affecting a single family, supported by linkages to community services and a new statewide committee to develop model guidelines and recommendations.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether an individual condominium unit owner could sue a developer and general contractor for alleged construction defects in the common elements of the condominium, where the owner had no defects in their own unit and the claims involved duties owed to all owners. The Florida Supreme Court held that a unit owner has standing to bring such an action because they hold an undivided ownership interest in the common elements, making them a real party in interest under the rules of civil procedure. The court further ruled that the unit owner must represent the interests of the other owners in the suit. The reasoning emphasized that courts determine standing based on protectible property interests, that the Condominium Act regulates but does not eliminate individual owners' rights to sue, and that the association's authority to act does not bar owners from proceeding individually.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether a trial court must individually consider each statutory criterion under sections 39.059(7)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, before sentencing a juvenile as an adult and whether those findings must be reduced to writing at the time of sentencing. Antonio Troutman, a sixteen-year-old with no significant prior record, pleaded nolo contendere to false imprisonment and grand theft; the trial court imposed adult sanctions consisting of probation after a predisposition report recommended juvenile community control, with a written order filed three days later. The Florida Supreme Court held that trial courts must evaluate each criterion with an individualized assessment and contemporaneously reduce findings to writing, as the statute makes these steps mandatory. The court quashed the district court's decision upholding the sentence, finding that the trial court's actions did not comply with the statutory requirements. The reasoning centered on legislative policy favoring differential treatment of juveniles and the explicit mandatory language in the juvenile justice statutes.

criminal law

The case involved Patricia Dubreuil, a Jehovah's Witness who refused blood transfusions after an emergency C-section due to her religious beliefs, despite medical advice that they were necessary to save her life; the hospital petitioned for court authorization to administer transfusions over her objections, citing the risk that her death would abandon her four minor children. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's ruling that had upheld the hospital's authority to proceed with the transfusions. The court held that the state interest in preventing abandonment of minor children did not override the patient's constitutional rights to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds where no actual abandonment was shown, as extended family and friends were available to care for the children and the estranged husband could not override her wishes. The decision emphasized that the patient's autonomy and religious liberty prevail absent proof that her death would impose a burden on the state.

religious libertycivil rightshealthcarefamily law

This case involves Richard Harold Anderson's appeal from a trial court's summary denial of his motion to vacate his murder conviction and death sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied the motion because it was not properly sworn and was facially insufficient. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial regarding the oath requirement but held it should be without prejudice, and reversed on the merits because Anderson was entitled to access public records to support his claims before the motion could be dismissed. The court remanded the case to allow Anderson to obtain the records and amend his motion accordingly.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jacobs Wind Electric Company, which patented a tidal flow system to prevent water stagnation and showed it to state officials, after which the Florida Department of Transportation installed a similar system without a license. Jacobs sued in federal court for patent infringement but the suit was dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds; it then brought takings and conversion claims in state court seeking just compensation. The circuit court allowed the suit, but the district court granted prohibition, ruling that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related claims. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that state courts have jurisdiction over the takings and conversion claims because Congress did not intend to preempt them from state review even when a patent is involved, as the claims do not arise solely under patent law.

propertyfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Jones, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision that reversed a defendant's convictions for two counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve. The district court had held that statements identifying the defendant, made by the child victim to physicians affiliated with a child protection team, were inadmissible hearsay not qualifying for the medical diagnosis or treatment exception under section 90.803(4) of the Florida Evidence Code. The Supreme Court quashed the district court's ruling, determining that the statements were admissible under the medical exception because they were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment. The court noted that the Florida Legislature had enacted a specific hearsay exception in section 90.803(23) to address child abuse statements while balancing reliability concerns, rendering further analysis of the child protection team's investigatory role unnecessary.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a homeowners insurance policy issued to Nicholas Castellano and whether its intentional injury exclusion clause barred coverage for injuries sustained by Larry Swindal when Castellano's gun discharged during an argument and chase. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased and answered a certified question in the negative, holding that coverage is not excluded if the gun discharged accidentally without the insured expecting or intending bodily injury. The court reasoned that the policy excludes coverage only for injuries directly resulting from an intentional act where harm was intended, and remanded for a factual determination on whether the discharge was intentional or negligent.

torts & liabilityguns

The case involved Roy Dwayne Thomason, who was charged with armed kidnapping and armed sexual battery. During his trial, after the State rested and the defense had presented several witnesses, the trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial over the objections of both parties, citing concerns about defense counsel's physical condition and ability to proceed based on the judge's observations. Thomason moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, but the motion was denied, leading to his nolo contendere plea and probation after the district court affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court held that double jeopardy under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution barred retrial, reasoning that manifest necessity for the mistrial was not established because the judge failed to consider or reject alternatives such as a continuance and relied primarily on subjective impressions rather than objective evidence of counsel's incapacity.

criminal lawprocedure

In Conley v. State, the petitioner was convicted of armed burglary, three counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and armed robbery with a firearm after a trial in which the State introduced a police dispatch report (relaying an unidentified caller's account of a man chasing a woman with a gun) through an officer's testimony and a victim's statement to an examining physician. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the convictions and vacated the sentences, holding that the dispatch testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was used to prove the truth of the asserted facts rather than merely to explain the officers' presence, in violation of the rule from State v. Baird that such accusatory out-of-court statements are prejudicial and not relevant to establish a logical sequence of events. The Court further found error in admitting the victim's statement to the physician, which was not made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, and determined that the combined evidentiary errors were harmful given the lack of corroboration on the firearm issue, requiring remand for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a split sentence of incarceration followed by consecutive probationary periods across three separate criminal cases violated Florida Statutes section 948.01(8), which requires probation to begin immediately upon release from incarceration without a time gap. The Florida Supreme Court held that the statute applies to the overall sentencing event rather than requiring immediate probation for each individual case, so long as all incarcerative portions are completed before any probation begins. The court reasoned that the statute's immediacy requirement corresponds to the single sentencing for all counts or cases, not per-case timing, and approved the district court's affirmance of the sentence while disapproving conflicting precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two minors charged under a Sanford, Florida city ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding the ordinance facially unconstitutional on grounds including overbreadth infringing First Amendment rights, vagueness, due process violations, and Fourth Amendment issues, but the district court reversed and upheld the ordinance. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision and invalidated the ordinance in its entirety, holding that it was vague, overbroad, and violative of substantive due process for reasons set forth in prior decisions striking down similar loitering ordinances.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights

The case concerned Renetha Wyche's conviction under Tampa City Code section 24-61 for loitering for the purpose of prostitution after police observed her waving to passersby and entering a vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a certified question on the ordinance's facial constitutionality and held it unconstitutional, quashing the district court's affirmance of the conviction. The court reasoned that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad because it could criminalize protected First Amendment activities such as talking, waving, or walking in public, particularly for those previously convicted of prostitution; it was also vague in allowing enforcement based on officers' discretion, punished innocent conduct in violation of substantive due process, and imposed penalties exceeding those in comparable state statutes.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved Oliver Holliday, who was charged under a Tampa city ordinance prohibiting loitering in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of illegally using, possessing, transferring, or selling controlled substances, and who pled no contest while challenging the ordinance's facial validity on grounds including vagueness, overbreadth affecting First Amendment association rights, and substantive due process violations. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding that section 24-43 of the City of Tampa Code is facially unconstitutional. Relying on its decision in Wyche v. State invalidating a similar loitering ordinance targeting prostitution, the court found this ordinance vague, overbroad, and violative of substantive due process.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involves Louis B. Gaskin, who was convicted and sentenced to death in Florida for two murders. Following a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in light of Espinosa v. Florida, which invalidated a jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed whether that instruction affected Gaskin's sentencing. The court determined that Gaskin had not preserved the issue by objecting to the instruction at trial, so it was not reviewable. Additionally, any error from the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt regarding one of the murders, leading the court to affirm the death sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

In Thomas v. State, the petitioner was stopped and arrested by police in Orlando for riding a bicycle without a required bell or gong under a city ordinance; a search incident to that arrest revealed a handgun, leading to a state charge of carrying a concealed firearm. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed certified questions on whether a municipality could enforce such an ordinance via arrest and impose criminal penalties, in light of state statutes in chapters 316 and 318 that treat bicycle and traffic violations as noncriminal infractions subject only to civil penalties. The court concluded that the ordinance conflicted with state law by authorizing criminal penalties for conduct the legislature had decriminalized, rendering the arrest invalid for this purpose, though it approved the conviction on other grounds while disapproving the lower court's reasoning regarding municipal authority. The decision declined to fully resolve the second certified question on the scope of home-rule powers to impose criminal sanctions for ordinance violations after the repeal of section 165.19.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant who had received a downward departure sentence of community control rather than prison after pleading guilty to robbery and auto theft while on probation for other offenses. The trial court initially failed to provide contemporaneous written reasons for the departure, leading to reversal on appeal and resentencing; after the defendant was later ordered to prison following a violation, the question arose whether he could receive credit for time already served on community control. The Florida Supreme Court held that credit must be given under these facts. The core reasoning was that community control constitutes a more coercive form of supervision than probation, the defendant had not violated the terms of his sentence, and it would be inequitable to penalize him for the trial court's procedural error in failing to issue written reasons.

criminal lawprocedure

The case consolidated six petitions involving juveniles found in contempt of court—four dependent children for violating orders against running away or skipping school, and two delinquent juveniles for direct contempt—and sentenced to secure detention facilities. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed whether such incarceration was allowed under chapter 39 of the Florida statutes, the Juvenile Justice Act. The court reasoned that although judges possess inherent authority to adjudicate contempt, the legislature holds power to restrict available sanctions, and the 1988 amendments demonstrated clear intent to limit secure detention to cases showing clear risk of danger, flight, or further violations, rather than as punishment for contempt. The decisions below were quashed in light of this statutory framework.

criminal lawfamily law

The case concerned whether the Florida Constitution's homestead exemption protects a personal residence from civil forfeiture under the state RICO Act when the property was used in racketeering activity such as bookmaking. The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that homestead property is not subject to RICO forfeiture and approving the district court's reversal of summary judgment for the State. The court reasoned that article X, section 4 exempts homesteads from forced sale under process of any court except for three narrow categories (taxes, purchase/improvement obligations, and labor on the property), that forfeiture constitutes a forced taking without owner consent, and that the exemption must be liberally construed in its natural meaning rather than limited to debtor-creditor contexts. It rejected arguments that the exemption does not apply outside debt cases or to property used in criminal enterprises, distinguishing prior equitable-lien cases that fell within the stated exceptions.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a challenge to the Town of Longboat Key's creation by ordinance of a special district spanning parts of two counties to fund beach renourishment through $14 million in general obligation bonds. Property owners intervened to argue that the district was independent under Florida Statutes chapter 189 because it crossed county lines and thus could only be created by the legislature, not by municipal ordinance, and that the ordinances were otherwise procedurally defective. The Florida Supreme Court held that the district was an independent special district under the plain language of section 189.403(3), rendering its creation by ordinance invalid and preventing bond validation. The core reasoning rested on statutory interpretation principles, emphasizing that the legislature clearly distinguished creation methods for dependent versus independent districts to ensure uniformity, and rejected arguments that the multi-county definition created ambiguity or conflict with merger provisions.

environmentbusiness & regulatory