Chanh Lovan, a Laotian citizen and U.S. lawful permanent resident, was convicted in 1991 of sexually abusing a child and later traveled abroad and returned in 2002; removal proceedings began when he applied for naturalization, based on a 1996 law classifying the conviction as an aggravated felony. Lovan sought discretionary relief from deportation under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which the Board of Immigration Appeals denied on remand after applying a statutory-counterpart analysis to find him ineligible. The Eighth Circuit granted Lovan’s petition for review and ordered the Attorney General to exercise § 212(c) discretion. The court reasoned that, under the retroactivity analysis in INS v. St. Cyr, Lovan would have qualified for nunc pro tunc § 212(c) relief at the time of the statute’s 1996 repeal because precedents such as In re G-A- allowed such waivers for returning permanent residents whose convictions also rendered them excludable, and the BIA improperly ignored that pre-repeal legal landscape.
Clifton D. Taylor was convicted of bank robbery after he waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial in the Western District of Missouri. On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by repeatedly denying his requests for substitute appointed counsel, which he claimed rendered his waiver of counsel involuntary under the Sixth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Taylor’s complaints about counsel were based on counsel’s refusal to file baseless pro se motions alleging government misconduct and that there was no breakdown in communication, only Taylor’s unwillingness to cooperate with competent counsel. The court further reasoned that because Taylor had no good cause for new counsel, his persistent demands amounted to a knowing and voluntary waiver, and the district court had properly warned him of the risks of self-representation.
The case involved George Stokes's claim of malicious prosecution under Arkansas law against Southern States Cooperative (SSC) after SSC sued him to enforce a loan guaranty on crop inputs sold to his tenant farmer. The district court granted summary judgment to SSC, concluding Stokes failed to show SSC lacked probable cause or acted with malice. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a jury could reasonably find SSC misapplied the tenant's payments to an unguaranteed note held by a related entity, failed to disclose this or provide an accounting, and pursued the suit for an improper purpose. The court determined these facts created genuine issues on the elements of probable cause and malice when viewed in the light most favorable to Stokes.
Wanda Slater, as assignee of LCI Equipment's rights under a commercial general liability policy, sued Republic-Vanguard Insurance in Arkansas state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy required the insurer to defend and indemnify LCI against her wrongful death claims arising from a tractor rollover accident allegedly caused by the lack of a rollover protection system. Republic removed the case to federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, concluding that coverage was barred by the policy's Products/Completed-Operations exclusion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that LCI was a nominal plaintiff whose presence did not destroy diversity jurisdiction and that the claims, including those framed as negligence, fell within the exclusion under applicable Texas law interpreting products liability actions.
This case involved defendant Randy Lee Vanhorn's appeal of a district court order revoking his supervised release. Vanhorn had been convicted years earlier of mail fraud and money laundering; after a prior revocation for committing a state crime, the court imposed a new supervised release term that included six months in a halfway house. When his probation officer attempted to arrange placement, Vanhorn repeatedly stated he would not go to any halfway house and sent a threatening email to one facility, leading the government to seek revocation before any placement was finalized. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding Vanhorn violated the condition because his statements and conduct demonstrated an absolute refusal to comply, regardless of whether a specific placement or report date had been offered.
The case involved Doyle C. Alcorn, who was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) after officers discovered marijuana plants and a shotgun at his home during multiple visits. A jury found Alcorn guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to two concurrent twenty-month terms. Alcorn appealed, arguing that the district court erred by providing only a general unanimity instruction to the jury, by denying his requested instruction on entrapment by estoppel, and by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions, concluding that the general unanimity instruction was adequate, that no evidence supported an entrapment by estoppel defense because no government official had affirmatively assured Alcorn his conduct was legal, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
